Plus ça change…: The Effects of Nationalism and Electoral Competition on Immigration and Integration Policy Proposals in Quebec, 1976-2014 by Rivard, Alexandre B.
Plus ça change…: The Effects of Nationalism and Electoral Competition on Immigration and 









































A Thesis in the Department of Political Science 
Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at 
Concordia University, 






“Plus ça change…: The Effects of Nationalism and Electoral Competition on Immigration and 
Integration Policy Proposals in Quebec, 1976-2014” 
Alexandre Rivard 
 
This work is a comprehensive study of immigration and integration policy proposals made by the 
Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) and the Parti Québécois (PQ) through the 11 elections that took 
place from 1976-2016. Where the PLQ is a federalist provincial party, the PQ is the PLQ’s 
primary opponent and represents the province’s sovereignist ambitions. However, this work 
posits that the PLQ and PQ propose similar immigration and integration policy proposals. Where 
one might expect to see a stark contrast between the parties’ proposed ethnocultural diversity 
management policies, we see periods of significant convergence—both parties, in fact, propose 
similar policies as a whole. Furthermore, this work examines the impact that nationalism and 
electoral competition maintained over the parties’ policy proposals. Simply put, this work argues 
that nationalism is incredibly important for both parties but both parties largely proposed 
inclusive and pluralist ethnocultural diversity management proposals. The theory of brokerage 
politics has been applied in order to explain this convergence, in effect demonstrating that the 
parties converge on this policy area in order to appeal to the greatest number of voters as 
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Quebec presents itself as a fascinating case study in political science. As a society that has 
claimed distinct status and, indeed, nationhood, it has managed to change the lens through which 
it views itself. In a little less than a decade—through the shifts brought about by the Quiet 
Revolution—Quebecers went from originally conceiving their nation as ethnic, to viewing it in 
civic terms. No longer was the path to being accepted limited and blocked off to those who were 
not born in the province; instead Quebec’s rapid social transformation in the 1960s allowed for 
the discourse surrounding both nationalism and ethnocultural diversity management to change—
newcomers to Quebec were now accepted and encouraged to integrate and participate in Quebec 
society. With the election of the Parti Québécois (PQ) in 1976, a new two-party system in 
Quebec emerged between the sovereignist PQ and federalist Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ). 
These two parties became the only ones to form government in the province from 1976 onwards 
and exemplified the sovereignist-federalist divide that has long characterized Quebec’s political 
history.  
 While a considerable amount of academic research has been spent tracing the 
nationalistic origins, tendencies, and evolution of nationalism within Quebec, little attention has 
been focused on the relationship between nationalism, the desire for political independence, and 
its relationship with immigration and ethnocultural diversity management
1
. More specifically, 
there exists a lacuna in the literature concerning to what extent nationalism affects immigration 
and integration policy
2
. With the dominant two-party system and the sovereignist-federalist 
divide, one might expect that the two parties that have formed government in Quebec since 1976 
                                                 
1
 In line with Salée’s work (2007; 2010) on ‘ethnocultural diversity management’, ethnocultural diversity 
management is defined as the combination of immigration and integration policies. Because immigration and 
integration policy proposals actively seek to ‘manage’ diversity and newcomers’ integration into a new society, the 
combination of these measures into the singular form as ‘ethnocultural diversity management’ accounts for the 
aspect of this management regarding both immigration and integration. 
 
2
 Where immigration and integration policy proposals combine to form ‘ethnocultural diversity management’, the 
two cannot be separated as, particularly in Quebec, immigration and integration policy play a particularly vital role 
in the debate surrounding accommodation, who is being accommodated, and the identification of the Other. 
Furthermore, both policy areas are often joined together in both the PQ and PLQ’s electoral platforms. Where 
immigration policy largely concerns the selection of immigrants (where they come from, efforts to recruit more 
immigrants from different regions) and target numbers; integration policy is defined in this thesis as the proposed 
policies which seek to integrate newcomers into Quebec society, thus taking into account how they are integrated, 
whether through a commitment to ensuring the practice and mastering of the French language, signed societal 
integration contracts, or overt references within election platforms towards ‘integrating’ into ‘Quebec society’ and 
by determining whether these integrative measures are more open and pluralist—or whether they are offer restrictive 
proposals which seek to limit cultural differences among newcomers. 
 2 
would propose strikingly different integration and immigration policies that are more in line with 
their respective ideologies. Thus, one could rightly assume that the pro-sovereignty PQ proposed 
policies that ultimately sought to advance the independence movement; while the PLQ in effect 
counteracted the PQ by proposing policies that were more favourable to Canadian integration.  
 Instead what emerges, and what is the central argument of this thesis, is a historical 
pattern of similar policy proposals by both governments that (i) are pluralist in nature, and (ii) 
does not necessarily seek to advance the independence project. These similar policy proposals 
are a result of Quebec’s two-party system whereby the PLQ and PQ act as rational vote-
maximizing agents seeking to capitalize on common public sentiment concerning strategies of 
ethnocultural diversity management. What is unclear, however, is whether these converging 
promises are affected by the political reality of Quebec nationalism. This work will examine two 
independent variables, (i) party competition/pragmatic vote maximization, and (ii) nationalism in 
order to determine which of these IVs has a greater influence on the dependent variable, 
immigration and integration policy proposals
3
. This work operationalizes ‘policy proposals’ as 
the proposed immigration and integration strategies, tools, and outputs made by the PLQ and PQ 
in their election platforms. It is this work’s opinion that the first independent variable (party 
competition) is more influential in the converging of these policy proposals than is nationalism. 
 Although this work is interested in examining the relationship between nationalism and 
immigration and integration, it is not interested in policy change per se. Instead, it seeks to 
understand the evolutionary process of proposed policies by each political party over time and 
the concrete actions undertaken by each party once in government. Therefore, election programs 
will be used as the primary source of evidence in order to analyze the evolution of rhetoric and 
policy over time. This thesis is not concerned with policy change but is primarily concerned with 
policy promises. 
 The outline of the thesis is as follows. First, the introductory chapter discusses the 
research questions, the analytical puzzle, and the relevance of the work proposed here. Chapter 
One is a review of the relevant literature on party ideology, party competition, Quebec 
                                                 
 
3
 Policy proposals are defined in this thesis as a combination of two important aspects of election programs. First, 
the outright promises and proposals within the document itself (“s’engage”). Second, the relevant parts of platform 
sections dealing with immigration and integration which are not specifically proposals; these include the 
introduction to the section, the language throughout, recognitions, and how the proposals are framed within the 
section. This allows for an analysis of immigration and integration within electoral platforms which encompass both 
concrete proposals and the document’s section as a whole. 
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nationalism, and immigration and integration. Chapter Two discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings of the thesis, notably Benedict Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined community’ and the 
notion of ‘brokerage politics’. The proposed immigration and integration policies from 1976-
2014 are discussed at length in Chapters Three (immigration) and Four (integration) respectively. 
The analysis proceeds along identified major themes over time. As the analysis points to the 
existence of convergence between the two parties, Chapter Five attempts to explain this 
unexpected outcome through brokerage politics. In essence, the nation affirming, protectionist, 
and pluralist classification seek to identify the influence of nationalism on the policy proposals 
while brokerage politics seeks answer why these two parties with different perspectives 
concerning the Canadian federation offer similar ethnocultural diversity management policies. 
The conclusion summarizes the findings, discusses some of the limitations of the work, and 
highlights areas for future research. 
 
Research Question 
The research questions stem from the relevant literature concerning both nationalism and party 
competition. While there has been considerable work done on theories of nationalism and 
Quebec nationalism, little has been done to examine the intersection of nationalism and public 
policy, specifically concerning how nationalism affects public policy. Béland and Lecours 
(2008) do an excellent job of discussing the nexus of nationalism and social policy but do not 
extend their analysis into the realm of immigration and integration policy. Indeed, the first 
research question has been tangentially extracted from their work: Does nationalism affect 
immigration and integration policies and if so, to what extent? 
 The second research question is based on the literature that concerns party competition. 
Simply put: Does electoral competition affect immigration and integration policy proposals 
(Downs 1957; Lever and Hunt 1992; Robertson 1976)? So it is possible that the similarities in 
immigration and integration policies between the PQ and PLQ have largely been shaped through 
the party competition model where each party has to appeal to the largest possible electorate 
through brokering diverse interests (Brodie and Jenson 1996; Carty and Cross 2010; Jenson 
1995). Therefore, the relationship between parties and party competition raises questions 
concerning both nationalism and party competition, particularly if there is no significant 




Political ideology is an important factor for political parties. Indeed, parties manifest themselves 
through the mobilization of like-minded individuals in order to compete for political power. The 
competition for political power allows for parties to differentiate between themselves while 
making explicit their views to potential voters. Voters, then, have readily identifiable alternatives 
for whom they are to cast their votes. For individuals where transaction costs may be too high 
(e.g. not enough time read party platforms) but already know their own personal political 
ideology, political parties that divide themselves by ideology are cogent vehicles through which 
to identify which party they support (Downs 1957). Therefore, individuals can come to support a 
party based on ideology without acquiring full information about their party specifics. Because 
ideologies are public distinctions between competing parties, parties create and propose differing 
policies which are, in theory, congruent with their adopted ideology. Thus the delineation 
between social-democratic and conservative parties should be apparent in the policies they 
propose. 
 Quebec, however, is in a unique political circumstance. As a substate nation, Quebec has 
twice asked its population for political independence from Canada and has been governed by just 
two parties since 1976. These two parties have come to articulate the sovereignist-federalist 
divide that has defined Quebec’s political reality since the Quiet Revolution. These two parties 
explicitly, and effectively, communicate their differing positions concerning Quebec’s place 
within Canada. While the parties’ respective ideologies concerning Quebec’s political 
independence manifest themselves in their general policy predispositions, one could rightly 
expect that these ideologies will extend to ethnocultural diversity management. Quebec is a 
substate nation whose members are bound together through a shared common history and linked 
future. They constitute what Benedict Anderson (2006) has called an ‘imagined community’. As 
such, they have been subject to considerable uncertainty concerning their future as a group.  
 Home to a linguistic minority within a large North American Anglophone hegemon, 
Quebec has sought to ensure the continued survival of both its national identity and the French 
language. Immigration has added to the province’s uncertain situation by bringing newcomers to 
Quebec who may not have been familiar with the French language—the quintessential tenet of 
Quebec citizenship. With two parties promoting different political ideologies, however, their 
ideological difference concerning immigration ought to become apparent. On the one hand, one 
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could logically expect the pro-nationalist and pro-independence Parti Québécois to extend this 
ideology to ethnocultural diversity management practices by proposing policies which sought to 
defend the nation’s uniqueness and force the imposition of this uniqueness onto newcomers. 
Because the PQ’s raison d’être is the secession of Quebec from Canada, one logically expects 
the PQ to impact this desire for sovereignty through its immigration and integration policies, that 
is by effectively proposing policies which facilitated the immigration of those who are more 
sympathetic to the sovereignty project and by advancing integrative measures which aim to 
‘woo’ newcomers to the sovereignist project in order to increase the likelihood of a successful 
referendum. Given the PQ’s focus on the preservation of the Quebec national identity, one may 
also expect the Party to advocate a strict restriction of immigration in order to ensure that those 
who are immigrating to Quebec are not putting the imagined community at risk. On the other 
hand, the federalist PLQ could propose ethnocultural diversity management policies which 
counter act the PQ’s by instilling integrative measures that stress the importance of pan-
Canadian multicultural unity over the Quebecois nation, in effect ensuring integration into 
Canada at the expense of Quebec. As will be shown later, Quebec’s two main political parties do 
not, in fact, propose ethnocultural diversity management policies that engage with their 
respective ideology. Instead the parties propose policies which effectively converge over time. 
Far from being distinct in their policy proposals, the two parties’ proposed policies led to 
convergence (despite being punctuated by brief periods of divergence). Hence the puzzle, why 
do the PQ’s predisposition to political independence and the PLQ’s predisposition to the 




While it is possible to find research that examines the nexus of social policy and nationalism 
(Béland and Lecours 2008), immigration in liberal states (Freeman 1995; Good 2009; Joppke 
2005; Koopmans et al. 2005), and immigration in stateless nations (Barker 2015; Bilodeau and 
Turgeon 2015; Helly 1996; Kymlicka 2001; Juteau 2002; Winter 2011), there is a lacuna in the 
literature on the link between nationalism, immigration, and immigrant integration policies. 
Although specialized literature explicitly recognizes that party ideology plays an important role 
in policy outputs (Castles and McKinlay 1979; Consterdine 2015; Hartmann 2014; Hinnfors et 
al. 2012), this thesis demonstrates that this is not the case in Quebec due to both (i) electoral 
 6 
competition and (ii) the influence of nationalism in public discourse. In so doing, it will shed 
more light on the way nationalism impacts our understanding of public policy. 
 As the notion of brokerage politics has rarely been applied to provincial cases (Wesley 
2009), its application to the Quebec case is a unique opportunity to apply a theoretical 
framework which will help better understand electoral competition and brokerage politics at the 
substate level. This thesis, then, takes its relevance on two fronts (i) the original contribution to 
better understanding the relationship between substate nationalism and policy proposals; and (ii) 
the unique application of brokerage politics to the provincial level in order to evaluate the results 
of electoral competition at the substate level through a lens which has traditionally been 
deployed as a tool to examine federal party electoral behaviour.  
 7 
Chapter I: Literature Review 
The literature on the various theories of nationalism is complex, nuanced, and voluminous. 
Because of the importance that nationalism maintains in the study of politics, particularly of sub-
state nations, much work has been done specifically on Quebec nationalism and its 
manifestations throughout the province’s history. Be that as it may, the relationship between 
nationalism and public policy has been little explored. More specifically, there exists a lacuna 
concerning the relationship between how nationalism affects immigration and integration 
policies. The literature on Quebec nationalism, which is interesting and influential, is large with 
considerable variation concerning what each author is trying to explain, and there remains an 
exciting opportunity to extend the study of Quebec nationalism to the policy choices made by the 
two political parties concerning immigration and integration. Identifying how Quebec’s political 
parties conceptualize their ethnocultural diversity management policies will help elucidate the 
relationship between nationalism and immigration and integration policy.  
 
Quebec Nationalism 
Although primarily talking about immigrant integration and citizenship, Danielle Juteau (2002) 
briefly presents a historical outline of Quebec nationalism. She identifies three aspects of 
nationalism beginning with the concept of French-Canadians’ survivance, the struggle to 
maintain the French language and the collectivity’s culture (Juteau 2002, 442); the changing 
dynamic of the emerging national community during the Quiet Revolution until the 1980s 
(Juteau 2002, 443); and from 1980 through 1995, an era filled with constitutional drama and two 
referenda (Juteau 2002, 444). The identification of the historic trend of nationalism in Quebec is 
further expanded upon by Rocher (2002) who, like Juteau, identifies Quebec nationalism in three 
waves: the statist wave, or the “dynamism of state action”; the marked decline of nationalism in 
the 1980s due to the success of the Quiet Revolution and the middle class; and market 
nationalism and the growth of the private sector (Rocher 2002, 80). The first wave, statist 
nationalism, occurred during the Quiet Revolution, culminating in an ideological shift in the 
discourse of citizenship and integration under the Johnson government (Rocher 2002, 77). It was 
through the Johnson administration that the old definition of citizenship “essentially based on 
ethnicity [was now] based on territoriality” (Rocher 2002, 77). It was through the growth of the 
state and the modernization that occurred that allowed French-Canadians to primarily achieve 
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three things: the first was to take back control of the economy and institutions away from the 
then influential Anglophone minority, the second was to change dialogue away from highly 
ethnic and blood-based to a civic and territorial conception, and finally to replace the term 
French-Canadian which had two inherent ascribed characteristics associated with it to a more 
vague and open conception of Quebecois.  
 Seymour (2000) articulates the difference between the concepts of the ethnic nation and 
civic nation. Where ethnic nationalism is based upon the perception of “the biological superiority 
of one group over the others” (Seymour 2000, 232), the concept of the ethnic nation consists of 
“individuals who have the same ancestry or who believe that they have the same ancestry” 
(Seymour 2000, 232 emphasis in original), and the concept of the civic nation which equates the 
nation with the sovereign state (Seymour 2000, 233). By touching on the theoretical works of 
nationalism and differentiating between the nation and nationalism, he, like Rocher and Juteau, 
demonstrates that “Quebeckers used to represent themselves as members of a purely cultural 
French Canadian nation, and they now see themselves as part of the Quebec nation understood in 
the sociopolitical sense” (Seymour 2000, 239). This conception of the Quebec nation as a 
sociopolitical construct is expanded upon by Balthazar (2001) who builds on the construct and 
adds that “le nationalisme québécois […] est un phénomène plus large que l’aspiration à la 
souveraineté. On peut être nationaliste au Québec sans être souverainiste” (Balthazar 2001, 195). 
For Balthazar, the historical emancipation from the ethnic definition has created a nationalism 
that allows for the acceptance of pluralism, multiethnic diversity, and a collective identity 
culminating into the autonomist movement (Balthazar 2001, 202). In sum, his argument is that 
autonomist nationalism permits citizens to be nationalists but not necessarily sovereignists in 
order to protect the common culture, language, and collective identity (Balthazar 2001, 197). 
 Writing before the 1995 referendum and specifically asking “Will Quebec Secede?” 
Stéphane Dion (1991) argues that Quebec’s secessionist movement “grows out of two 
antithetical feelings: fear and confidence” (Dion 1991, 14). These feelings are “rooted in its 
linguistic heritage and is longstanding” and is a “very real concern about losing its linguistic 
identity” (Dion 1991 14). Stasiulis (2013) identifies the root causes of this fear as the “protracted 
history of an anxious and fragile form of nationalism—that sees francophone Quebecers as 
historically ‘conquered’ by the British, their linguistic distinctiveness rendered precarious by its 
location in a predominantly Anglophone North America, and increasingly jeopardized by 
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immigrants essentialized as pre-modern, nonliteral and barbaric” (Stasiulis 2013, 187). Thus the 
fear of the loss of culture and common identity is of primordial importance for nationalists. But 
Dion, an ardent federalist, contends that Quebecers should take confidence in the fact that 
Quebec has become a “modern quasi state, with exclusive or joint responsibility with the federal 
government over education, health, welfare, energy, immigration, industry, language, 
communication, and so on” (Dion 1991, 18). Gagnon and Lachapelle (1996), on the contrary, 
argue that federal overreach in terms of taxation and spending powers have been at the cost of 
“frequent opposition to Québec’s policy preferences” which has only further increased support 
for sovereignty (Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996, 181). The tenuous relationship (at the best of 
times) between Canada and Quebec is of great importance to the sovereignty movement. Gagnon 
argues that “asymmetrical federalism represents a unique institutional construction that gives 
considerable flexibility in governance” (Gagnon 2009, 266-267). By allowing Quebec unique 
control over policy domains that other provinces do not have, Canada will be recognizing the 
fact that Quebec is a unique province and should have unique privileges. 
 McRoberts (1993) argues that although the PQ is often seen as radical by English 
Canada, it was in effect quite cautious and restrained in its actions under René Lévesque—
specifically seeking to garner support for sovereignty through an étapiste approach by “gradual, 
step-by-step change” and eschewing radical policy change (McRoberts 1993, 363). Murray and 
Murray (1979) argue that the Parti Québécois is a function of “two fundamental ideological 
groups with the party which we call the ‘technocrats’ and the ‘participationists’” (Murray and 
Murray 1979, 243). For them, the PQ is at constant struggle between two foundational groups: 
those who want outright autonomy and those who want “the creation of a new style of 
participatory government” (Murray and Murray 1979, 253). Thus the PQ is performing “a 
delicate balance” given their realization that “they must follow a prudent and reassuring course 
in order to win these voters over” (Murray and Murray 1979, 253). 
 Quebec nationalism is ongoing and continuously evolving. It is contentious in that the 
identification of Quebec as a civic nation has been disputed; although the rapid shift that the 
province underwent from one that was primarily ethnic to civic is well articulated and argued 
(Karmis 2004; Juteau 2002; Rocher 2002). What is indisputable, however, is the significance that 
nationalism has on Quebec’s political climate and culture. With two referenda on sovereignty, 
failed constitutional negotiations, and two parties which represent the sovereignist-federalist 
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divide, nationalism permeates the province’s political reality. The relationship between 
nationalism and immigration and integration policy proposals deserves to be formally articulated 
in order to understand, in the Quebec case, to what extent nationalism affects said policy 
proposals. However, before making formal articulations about the extent to which nationalism, 
or party competition, affect policy proposals, one must first become acquainted with the 
literature on immigration, integration, and Quebec nationalism. From this literature emerges the 
gaps and research opportunities upon which thesis will build.  
 
Immigration and Integration 
Joppke (2005) looks at ethnic migration in liberal states. Although he contends that “liberal 
states no longer can explicitly and directly reproduce and reinvigorate particular nationhood 
through immigration policy”, ethnic migration remains a tool in which states can selectively 
choose newcomers who may best fit the national mould (Joppke 2005, 2). Joppke identifies four 
forms of ethnic migration: discriminatory directions—the extension of positive derogations to 
applicant ethnic groups
4
 (Joppke 2005, 22); justifications—“ethnic migration is justified in terms 
of its easier ‘assimilability’ to domestic society” (Joppke 2005, 23); selection mechanisms and 
legal infrastructures—selection criteria based on country of birth instead of “ethnicity proper” 
(Joppke 2005, 24); and pressures and types of conflict. Joppke’s ethnic migration and their 
forms/justifications can be extended to the Quebec case when specifically looking at their 
policies. If Quebec governments wanted to protect the nation, surely ethnic migration policies 
would be implemented in order to select citizens that already speak French and are more likely to 
integrate into their host society. The protection of the culture and the nation is more likely to 
occur based on what the immigrant is instead of what it does.  
 Koopmans et al. (2005), like Joppke, look at immigration in terms of national identity. 
For the authors, immigration “creates pressures and opportunities for a redefinition and 
reinvention of the conceptions of citizenship and national identity of the receiving nation-state” 
which plays a crucial role in the determination of citizenship policy (Koopmans et al. 2005, 6). 
Citizenship can be divided three-fold: (i) ethnic or exclusive which “denies migrants and their 
descendants access to the political community” or makes access extremely hard; (ii) 
assimilationist or republican as exemplified in France and the United States which allows for 
                                                 
4
 Much like Right of Return laws seen in Israel and Germany. 
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easy citizenship but “gives little or no recognition to their cultural differences”; and (iii) 
multicultural or pluralistic which includes Canada and provides “for both easy formal access to 
citizenship and recognition of the right of ethnic minority groups to maintain their cultural 
differences” (Koopmans et al. 2005, 8). Indeed, this aspect of citizenship regarding how 
migrants are integrated into their host country has been subject to considerable study and debate. 
In fact, citizenship and integration policies have received limited treatment by Quebec 
academics. Yet this presents itself as an exciting lacuna within the literature that is certainly 
worthy of being filled. 
 Azzedine Marhraoui’s (2004) doctoral thesis primarily looks at the intersection between 
nationalism and ethnocultural diversity management between 1990 and 2000. In his lengthy 
review, Marhraoui outlines one of the primary issues of Quebec immigration and integration: the 
protection of the French language to ensure that new arrivals to Quebec will adopt French over 
English and thus, hopefully, strengthen their ties to Quebec over Canada (Marhraoui 2004, 51). 
This is seen in the changes brought about in immigration policy which favoured “une 
immigration francophone en axant le recrutement à partir du bassin de la francophonie mondiale 
[…]” (Marhraoui 2004, 62). Marhraoui, it must be said, painstakingly reviews the relevant policy 
documents which included the historical period as context prior to his start date of 1990. In fact, 
the aspects he discusses concerning the changes in rhetoric, dialogue, and policy are among the 
most in-depth analysis of Quebec immigration and integration policy identified.  
 Institutionally, Marhraoui discusses the changes that various ministries have undergone in 
Quebec. This has also been undertaken by Symons (2002) in her work observing the structural 
and discursive changes in Quebec immigration ministries from 1968 to 1996. These institutional 
changes highlight that Quebec’s “ambivalence to immigration and diversity is reflected in and 
symbolized by the various transformations of its ministry responsible for immigration” (Symons 
2002, 40). This ambivalence is observed by McAndrew (2004) in her review of immigration and 
education policies in Quebec. Quebec’s primary objective, to protect French language and 
culture, was epitomized through Law
5
 101 (McAndrew 2004, 309). She characterized Quebec’s 
immigration policy by three elements: (i) that Quebec receive 25 percent of total Canadian 
immigration to combat demographic decline; (ii) the “conciliation of various objectives” 
                                                 
5
 In line with the fact that the bill became law and French literature refers to it as Loi 101, Law 101 will be the 
chosen identification instead of Bill 101. 
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including the “recruitment of French-speaking immigrants, the contribution of immigration 
economic development, the support for family reunification and the commitment to international 
solidarity”; and (iii) permanent residency within the province (McAndrew 2004, 310). By 
outlining education and immigration policies, McAndrew has identified what appears to be an 
ethnic migratory tendency on the part of immigration policy but does not identify whether this is 
maintained across time and across the political parties. 
 Perhaps the most noteworthy work has been conducted by Bilodeau and Turgeon (2015), 
Lavoie and Serré (2002), and Turgeon and Bilodeau (2014) who quantify public perceptions of 
immigration. Turgeon and Bilodeau (2014) observe openness to immigration among Quebecois. 
They find that a “majority of Quebecers are thus open towards immigration and have become 
more so over the last twenty years” but that “Quebecers of French Canadian origin appear to be 
less positive towards immigration than other Quebecers, but only in their propensity to ask for 
‘more’ immigrants” (Turgeon and Bilodeau 2014, 325). Furthermore, they note that the 
“proportion of Quebecers asking for ‘fewer’ immigrants is highest among strong supporters of 
Quebec sovereignty […] and declines among those who somewhat support […] and those who 
somewhat oppose it” (Turgeon and Bilodeau 2014, 326). The authors conclude that cultural 
insecurity is a significant factor in determining whether one wants more or less immigrants 
which leads them to note that “above and beyond linguistic insecurity, national identity and 
nationalism, Quebecers of French Canadian origin are less enthusiastic about immigration than 
other fellow Quebecers” (Turgeon and Bilodeau 2014, 328). They are careful, however, to 
conclude that the overall negative sentiments concerning immigrants has decreased in Quebec, a 
fact that is very much in line with the rest of Canada (Turgeon and Bilodeau 2014, 332). 
Building on their findings concerning cultural insecurity, Bilodeau and Turgeon (2015) observe 
the regional variations of Quebecois Francophones in relation to whether or not immigration is a 
perceived threat towards Quebecois culture. Interestingly, they find that it is not in the outskirts 
of Quebec where Francophones feel their culture is most threatened by immigrants. Instead the 
authors discover that there exists a ‘halo’ effect around the island of Montreal particularly in the 
north (Laval) and south sections surrounding the island which have a “sentiment de menace 
culturelle plus fort que celui des résidents de Montréal” (Bilodeau and Turgeon 2015, 294).  
 Building off Jacques Parizeau’s infamous “l’argent et des votes ethnique” comment, 
Lavoie and Serré (2002) seek to analyze CIIRM’s (Citoyens issus de l’immigration de la région 
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montréalaise) voting pattern—literally the ethnic vote concerning whether immigrant groups 
vote in bloc (together) or sociale (“un alignement du groupe minoritaire sur le vote du groupe 
majoritaire”) (Lavoie and Serré 2002, 52). The authors find that CIIRMs are more likely to 
identify with Canada over Quebec—regardless of primary language, which has consequences for 
sovereignty support. Immigrants who primarily identify with Quebec over Canada increase their 
likelihood of supporting the PQ and the sovereignty project; the same trend is noted for 
immigrants with “forte intégration” compared to those with “faible intégration” in regard to 
knowledge and use of the French language (Lavoie and Serré 2002, 64). 
 By creating a triangular relationship between ‘us’, ‘others’, and ‘them’, Elke Winter 
(2011) creates a nexus in order to construct “pluralist alliances, rather than on identifying 
strategies of othering, which are inherent to binary us/them relations” (Winter 2011, 163). This 
nexus allows her to argue that “rendering the idea of the nation compatible with ethnic diversity 
is primarily achieved through the paradigm of pluralism, that is, an approach that encourages the 
recognition of ethnic diversity” (Winter 2011, 4). This pluralist perspective is the basis for her 
analysis of Quebec and the relationship between Quebec’s sovereign ambitions and the 
relationship with Canada outside Quebec. However, Winter centres her discussion of nationalism 
and pluralism within a multicultural framework—a framework which was outright rejected by 
Quebec in favour of a unique intercultural approach. 
 Kymlicka (2007) discusses the intersection between diversity and multiculturalism. For 
Kymlicka, multicultural policy has resulted in two notable trends for substate nations: the 
creation of a “federal or quasi-federal subunit in which the minority group forms a local 
majority, and can thereby exercise meaningful forms of self-government” (Kymlicka 2007, 69); 
and “a shift from suppressing substate nationalisms to accommodating them through regional 
autonomy and official language rights” (Kymlicka 2007, 70). These two trends have occurred in 
Quebec since the Quiet Revolution due to Canada’s multicultural policy. He further identifies 
three aspects of a multicultural state, the first of which can be easily applied to Quebec: “the 
repudiation of the older idea that the state is a possession of a single national group” (Kymlicka 
2007, 65). This repudiation in Quebec is exemplified from the discursive shift from ethnic to 
civic nationalism and the more accepting and encompassing policies that followed. This shift led 
to a reconceptualization of what it meant to be a Quebecer.  
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 Beauchemin (2004) identifies three Quebec subjects in determining “What does it mean 
to be a Quebecer?”. For him, there existed the “monologic subject” based on “the figure of a 
colonized and alienated subject [which] is discernible in the French-Canadian destiny” 
(Beauchemin 2004, 23)—a figure that “became increasingly scarce as the new definition of the 
subject emerged” (Beauchemin 2004, 24). Beauchemin identifies two more subjects: the 
“ambivalent”—one who does not view the sovereignist project with “the same urgency, and 
constitutes but one emancipatory claim among many others” (Beauchemin 2004, 25); and the 
“dialogic subject”, where the citizen would be “the image of a more fluid ‘collective-we’ that 
joins heritages and influences” and would be formed through a discursive and “dialogic process 
that would enable a future identity open to all possibilities to emerge” (Beauchemin 2004, 27). 
This identity, in face of multicultural Canada, seems to be open, pluralist, accepting, and based 
on dialogue between newcomers and the host society. 
 Regardless of ideological perspective concerning Quebec statehood, Karmis (2004) puts 
forth the conception of pluralism in regards to national identities as a tool of integration. For 
Karmis, three levels of inclusion exist: possible inclusion, the elimination of “race, social class, 
sex, and ethnicity” as means for inclusion “without eliminating totally criteria such as language 
and culture” (Karmis 2004, 72); symbolic inclusion, that national identity “should be inclusive in 
the sense that it reflects and asserts the practices, the institutions, and the memory of all the 
cultural communities that inhabit a space” (Karmis 2004, 72); and deep inclusion, that national 
identity and inclusion “must be compatible with the pluralist and complexity of citizens’ 
identities” (Karmis 2004, 72-73). Integration and national identity, for Gagnon and Iacovino 
(2004), became “inextricably tied to the fate of the Québec nation” (Gagnon and Iacovino 2004, 
374).  
 The delicate balance between immigration and preserving Quebec’s national identity and 
the sovereignty movement is epitomized through the official policy of interculturalism, a policy 
that “strikes a balance between the requirements of unity […] and the recognition of minority 
cultures” and encourages the use of French as the common language as the “conduit through 
which the disagreements, contentions, and conflicts inherent in a culturally diverse society can 
be aired in a situation of normal politics” (Gagnon and Iacovino 2004, 384). Building on the 
determinants of national identity and integration in regards to the sovereignty movement, Juteau 
(2002), argues that from 1980 through 1995, “belongingness was redefined, at least in 
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governmental discourses and official documents” which led to Quebec embracing “pluralism and 
intercultural practices” but the changes in discourse and policy “did not induce immigrants and 
ethnic minorities to identify with Quebec to the extent of supporting independence” (Juteau 
2002, 446). Once more, in wake of Premier Parizeau’s infamous comments, Quebec realized a 
change that sought to replace the previous “categorisation of individuals and groups in terms of 
ethnicity or immigrant trajectory” with “the citizen, a status that transcends political, ethnic 
ideological belongings” (Juteau 2002, 451). This pushes aside the “subordinate ethnicity, a move 
that makes room for a ‘universal’ national québécois subject” for greater integration into the 
nation (Juteau 2002, 451, emphasis in original). 
 Ines Molinaro observes Quebec’s intercultural policy and notes that it has two broad 
goals: “the integration of allophones into mainstream Quebec society and the promotion of 
openness within Quebec society towards members of cultural communities” (Molinaro 2011, 
461). The relative success of the intercultural policy over time is apparent through Law 101: “in 
1971, 90% of Allophone children were enrolled in English schools; by 1994-1995, 79% were 
enrolled in French language schools” (Molinaro 2011, 464). Salée (2011)6, however, remains 
weary of the ‘successes’ of Quebec’s integration strategies. For Salée, “sovereignists remain 
unable to bring Anglophone and allophone minorities on side” (Salée 2011, 472). The policies 
and strategies implemented by Quebec governments “regarding immigration and the integration 
of immigrants have also done little to dispel the impression held by the vast majority of non-
Francophones and new Quebecers that they are strangers in their own house”, these policies are 
non-negotiable for newcomers which creates a climate where newcomers “can be in the nation, if 
they wish; somehow, they will never really be of the nation”7 (Salée 2011, 475).  
 Bilodeau et al. (2010) and White et al. (2015) attempt to quantify integration strategies 
and their effectiveness on immigrants. Where White et al. (2015) focus specifically on Canada in 
determining that “more than one third (35%) of recent immigrants feel ‘fully accepted’ by 
Canada” (White et al. 2015, 299) and that, in general, newcomers have a strong sentiment of 
support for their host country and that this sense of support is strengthened when immigrants 
                                                 
6
 Originally published in 1997. 
7
 In the Canadian context, this sentiment is brilliantly echoed in Bannerji’s highly personal essays, stating that: “We 
are part of its economy, subject to its laws, and members of its civil society. Yet we are not part of its self-definition 
as ‘Canada’ because we are not ‘Canadian’”; and “[…] if we problematize the notion of ‘Canada’ through the 
introjection of the idea of belonging, we are left with the paradox of both belonging and non-belonging 
simultaneously” (Bannerji 2000, 65). 
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“feel more accepted by other Canadians” (White et al. 2015, 301). Bilodeau et al. (2010) 
quantify public perceptions of immigrants and determine that immigrants “from both traditional 
and non-traditional source countries express more federally oriented loyalties than the Canadian-
born population of their respective province” (Bilodeau et al. 2010, 525-526). While it is, 
perhaps, not surprising that survey respondents in Quebec had more favourable provincial views 
than federal views when compared to the other provinces, this is not “transferred very efficiently 
to immigrants; only 16 per cent of immigrants from traditional and 24 per cent from non-
traditional source countries respectively express a more positive feeling for Quebec than 
Canada” (Bilodeau et al. 2010, 526). Interestingly, the authors find that “immigrants who speak 
French at home exhibit political loyalties similar to those of the local population” but there “are 
no discernible differences in the orientations of French-speaking immigrants from traditional 
source countries and native-born population in Quebec” (Bilodeau et al. 2010, 531). Salée, then, 
comes closest to fully understand the realities that make-up Quebec integration policy: that there 
exists a real tenable and tangible reality that various sections of the population feel like they are 
outside the majority’s society. 
 
Taking Stock of the Literature 
Triadafilopoulos (2012) presents an interesting framework for the study of Canadian 
immigration and membership policy. His look at policy reform in Canada and Germany is 
similar to Stasiulis’ identification of nation states’ continued engagement in “various revisions 
and iterations of national myth making and production of national identities through discursive 
and legal practices of inclusion and exclusion” (Stasiulis 2013, 183). Triadafilopoulos identifies 
three mechanisms “through which the changing normative context influenced Canada and 
Germany’s immigration and citizenship policies: policy stretching, unravelling, and shifting” 
(Triadafilopoulos 2012, 11). ‘Stretching’ “aims to capture the dynamic tension that arises when 
entrenched policy regimes that reflect taken-for-granted ideas, terminology, and practices carry 
over into new normative contexts” and thus attempts to demonstrate that change “unfolds 
incrementally as policy makers seek to reconcile the unfamiliar demands of a newly emerging 
normative order with the deeply engrained, path-dependent logic of established policy 
frameworks” (Triadafilopoulos 2012, 11). Stretching is “a variant of incrementalism, albeit with 
an important twist: whereas standard incrementalist theories cast policy makers as modestly 
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groping towards some new end in a cost-averse manner, in the sense understood here, their 
actions are directed towards preserving the overarching goals of the established policy regime” 
(Triadafilopoulos 2012, 11). Triadafilopoulos’ identification of ‘policy stretching’ is a unique 
way of looking at immigration and membership policy in Canada. In fact, his core argument is 
one which is similar to the one this thesis employs: that there exists past normative orders that 
have maintained their importance over time. His framework inspires the direction of this study. 
Although ‘policy stretching’ has not been adopted as a theoretical framework given some 
ambiguity in his meaning and application of the term, there exists considerable parallels between 
his book and the intents of the present thesis which advances Triadafilopoulos’ work by adding 
the dimension of nationalism to the evaluation of immigration and membership policy within a 
substate nation.  
 The identified literature is well done, well researched, and fundamentally inspired the 
development of this thesis. However, three issues arise from the literature. First, the underlying 
relationship between nationalism and how it affects immigration policy are unclear. While 
authors have presented works that attempt to explain this relationship, many have studied 
Quebec as a single case study among many—traditionally as a tripartite study of Quebec, 
Scotland, and Spain; or Quebec, Scotland, and Belgium. While this greatly adds to our 
knowledge of Quebec within a comparative context, it nonetheless limits the time that can be 
spent discussing and examining Quebec. This somewhat limits the overall scope of the literature 
as authors constrain their analyses of Quebec in order to focus on other cases. While the 
observation of the interaction between nationalism and social policy, and comparisons between 
other substate nations, is an essential comparative project and helps situate Quebec within a 
global polity, the study of Quebec can benefit from a committed single-case study which 
accounts for history and nuance.  
 Second, studies of immigration and integration in Quebec have primarily been 
normatively and quantitatively based. Building off the works of Marhraoui and McAndrews 
presents the opportunity to extend the study of relevant documents and policy proposals—be it 
implemented Bills or election platforms. Studying election platforms allows for the recognition 
of how campaign promises differ across parties—thus this allows for recognizing how each party 
differs in their desired immigration policy.  
 18 
 Third, although there exists considerable work which studies Quebec nationalism ranging 
from immigration and integration to citizenship and history, the literature is has presented an 
exciting opportunity to further develop the nexus between immigration and integration, and 
substate nationalism. While work exists which seek to better understand immigration and 
integration into substate nations, little account for the influence of political ideology and 
nationalism on the policies proposed. These relationships deserve to be analyzed more by 
looking at the ethnocultural diversity management and nationalism nexus through applying said 
nexus to Quebec as a case study. Because Quebec is both a substate nation with a credible and 
veritable secessionist movement and has considerable policy power over immigration and 
integration, the relationship between the policies proposed by each party and their interpretation 
concerning Quebec’s place within the federal compact will help in filling the lacuna that emerges 
from the literature.  
 This work adds to the literature on substate nations, substate nationalism, and the politics 
of immigration and integration through the unique study of this identified nexus. Filling this gap 
in the literature, however, requires both a theoretical framework and an applicable methodology 
in order to observe whether nationalism affects public policy proposals whatsoever. Borrowing 
from Benedict Anderson’s (2006) notion of an ‘imagined community’, the employed theoretical 
frameworks account for both policy proposals which effectively seek to affirm or protect the idea 
of the nation, as well as policies which seek to make the nation more open and accessible to 
newcomers in effect extending citizenship to newcomers through pluralist integrative measures. 
The employed methodology in which to observe the influences of both nationalism and electoral 
competition will be document analysis. Together these frameworks and methodologies will 
combine in order to succinctly add to the literature on Quebec politics, substate nationalism, and 
ethnocultural diversity management in order to more fully understand the nexus between 





Chapter II: The Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Theoretical Framework: Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Community’ and Nation Affirming & 
Protecting Policy Proposals; and Pluralist Policies 
Quebec’s two major political parties, the PQ and PLQ, represent competing sides of the 
sovereignist-federalist divide that has come to define Quebec politics. Where the PQ champions 
the cause for an independent and sovereign Quebec, the PLQ argues for Quebec’s continued 
place within the Canadian federation. As a result, the parties occupy two different places within 
the ideological spectrum concerning self-governance and self-determination. These policy 
differences largely manifest themselves in the parties’ views concerning Canadian federalism. 
The analysis developed in this thesis rests on a theoretical framework designed to show that the 
two parties, in spite of their competing and different ideologies, in fact propose similar 
ethnocultural diversity management policies over time.  
 For Benedict Anderson (2006), a nation is an “imagined political community—and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 2006, 6). It is imagined “because 
the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their-fellow members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(Anderson 2006, 6). Anderson successfully manages to discuss the concept of the nation without 
engaging the debate surrounding civic and ethnic identifications, instead offering that his view of 
the imagined community is composed of three elements, that the nation is: limited, sovereign, 
and a community (Anderson 2006, 7). It is limited because “[n]o nation imagines itself 
coterminous with mankind”; sovereign because it rejects the dynastic realities of old; and 
communal because “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” 
(Anderson 2006, 7). This conceptualization of the nation seems to be the most fluid, adaptable, 
and applicable. Obviously, nations have a certain connection between members, and a legitimate 
nation will need this connection to be strong and be felt across a large territory by people who 
will never meet. Indeed, the crux of nationalism is that people feel connected to each other and 
have the same desires—but a legitimate community they do not make given the practical 
difficulties in meeting every single citizen and interacting with fellow nationals. Thus, by not 
specifically engaging the theoretical ethnic-civic dialogue, Anderson creates a definition of 
‘nation’ that is simple to understand and easily applicable as a theoretical framework to 
determine its relevance: a true nation, in Andersonian terms, would have to be an imagined 
community—if no connection exists between people across a large territory, then the nation itself 
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is not tenable, the connection is not strong enough and will possibly either disappear or become 
integrated into the majority culture.  
 Anderson’s imagined community is in agreement with Gellner’s (1974) recognition that 
“nationalism is basically a movement which conceives the natural object of human loyalty to be 
a fairly large anonymous unit defined by shared language or culture” (Gellner 1974, 149). 
Gellner identifies that citizens in a nation need an anonymous “positive link with each other, and 
that the subdivisions within the nation are not of importance comparable with the large unit” 
(Gellner 1974, 149). While membership is debatable, Anderson’s offering that a nation is an 
imagined community remains the most convincing definition. The term implies both a sense of 
faith (imagined) and belonging (community) in order to underscore the importance that this 
connection needs to exist.  
 The recognition of the imagined community as a political reality in Quebec allows us to 
situate policy proposals within the context of the Québécois nation. Using the imagined 
community as a theoretical basis for what comprises the nation, the first theoretical framework 
aims to determine whether proposed policies ultimately seek to protect or affirm this nation. The 
first framework, then, is a combination of ‘protectionist’ and ‘nation affirming’ proposals. The 
protectionist policies observed, however, entail a caveat. These policies are not interested in 
economic protectionism and needs to be divorced from the notion of economics entirely. 
Protectionist ethnocultural diversity management proposals are policies which seek to protect the 
nation’s French fact—these proposals are not proposed as pluralist integrative measures. 
Examples of protectionist policies are proposals which ensure that newcomers learn French not 
as a means to facilitate integration but in order to protect the French fact—that learning French 
consolidates the imagined community’s shared language by reducing the appearance of non-
French languages.  
 The second aspect, ‘nation affirming’ policies, are proposals which seek to account for, 
codify, and concretize the values which encapsulate the Quebec nation. Thus, the proposal of 
policies which seek to expand the nation through non-pluralist means through integration 
contracts, the codification of values and morals, and seek to limit citizenship to newcomers for 
the benefit of settled Quebecers fundamentally seek to affirm the nation. Simply put, policies 
which emphasize the limiting of cultural difference in favour of a common culture are nation 
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affirming and seek to account for the aspects of the imagined community which bind the nation 
together.  
 First, based off Benedict Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined community’, the protectionist and 
nation affirming approach will allow for the identification of policies which seek to protect the 
nation from the Other as well as make the nation more salient and attempt to codify common 
values that belong to the nation. Second, the identification of pluralist policies will allow for 
recognizing when parties are proposing open, inclusive, and expansionary policies. As a result, 
these two classifications allow for the differentiation between the parties’ policies: those which 
are restrictive and those which are inclusive. By parcelling out the policies in such a way, 
comparisons can be made between them by determining to what extent each individual proposal 
fits the respective typology. This allows for the total recognition of whether the proposals are 
restrictive or inclusive and whether the parties are proposing similar policies over time. If, as this 
work posits, ideological differences between the two parties are essentially mitigated concerning 
ethnocultural diversity management policy proposals, then the division of policies into these 
frameworks is essential for demonstrating the similarities and differences of the proposals across 
time. To better explain why two parties with different ideologies concerning Quebec’s status 
within Canada propose similar policies, brokerage politics will be applied. Simply put, brokerage 
politics argues that political parties mitigate the differences between them in order to appeal to 
the broadest electorate possible. Brokerage politics, however, is more fully expanded upon and is 
the subject of its own proper chapter later in the work. 
 The protectionist and nation affirming approach is comprised of three aspects: 
protectionist proposals, nationalist proposals, and proposals which seek to limit cultural 
differences. Protectionist policies either overtly (through the policies proposed within the 
platform) or implicitly (through the way in which the policies are framed) propose policies which 
aim to protect the French fact. Language policy can be classified as protectionist if francization 
measures are proposed as a means of protecting the French language and not facilitating 
integration. Language policies, then, can be categorized as either protectionist, nation affirming, 
or pluralist depending on their context and desired result. Immigration policies can be 
determined to be protectionist if they aim to prioritize Francophone immigration or limit the 
immigration of non-Francophones specifically as a tool to ensure the survival and promotion of 
the French language or nation as a whole.  
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 Nationalist policies are ones which seek greater policy autonomy. While demands for 
policy autonomy are neither necessarily inclusive nor exclusive, the demands for increased 
power concerning immigration policy are often channelled through Quebec’s distinct status. This 
distinct status allows Quebec to demand increased policy autonomy which will allow the 
province to develop immigration and integration policies which best suit Quebec’s distinct 
language, culture, and specific needs, thus affirming the imagined community. These policy 
demands have been coded as nation affirming/protectionist and pluralist. Coding entails 
determining categories in which to sort data. It allows for the facilitation of categorizing 
qualitative data into organized observations (McNabb 2010, 258; Silverman 2010, 432). For this 
thesis, the notions of nation affirming, nation protecting, and pluralism were applied to each 
proposed immigration and integration policy throughout the PLQ and PQ’s electoral programs. 
Each policy was determined to fit one of these classifications. Nation affirming and nation 
protecting occupied the same organizational space and pluralist policies occupied a separate 
space. The goal of this organization is to demonstrate observable differences between policies 




 The policies have been categorized as nation affirming or protectionist for two reasons. 
First, outright demands for greater policy autonomy based off cultural and linguistic uniqueness 
are nationalist in nature given that they take the nation into account and believe that the substate 
unit is better equipped to deal with their own needs than is the national unit. Second, policy 
demands can be categorized as protectionist if the demands seek policy autonomy as a means of 
protecting the nation through the eventual implementation of unique immigration and integration 
policies. Simply put, policies which demand greater autonomy and decision-making power over 
ethnocultural diversity management policies from the federal government are classified as 
protectionist given that these requests are determined through Quebec’s distinct status and, as 
such, Quebec desires greater policy autonomy as a means of protecting and ensuring this distinct 
status. The third aspect of the protectionist and affirmationist approach are policies which seek to 
limit or reduce the cultural differences between the settling and the settled—either by proposing 
policies such as ‘moral’ or ‘integration’ contracts, banning certain religious practices in public, 
                                                 
8
 The coding scheme can be found in the attached Appendix B. 
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banning the wearing of religious symbols which asymmetrically targets one religious group over 
another, or through legislations which seek to codify Quebec’s common values. 
 In contrast, pluralist ethnocultural diversity management policies are the fundamental 
opposite of affirmationist and protectionist policies. Pluralism has been defined through referring 
to the “fact that contemporary states are characterized by a growing diversity of collective 
identities and by a growing political expression of that diversity. In its normative sense, 
pluralism refers to an ideology (more precisely, a family of ideologies) claiming that definitions 
of citizenship should be sensitive to sociological pluralism” (Karmis 2004, 70). Looking at the 
relationship between multiculturalism and pluralism, Schiller (2015) contends that 
multiculturalism “bestows value on cultural pluralism and emphasizes the rights of migrants to 
hold on to their cultural belongings. The state is meant to ensure that cultural groups are 
recognized (Faist 2009, 1976). In local practice, this was often implemented by identifying 
‘target groups’ that received specific attention or funds by state institutions” (Schiller 2015, 
1127). Although Quebec does not subscribe to the ‘multicultural approach’, Schiller’s 
identification of multicultural pluralism allows for the identification of pluralist ethnocultural 
diversity management proposals (Schiller 2015, 1127). These proposals seek to recognize 
different cultural groups, promote their traditions and cultures, and ensure their survival 
alongside the French majority culture and language. The Quebec model of interculturalism 
allows these cultures to exist coterminous with the nation on the expectation that the newcomer 
eventually integrates into the majority culture and language but the newcomer is still allowed the 
right to maintain their cultural traditions thus interculturalism is a non-assimilationist form of 
integration.  These policies are more open and inclusive than are the nation affirming and 
protectionist policies. Language policy can be pluralist if the learning of French is formulated as 
a way of facilitating integration at large into the linguistic majority and not as a means of 
protecting the nation.  
 More concretely, a pluralist view is one where political parties outwardly recognize that 
languages other than French, and that religions and cultures which are not part of the 
mainstream, ward off cultural sterility and are a net benefit to Quebec. It aims to support and 
promote different cultures and traditions. Pluralist policies in Quebec generally try to balance the 
ability of the newcomer to maintain their already held unique culture and tradition while 
attempting to ensure that they integrate into the majority culture and language. Yet newcomers 
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are not expected to stop adhering to their language and culture. These can be practiced in parallel 
to the French culture and language, but pluralist policies do not seek to limit or restrict cultural 
differences between the settled and the newly established Quebecer. The protectionist and nation 
affirming approach can readily be contrasted to the pluralist approach as they differ in their 
policy intentions. One seeks to make the nation more identifiable and reduce difference between 
the newly established and the settled, while the other aims to promote cultural difference 
alongside the cultural and linguistic majority. These approaches, however, do not necessarily 
have anything to do with the respective political party. Indeed, it would be a common place value 
judgement for one to say that the PQ is more restrictive than is the PLQ. But when looking at the 
parties’ ideological predisposition concerning Quebec’s place within Canada, one can safely 
assume that the PQ will opt for more nation affirming and protectionist policies than would the 
PLQ. The desire to fortify the nation from an encroaching federal government and North 
American Anglophone hegemony impels the PQ to propose ethnocultural diversity management 
policies which seek to facilitate the sovereignty project and protect the nation, prioritize 
Francophone immigrants as a way of ensuring the survival of the French language, and instil 
integrative efforts to court newcomers to the sovereignty project. Regardless, the application of 
these approaches allows for the recognition of whether a party relied more on either nation 
affirming, protectionist, or pluralist policies. As a whole, these approaches both allow for the 
recognition of the preferred policies in a specific election by each party, as well as the 
identification of shifts over time—whether the parties continuously converged overtime by 
favouring pluralism or whether convergence occurred through a similar for protectionist and 
nation affirming policies. 
 In sum, policies which seek to protect the nation, give the nation more policy autonomy 
from the federal government, and limit or reduce cultural differences have been classified as 
protectionist or nation affirming. This typology accounts for the policy areas which take the 
nation into account—the policies which seek to make the nation more tangible and actively 
engages the common sense of unity and collectivity which binds the nation’s members together, 
particularly in the face of the Other and perceived threats to the nation’s continued survival. To 
apply this theoretical framework to the Quebec case, however, there must be something of which 
it is to be applied. The application of this framework relies heavily on the availability of electoral 
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platforms. Studying a large number of electoral platforms spanning a nearly 40-year period, 
however, is subject to a considerably rigorous methodological application. 
 The theoretical frameworks and the subsequent coding scheme requires a discussion of its 
overall validity. To this point, the coding scheme allows for the recognitions of pluralist, 
restrictive, and nation affirming policies. The identification of ethnocultural diversity 
management policy combined with historical context, electoral context, party ideology, policy 
intention, and conceptions of nationalism allows for the illumination of how these policies 
fundamentally aimed to either protect or promote the nation. From here, policies could be 
identified as pluralist or non-pluralist and then placed in within a framework which appropriately 
accounted for these distinctions. Non-pluralist proposals were coded as ‘nation affirming’ and 
‘nation protecting’ while pluralist policies were coded as ‘pluralist’. As a result, a coding scheme 
emerges which can then account for policy difference across elections and parties from 1976 
onward. By looking at historical context, ideology, and conceptions of the nation, the coding 
scheme itself is subject to considerable validity. Because the interpretation of the nation—that is, 
defense or promotion—serve as the overarching reality under which these policies are studied, 
the theoretical frameworks and the coding scheme can be subject to replication by other 
researchers. By using, expanding, and further developing these frameworks, future researchers 
may be able to classify policies, or policy proposals, outside the area of ethnocultural diversity 
management and account for the nationalistic similarities and differences of the PLQ and PQ in 
different policy areas. In sum, the coding scheme accounts for ideological difference and 
competing conceptions of the nation. To that extent, policies can confidently be identified as 
either pluralist or non-pluralist by researchers and the coding scheme demonstrates reliability and 
validity in terms of the codification process, theoretical application, and possibility for future 
replication. A visual representation of the coding scheme is found in the attached Appendix A—
what constitutes nation affirming, protecting, and pluralist policy proposals have been organized 
in a horizontal organizational chart. To that point, the policies are not organized by any type of 
hierarchy, all are weighed and coded equally without placing more value on any one type.  
 However, the coding scheme is subject to limitations. The binary composition of the 
scheme (pluralist or non-pluralist) does not account for multidimensional policies. A single 
policy proposal may contain rhetorical elements of both pluralism and non-pluralism and thus 
confuses the coding process. It is possible that a policy proposal may encompass more than just 
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immigration or integration. To this point, economic-immigration has been included in 
ethnocultural diversity management policy proposals without fundamentally engaging with the 
protection or promotion of the nation. Given that some of these policies cannot be classified as 
pluralist or non-pluralist, they could not be included in the coding scheme. Similarly, education 
and language policy were at times lumped into immigration and integration policies without 
directly engaging with the nation (either by protecting or promoting it) and these policies could 
not be adequately placed within the coding scheme. Thus the binary composition of the coding 
scheme does not account for all policies (economic, education, and language) but accounts for 
the vast majority of the proposed policies. 
 Furthermore, there are limits concerning the process of qualitative data coding, primarily 
that there is a “failure to generate mutually agreed-upon systems of coding through which 
diverse content could be investigated and compared across all types of content analysis projects” 
(Crano et al. 2015, 312). Because this project essentially aims to demonstrate a narrative across 
the studied electoral platforms (Prior 2011), the generalizability of narratives is not as 
generalizable as are quantitative-based findings (Pepper and Wildy 2009, 22). Thus, where 
qualitative-based generalizability may not be feasible across cases and countries; the notion of 
‘transferability’ is applicable given that the identified narratives from this work can be applied to 
other substate nations (Pepper and Wily 2009, 22). Transferability is, in effect, the researcher’s 
ability to demonstrate, through content and document analysis, the rhetorical and methodological 
validity of the findings in order to convince readers of the legitimacy of the work. Emergent 
narratives, however, must have explanatory power and appear to be authentic (Pepper and Wily 
2009, 22). Thus, an associated problem with the identification of a narrative over time is the lack 
of methodological rigour in which to demonstrate the narrative—apart from the researcher’s 
rhetorical ability. 
 Where narrative development may not have generalizability and instead relies of 
transferability (Pepper and Willy 2009, 22), the coding (or indexing) of identified data points 
within documents may serve to strengthen transferability and methodological validity. By 
developing a series of classificatory regimes through which the identification of whether a policy 
is protectionist, affirmationist, or pluralist, the coding scheme allows for an organisable means in 
which to classify and analyse ethnocultural diversity management policies. While the employed 
coding system does allow for policies to be parcelled out based on an applied theoretical 
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framework; the coding system in this work does not employ a formal hierarchy. To that point, 
Drisko and Maschi (2015) note that, when conducting inductive research, a hierarchy of indices 
primarily allows researchers to determine which codes serve as the guiding basis for a subsidiary 
of codes. Thus, hierarchies add rigour and reliability to the coding process given that a subsidiary 
of codes can be further classified among the hierarchy. Simply put, the inductive hierarchy 
manipulates the coding plan so as to make sure that codes are not randomly assigned to certain 
categories—that there exists a hierarchy guiding the division of non-classified codes. This 
ensures, then, that the coding schema has a methodological rigour behind it and allows the 
researcher to then analyse the finished coding application for common themes, narratives, 
similarities, and differences.  
 While hierarchies have significant benefit for inductive qualitative data coding (ensuring 
sense of direction), this work relies on a deductive coding application where a pre-identified 
theoretical framework is employed to derive classificatory categories (Drisko and Marschi 2015, 
106). Thus, the initial theory of Benedict Anderson’s imagined community serves as the basis in 
which the polices are situated—from here, then, the concepts of nation protecting, affirming, and 
pluralist policies are derived and applied to the election platforms. Although the coding scheme 
does not employ a formal hierarchy in the inductive sense, the deductive method allows for 
Anderson’s theory to develop the coding and classificatory rules concerning the policy 
proposals. So where inductive coding allows for the hierarchy as the overarching umbrella, 
deductive coding ensures that pre-existing theory serves as the motivation for the coding process. 
In sum, from the imagined community comes the notion of nation protecting, affirming, and 
pluralist policy proposals. The policy proposals found within electoral platforms are then 
categorized based on those three frameworks. Although this work does not employ a formal 
hierarchy, that does not mean that there is no guide. One of the strengths of the theory-driven 
inductive model is that it allows for consistency across time periods. By holding the 
classificatory schemes constant over time, the organized codes are then ready for critical analysis 
by the researcher. The researcher can then identify narratives or themes within the data over time 
specifically in relation to the organized data (Drisko and Marschi 2015, 107). A further strength 
of the inductive method is that it allows for replication. The theoretical frameworks which are 
applied to the data can further be applied, altered, or expanded upon by future researchers both to 
different cases or the same cases.  
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 The replication of the coding scheme, however, speaks to a limitation of the work—
notably that it is devoid of inter-coder reliability. In most projects involving qualitative data 
coding, the researcher ought to develop the coding schema, code a base amount, and then rely on 
the participation of a colleague to code the same data in relation to the given theory or hierarchy. 
From there, the third-party researcher’s coding can then be compared with the primary 
researcher’s in order to determine areas of agreement, disagreement, and ambiguity. The 
participation of other researchers engaging in qualitative data coding strengthens the primary 
researcher’s framework due to inter-coder reliability. This reliability ensures greater 
reproducibility, validity, and reliability (Drisko and Marschi 2015, 107). This thesis, however, 
primarily due to time constraints, does not employ a method of ensuring inter-coder reliability. 
As a result, the coding scheme and indexing of policy proposals has only been deemed reliable 
and valid by the researcher and are subject to valid criticisms of researcher bias (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005, 1283; Trumbell 2005, 121). The non-reproduced, subjective scoring “is subject to 
much criticism” and “[e]xtreme care must be executed by the researcher in collecting data” 
(Trumbell 2005, 121).  
 Where classic content analysis resulting in the enumeration of qualitative data often 
excludes the document’s context, this work’s documentary analysis seeks to limit the bias within 
the coding and classification process by taking into account the context of the document—as a 
result, the identification and explanation of the context should reduce the inherent bias 
association with this type of study (McNabb 2010, 320). Furthermore, the way in which pre-
existing theory guides the coding process and the justification of its use, as well as the division of 
theoretical frameworks (see Appendix A) demonstrate what constitutes a certain policy. To that 
extent, other researchers can apply these justification and theoretical guidance in order to 
determine whether the employed coding scheme in, indeed, justifiable, valid, and reproducible.   
 
Methodology 
In order to determine the nature of the policy proposals the analysis will proceed by reviewing 
the election platforms and policy documents of the PLQ and PQ between 1976 and 2014. It will 
critically examine the discursive and rhetorical elements of appropriate documents and compare 
and contrast them with their preceding documents as well as the proposed and implemented 
policies of their political rival.  
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 Bowen (2009) defines document analysis as a “systematic procedure for reviewing or 
evaluating documents—both printed and electronic […] material. […] document analysis 
requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and 
develop empirical knowledge” (Bowen 2009, 27). Document analysis is a “procedure [which] 
entails selecting, appraising (making sense of), and synthesising data contained in documents” 
and “yields data—excerpts, quotations, or entire passages—that are then organised into major 
themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content analysis” (Bowen 2009, 28). 
Documents are “‘social facts’, in that they are produced, shared and used in socially organised 
ways. They are not, however, transparent representations of organisational routines, decision-
making processes, or professional practices. Documents construct particular kinds of 
representations using literary conventions” (Atkinson and Coffey 2011, 79). Yet one has to treat 
documents carefully and “approach documents for what they are and what they are used to 
accomplish. [One] should examine their place in organisational settings, the cultural values 
attached to them, their distinctive types and forms” (Atkinson and Coffey 2011, 79). Document 
analysis has considerable benefits (Bowen 2009, 31), notably easy access, cost-effectiveness, 
exactness, stability, and their ability to “endure and thus give historical insight” (Hodder 1994, 
393). In the case at hand, all election platforms have been made publicly available thanks to the 
non-partisan PolText project undertaken by Université Laval. 
 Particularly because platforms serve as “repositories for ideologies” (Hartmann 2014, 
30), and that Schmitter (2001) demonstrates that “party platforms provide the best possible 
means for aggregating diverse interests […] into a coherent, system-wide mix of public policies” 
(Schmitter 2001, 67), the study of electoral platforms allows for observing the extent that each 
party’s inherent ideology affects their immigration policies. One could expect that the 
sovereignist PQ proposed immigration policies which sought to facilitate the sovereignty project 
while the federalist PLQ proposed immigration policies which added to the pan-Canadian 
multicultural mosaic and stressed Canadian unity instead of a policy which gave primacy to the 
Quebec nation. In addition to electoral platforms, inaugural addresses will be studied in order to 
determine the extent to which premiers gave importance to issues of immigration—thus 
determining whether the measures proposed in their electoral platforms were echoed on the floor 
of the National Assembly when speaking to a new legislative session. 
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 Document analysis has been employed by Budge (1987) in his review of post-war 
election programs in 19 democracies
9
. He argues that “election programmes are interesting not 
only for their bearing on government action, but also for their contribution to the electoral 
success of the party, to the formation of like-minded coalitions, and to the study of policy-spaces 
constraining the choices the choices rational actors will make” (Budge 1987, 15). Because 
Budge’s intention was to “trace the broad development of party appeals over the post-war 
period”, he chose to “focus on a set of key central statements of party position through which we 
could map the movements of parties over time” including “party manifestos or platforms, or, in 
their absence, the nearest equivalent, ranging from the especially authoritative and 
comprehensive statements made by party leaders” (Budge 1987, 17-18). Budge recognizes that 
election manifestos are an essential tool for understanding the development of party appeals over 
time.  
 Similarly, Rose (1988) identifies election platforms as “a piece of political journalism; its 
purpose is to persuade, and to do so by evoking partisan slogans and symbols” (Rose 1984, 61). 
Schmitter argues that “party platforms provide the best possible means for aggregating diverse 
interests and passions into a coherent [and] system-wide mix of public policies” (Schmitter 2001, 
67) while Hartmann identifies platforms as “repositories for ideologies” which “possess a certain 
continuity from one election to another […] and their policy mixes ‘satisfy the general demands 
of their constituents’” (Hartmann 2014, 30). For Hartmann, platforms represent ideology through 
the enunciation of policy—yet he understands that “it is unclear whether party ideology as 
expressed in these documents really influences policy-making or whether there is a gap between 
the advertised policies and this is implemented when in office” (Hartmann 2014, 30). Where 
Hartmann identifies the ideological reality of platforms, Robertson (1976) identifies platforms as 
“required to be sensitive to the popularity and success of policies […], and to reflect majority 
interest even when that is to be unnecessarily competitive” (Robertson 1976, 18). Election 
platforms are thus an essential tool in determining the evolution of political parties’ policy 
proposals. It is through comprehensive documentary analysis of election platforms and policy 
statements that the similarity and difference of each party’s policy proposals can be analyzed. 
Election platforms present themselves as a vehicle in which to observe the evolution of 
                                                 
9
 For the influence of election platforms in Canada, see Rallings (1987). 
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nationalist sentiment in Quebec and to what extent this is mirrored, or not, in each party’s 
proposed policies.  
 Dealing with the content of a document, such as an electoral program, can seem like an 
intimidating task. Abbot et al. (2004) contend that, specifically when looking at prospective 
documents, one method of analyzing said documents is to “simply extract basic descriptive 
information about the documents” (Abbot et al. 2004, 261). Analyzing their contents may lead to 
the identification of ‘policy narrative’, or a continuing theme or pattern that appears throughout 
similar documents (Prior 2011). More concretely, Prior (2011) identifies a policy narrative 
through the analysis of health documents: “Virtually all health documents in all countries contain 
policy narratives and although such documents can relate to vastly different areas of activity, 
then tend to contain a similar storyline” (Prior 2011, 98). In sum, analyzing documents over time 
may allow for the recognition of the emergence of a policy narrative—the realization that a 
certain policy area may create a somewhat path-dependent structure where a ‘story’ is told that 
either reinforces the past decisions made or continuously presents a policy area that is contested 
between competing parties. 
 Documentary analysis itself, according to Bowen, has five main academic benefits: (i) 
“documents provide data on the context within which research participants operate […]. […] 
documents may provide background information as well as historical insight”; (ii) documents 
allow for the recognition of additional research questions; (iii) “documents provide 
supplementary research data”; (iv) documents provide a means of tracking change and 
development. Where various drafts of a particular document are accessible, the researcher can 
compare them to identify the changes. Even subtle changes in a draft can reflect substantive 
developments in a project”; and (v) documents can be analyzed as a means “to verify findings or 
corroborate evidence from other sources” (Bowen 2009; 29; 30). The actual analysis itself 
involves “skimming (superficial examination), reading (thorough examination), and 
interpretation. This iterative process combines elements of content analysis and thematic 
analysis”; content analysis is defined as the “process of organising information into categories 
related to the central questions of research” (Bowen 2009, 32). Bowen (2009, 33-34) succinctly 
synthesizes his analysis of document analysis as follows:  
   Document analysis, then, is not a matter of lining up a series of excerpts    
 from printed material to convey whatever idea comes to the researcher’s    
 mind. Rather, it is a process of evaluating documents in such a way that    
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 empirical knowledge is produced and understanding is developed. In the    
 process, the researcher should strive for objectivity and sensitivity, and    
 maintain balance between both. 
Rapley (2007) contends that exploring a text is more than solely observing the words of the 
document in a non-contextual way, indeed there is a significant amount of rhetorical strategy that 
needs to be interpreted and analyzed: “When studying texts you are also interested in the 
rhetorical work of the text, how the specific issues it raises are structured and organized and 
chiefly how it seeks to persuade you about the authority of its understanding of the issue” 
(Rapley 2007, 113 emphasis in original). 
 Document analysis is an important and large analytical tool. Where Rapley (2007, 113) 
recognizes that analyzing documents requires accounting for rhetoric, organization, and the 
ability to persuade; content analysis is an aspect of document analysis which seeks to do just 
that. As a result, content analysis falls under the overarching umbrella of document analysis but 
seeks to refine it as an analytic tool. Content analysis has been variously defined as “the process 
of identifying, coding, and categorizing the primary patterns in the data” (Patton 1990, 381); 
“any techniques for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages” (Holsti (1969) in Benoit 2011, 269); and “a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from texts […] to the contexts of their use. This definition 
is important for stressing the context of content analysis” (Krippendorf (2004) in Benoit 2011, 
269). White and Marsh (2006) and Elo and Kyngäs (2008) present definitions which are easiest 
to apply to the documentary analysis of election platforms. First, White and Marsh (2006) argue 
that content analysis is flexible which takes the document’s context into account in order to 
“move from text to the answers to the research questions” (White and Marsh 2006, 27). Second, 
Elo and Kyngäs (2008) argue that “[c]ontent analysis is a research method for making replicable 
and valid inferences from data to their context, with the purpose of providing knowledge, new 
insights, a representation of facts and a practical guide to action (Krippendorff 1980). The aim is 
to attain a condensed and broad description of the phenomenon, and the outcome of the analysis 
is concepts or categories describing the phenomenon” (Elo and Kyngäs 2008, 108). Content 
analysis, then, is a part of document analysis but with a greater importance on the context and 
inferences that emerge from the document being studied. Analysing these documents needs an 
organizational approach in order to make sense of what can be a large amount of data. Implicit in 
content analysis is qualitative data coding. 
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 The timeline of nearly 40 years of Quebec history from 1976-2014 results in a total of ten 
campaigns for a total of 20 platforms. In order to make analyses concerning the policy proposals 
over time, the findings from each platform needs to be coded or categorized so as to facilitate the 
contrasting and comparison of the data over time. Coding has been defined as “putting data into 
theoretically defined categories in order to analyse them” (Silverman 2010, 432); “the process of 
applying some conceptually meaningful set of identifiers to the concepts, categories, and 
characteristics” (McNabb 2010, 258); and “[c]ommunications—oral, written, or other—are 
coded or classified according to some conceptual framework. Thus, for example, newspaper 
editorials may be coded as liberal or conservative” (Babbie 1998, 313). More generally, coding 
requires parceling out the differences in the documents that one is analyzing. Determining how 
to code the aspects of a document is dependent upon the type of coding one does. This work 
employs qualitative data coding—that is “the researcher’s initial foci are not a priori codes but 
the initial foreshadowing questions he aims to answer through his research” (White and Marsh 
2006, 37). The coding undertaken seeks to answer the previously discussed research questions. 
This work first and foremost argues that the PLQ and PQ put forth converging pluralist 
immigration and integration policies. As a result, the proposed immigration policies by each 
party are to be coded as either nation affirming, protectionist or pluralist. This is indicative of 
deductive qualitative coding where a set of pre-determined codes, or categories, have been 
identified from the theoretical literature (Benoit 2011, 271). 
 In order to apply the nation affirming, protectionist, and pluralist typologies, the content 
analysis and coding scheme employed can be defined as a “directed approach” (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005). The directed approach uses prior theory in order to guide the classification 
process resulting in a strategy which begins with immediately coding the data with 
predetermined codes (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1282). Data which cannot be coded as either 
nation affirming, protectionist, or pluralist are “identified and analyzed later to determine if they 
represent a new category or a subcategory of an existing code. The choice of which of these 
approaches to use depends on the data and the researcher’s goal” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 
1282). The content analysis and coding scheme employed differ from the traditional intended 
results of content analysis which has the ultimate goal of enumerating the findings, resulting in 
observing the “presence or absence of a given category [which] can be measured or the 
‘frequency with which the category appears,’ or the ‘amount of space allotted to the category,’ or 
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the ‘strength or intensity with which the category is represented’” (Buttolph et al. 2008, 284). 
Instead, this coding scheme engages with hermeneutics as a tool of “deciphering the meaning of 
the text (1) through the eyes and intent of the writer or creator of the text or artifact, (2) 
according to the time frame existing at the time of writing, and (3) considering the political and 
cultural environmental influences existing at the time of the creation of the text or artifact” 
(McNabb 2010, 315). McNabb defines hermeneutic research as extrapolating the meaning of a 
text, thus “meaning cannot be deciphered without understanding the context as well as the text or 
phenomenon” (McNabb 2010, 316). Therefore, the coding process favoured here is not simply 
about identifying and counting how many times a certain word or phrase was mentioned; instead 




Chapter III: Immigration 
Not only are immigration and integration policies conflated within the academic literature, but 
both the PLQ and PQ often mould these two policy areas together within their electoral 
programs. For the parties, immigration is part-and-parcel of integration policy. This chapter, 
however, distinguishes between immigration and integration. Simply put, immigration policy 
proposals deal with getting newcomers to Quebec and integration proposals attempt to determine 
what needs to be done once the newcomer has arrived.   
 The recruitment and selection of newcomers over time in Quebec has been subject to 
considerable evolution, both reflected in the discursive change undertaken by various Quebec 
ministries (Juteau 2002; Symons 2002) and through the PLQ and PQ’s conceptualizations of 
immigration over time, shifting from prioritizing in-Canada immigration to prioritizing 
immigration from Francophone countries, and going from being driven by Quebec’s 
demographic realities to being motivated by economic considerations. Throughout, though, 
concern over the protection of language policy autonomy from the federal government played a 
constant role in these changing conceptualizations. Overall, the immigration policies put forth by 
the PQ which sought to protect the French language were not reflective of the party’s larger 
sovereignty ambitions. Instead, the policies aimed to solely protect the French language and did 
not seek to increase the likelihood of achieving political independence through the creation of 
immigration policies which were more sympathetic to the sovereignist project. 
 This chapter explores the ways in which the parties formulated their immigration policies 
over time and demonstrates that five themes emerge. The first one is the protection of Quebec’s 
French fact. The second theme is the acquisition of policy autonomy. The third concerns the 
demographic challenges that the province faced. Fourth is economic challenges. And the fifth 
and final theme is the importance of language. 
 
Theme I: Protection of the French Fact 
With Quebec’s historical shift away from the Grande Noirceur of the Duplessis era into the 
province’s coming-of-age as a boisterous defender of the Quebecois people during the Quiet 
Revolution, reflected in changing ideologies concerning the nation’s citizenship (Beauchemin 
2004; Gagnon and Iacovino 2004; Karmis 2004; Rocher 2002; Salée 2011), and culminating in 
the election of the province’s first sovereignist government in 1976, the province was now set on 
a new political path—one in which political competition was to be contested between two 
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political parties representing a clear difference in ideology concerning Quebec’s place within 
Canada. Within a substate nation such as Quebec, a nation which is both a majority and a 
minority within a large North American Anglophone hegemon, immigration poses itself as a 
sensitive issue. The nation first must determine whether immigration is desirable given perceived 
exogenous threats to the nation’s language and cultural uniqueness—welcoming newcomers may 
create an endogenous threat where newcomers may possess values which threaten the imagined 
community. 
 The 1976 campaign saw the PQ propose only a single policy concerning immigration. 
This proposal was to “take the necessary measures to prioritize the immigration of already 
established francophone families and individuals”10 (PQ 1976, 305). The notion of minority 
recruitment through immigration is extended to Canadian minorities thus there is an attempt to 
protect the nation through prioritizing the immigration of those who have the ability to easily 
integrate into their new host society by explicitly prioritizing those who are already familiar with 
French instead of those who are not. This proposal is an explicit preference for domestic 
immigration instead of international immigration. This prioritization of intra-Canada 
immigration, specifically intra-Canada Francophone immigration, came to partly define the PQ’s 
immigration policy for the next three elections (PQ 1981, 49; PQ 1985, 31; PQ 1989, 85). These 
early efforts to recruit and select French-speaking immigrants from within Canada, even during 
their later reconceptualization of immigration as a tool to address Quebec’s demographic decline, 
were offered as means in which to reinforce Quebec’s French culture and language (PQ 1976, 
305; 1981, 49; 1985, 31; 1989, 77, 85). Although this early prioritization of intra-Canada 
immigration served as a protectionist measure, the PQ proposed pluralist immigration policies in 
1981 (PQ 1981, 9) and 1985 (PQ 1985, 13). 
 While the PQ first prioritized immigration as a protectionist tool during the 1976, 1981, 
1985, and 1989 elections, the party also proposed two pluralist immigration policies in 
conjunction with this conceptualization. The 1985 platform proposed an immigration policy 
which encouraged the expression of different cultural communities (PQ 1985, 13) and was a 
pluralist recognition that the province needed to remain accommodating to non-Canadian 
immigration. By remaining open to non-Canadian immigration, this policy was an implicit 
acceptance that the protection of the French fact did not need to be achieved solely through intra-
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Canadian immigration. The 1981 platform proposed the pluralist creation of a ministry 
specifically dealing with immigration—a resulting ‘super ministry’ which would simultaneously 
deal with work and the workforce, social wellbeing and family, health, youth, and immigration 
would all be under the Ministry of Social Affairs (PQ 1981, 9). While the new ministry was to be 
responsible for a host of obligations, this proposal has been categorized as pluralist because it is 
an acceptance of immigration and attempts to extend the state’s role into the sphere of 
immigration. Indeed, the creation of a ministry to deal with immigration was proposed in 1976 
by the PLQ in their proposal for a Ministry of Population and Immigration with two principal 
tasks. The first task concerned immigration: “determining Quebec’s demographic policy 
objectives: volume, growth rate, geographical distribution, and a demo-linguistic balance”, and 
to provide advice to the Minister in regards to immigration policy and demographic problems; 
while the second task concerns integration: “to formulate immigration policies concerning 
immigrants’ needs upon arrival and for their integration into life in Quebec” (PLQ 1976, 55).  
 Although the PQ proposed immigration policies which favoured in-Canada Francophone 
immigration, and later Francophone immigration as a whole, in 1976, the PLQ did not echo this 
sentiment. So while this prioritization of French speaking immigrants is in line with the PQ’s 
nationalist ideology, particularly concerning the importance of the preservation of the Quebecois 
nation, the PLQ framed their immigration policies in 1976 in terms of policy autonomy. How the 
parties framed their immigration policies were not similar but ultimately still sought to address 
the same ends: protecting the French fact. From 1976-1985, the PQ thought this could best be 
done by ensuring that immigrants understood French upon arrival. This would make integration 
easier and would ensure that the French language, a primordial element of the nation, would 
remain intact. The PLQ, however, committed themselves to the protection of the nation through 
vociferous demands for more provincial power over immigrant selection and recruitment. 
Although the first two decades of immigration policy proposals were framed differently, a 
dissimilarity between the two parties emerged, one where they fundamentally agreed on the ends 
(the survival of the nation) but disagreed on the means. 
 
Theme II: Policy autonomy, 1976-1994 
As noted by Seidle (2010), “[i]n virtually all federations, subnational governments have no say in 
the selection of immigrants. Canada is an exception” (Seidle 2010, 49). Although Quebec’s 
autonomy concerning immigration is best exemplified in the Canada-Quebec Accord (Béchard 
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2011; Government of Canada 1991; Seidle 2010), the province long had a history of 
incrementally increasing its power concerning immigration since 1971. After winning the 1970 
provincial election, Robert Bourassa’s PLQ signed the Lang-Cloutier Agreement, a “modest” 
agreement which “authorized the province to post an immigration counsellor in designated 
countries” (Seidle 2010, 50). Following the Lang-Cloutier Agreement and the PLQ’s successful 
re-election in 1973, Bourassa’s government signed the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement in 1975 
which gave Quebec a “role in immigrant selection and was enhanced in 1978” through the 
Cullen-Couture Agreement (Seidle 2010, 50). The 1971, 1975, and 1978 agreements were, in 
effect, incremental transfers of powers away from the federal government to the province of 
Quebec concerning immigration. In fact, two of these three agreements, 1971 and 1975, were 
signed by Liberal governments—indicating that even the federalist party demanded increased 
policy autonomy from the federal government in this area. And yet, the constitutional devolution 
of immigration policy towards the provincial level effectively allowed the province to become 
increasingly more vociferous in their demands for more powers in this policy area. The biggest 
increase in immigration policy autonomy the province received, however, was a direct result of 
the Meech Lake Accord’s failure (Béchard 2011, 1) which typified the ongoing demands for 
increased policy autonomy espoused by both the PQ and PLQ since 1976 onwards. This 
convergence is particularly significant given the language in which the parties’ demand for 
policy autonomy were couched were essentially the same: that Quebec needed unique powers of 
the selection, recruitment, and integration of newcomers as a way of ensuring their demographic 
survival and the continuance of the French fact. Both the sovereignist PQ and federalist PLQ 
equally agreed that increased powers over immigration were essential to the survival of the 
Quebec nation—and by extension the imagined community—and these demands further came to 
frame immigration policy proposals until the signing of the Canada-Quebec Accord in 1991. 
 From 1976-1994, the PLQ primarily framed their immigration policies through demands 
for increased policy autonomy concerning immigration. Based off the considerable and 
incremental transfer of powers to Quebec from the 1971 and 1975 agreements, the PLQ’s 1976 
platform called for a recognition that “immigration is a shared constitutional jurisdiction between 
the federal government and the provincial government, [but] Quebec’s recruitment policy must 
have defined shared criteria with the federal government which are oriented towards Quebec’s 
specific needs” (PLQ 1976, 55-56).  
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 Although the platform recognized the shared nature of immigration policy as set forth by 
the British North America Act, 1867, there was still the demand for a policy “oriented towards 
Quebec’s specific needs” in respect to this shared jurisdiction, thus demonstrating that the shared 
jurisdiction must have a unique composition which recognized Quebec’s sociodemographic and 
sociolinguistic uniqueness (PLQ 1976, 55-56). In essence, the 1976 platform’s proposal was a 
way of arguing that the federal immigration policy could not be one-size-fits-all and it must take 
Quebec’s unique needs into account; the federal immigration policy had to be tailored to Quebec. 
Although the PLQ did not mention policy autonomy in their 1981 platform, the PQ identified, in 
1981, that the tailoring of immigration policy to best fit Quebec’s needs could be done through 
sole control over immigration policy, this allowed the PQ to explicitly promise to “exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction in matters of immigration” (PQ 1981, 49). This demand by the PQ is not 
altogether surprising given that the party’s raison d’être is the creation of an independent 
Quebec, demands for policy transfer from the national to subnational level are a logical 
extension of the sovereignty project. The constitutional transfer of this shared jurisdiction to the 
provincial level, for the PQ, is a recognition by the party that the federal policy is not best suited 
for Quebec and that Quebec is well equipped to be responsible for its own unique selection and 
recruitment policies.  
 The PLQ, however, continued to demand increased policy autonomy from 1985 onwards. 
Found in the “La carte du Canada et de la Francophonie” section, the 1985 platform first 
outlines the PLQ’s constitutional demands from the federal government with a promise that a 
“PLQ government, which understands the necessity of recognizing Quebec as a distinct society 
and to give this society the required instruments for its social and economic development, will 
continue its pragmatic efforts to end the constitutional reforms brought about by the Party, 
notably concerning the Supreme Court, the Senate, and the sharing of powers” (PLQ 1985, 11, 
emphasis added). Couched by the Lévesque government’s refusal to sign the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in 1981, the PLQ proposed a policy to “end the constitutional reforms” (PLQ 
1985, 11) and to address the sharing of powers, an area under which immigration falls. Although 
constitutional reforms came to dominate Quebec’s political climate with the Mulroney 
government’s Meech Lake Accord beginning in 1987, the PLQ included full powers over 
immigration as a pre-requisite for its signature on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985. 
Indeed, the reference to the “sharing of powers” can be extended to the area of immigration—
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one of the few constitutional areas in which powers are shared between the state and substate 
unit. The second proposal concerning immigration in the 1985 platform is found under the 
“Conditions for Accepting the New Constitution” section. This proposal is an elaboration on the 
previous statement which referenced the shared jurisdiction of powers, and promised that a PLQ 
government would “reclaim the constitutional recognition of Quebec’s right to determine with 
the federal government the number and selection of immigrants coming to Quebec, these new 
guaranties will serve as instruments for the development of Quebec’s policy concerning 
population and immigration” (PLQ 1985, 13). This reclamation of the constitutional right to 
conjointly determine the recruitment and selection of newcomers to Quebec are precursors to 
what the Bourassa government demanded in the Meech Lake Accord’s negotiations—outright 
independent control over immigration policy from the federal government.  
 Quebec’s refusal to sign the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 proved to be an 
issue worth rectifying with the election of the federal Mulroney government in 1984. Mulroney 
twice attempted to receive Quebec’s signature on the Charter through the Meech Lake Accord in 
1987 and the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. As a result, the Meech Lake Accord and 
Charlottetown Accord came to define the political climate of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Included in these constitutional discussions were demands from the PLQ for increased autonomy 
concerning immigration policy from the federal government—ultimately leading to this 
increased autonomy in 1991 (Paquet 2016, 63; Simeon 1988, s9). The PLQ’s continued 
formulation of immigration policy through an administrative and constitutional struggle for 
greater policy autonomy largely came to a head with the Meech Lake Accord. The Meech Lake 
Accord has been subject to study concerning its impacts on federalism (Simeon 1998) and its 
failure (Cairns 1988), and so too has the Charlottetown Accord (Johnston 1993; LeDuc and 
Pammett 1995), but little has been done which examines the relationship between immigration, 
integration, and these constitutional projects. With the Meech Lake Accord beginning in 1987, 
and with the 1985 platform demanding increased policy autonomy for Quebec, the PLQ’s 198911 
platform included an immigration proposal, in the ‘Reception and Insertion into Quebec’ section, 
which demanded that “federal immigration policy has to take into account the unique and 
additional powers Quebec has concerning immigration policy” (PLQ 1989a, 56). This continued 
                                                 
11
 Although beginning in 1987, the Meech Lake Accord had a three year period for it to receive approval from the 
provincial legislatures. 
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the Party’s non-negotiable demand that one of the requirements for receiving Quebec’s signature 
on the Charter at the 1987 Meech Lake Accord, and the Charter by extension, was a legal 
devolution of immigration policy to the province.  
Where both the Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Accord failed, the Meech Lake 
Accord’s demise proved to be beneficial for the PLQ’s long-standing desire for the constitutional 
transfer of immigration policy from being shared to unique to Quebec. The Canada-Quebec 
Accord was, in terms of scale, the largest and most significant transfer of powers to the substate 
level. The Accord codified the demands that both the PQ and PLQ had been making, including 
granting Quebec the “selection of persons who wish to reside permanently or temporarily in 
Québec, their admission into Canada, their integration into Québec society, and the 
determination of levels of immigration to Québec” (Government of Canada 1991). The stated 
objective of the Accord was the “preservation of Québec’s demographic importance within 
Canada and the integration of immigrants to that province in a manner that respects the distinct 
identity of Québec” (Government of Canada 1991). As an outcome of the Meech Lake Accord, 
the Canada-Quebec Accord incorporated “the Meech Lake Accord’s commitment that Quebec 
should receive the same percentage of the total number of immigrants admitted to Canada as is 
its percentage of the Canadian population, with the right to exceed this figure by 5%, for 
demographic reasons” (Béchard 2011, 2). Not only was the federal government to withdraw 
from the selection, recruitment, and integration of newcomers into Quebec, but they were now to 
provide Quebec with financial compensation with “[e]ach year’s payment […] calculated 
according to an ‘escalation factor’. The grant has grown from $76 million in 1991/92 to $254 for 
2010/11” (Seidle 2010, 50). 
 Although the PQ did not propose policies which sought to increase the powers the 
province had over immigration policy apart from the 1981 platform, this is not altogether 
surprising. With the PQ’s ultimate political goal being the secession of Quebec from Canada, 
increased policy autonomy over virtually every area of policy is assumed. The Party’s silence 
within its platforms does not mean that it did not want the transfer of powers. The PLQ, 
however, proposed policies which sought greater autonomy in the 1976, 1985, and 1989 
elections. The 1976 and 1985 platforms formulated these demands through a more stringent 
application of the shared jurisdiction in order for it to account for Quebec’s cultural uniqueness 
but the 1989 platform was set against the backdrop of the Meech Lake Accord and the Bourassa 
 42 
Liberals’ demand for outright autonomy of the selection, recruitment, and integration of 
newcomers into Quebec. Even in the post-Meech Lake Accord environment, and with the 
signing of the Canada-Quebec Accord in 1991, the PLQ remained committed to seeking 
increased policy autonomy from the federal government as indicated by two passages in their 
1994 platform.  
 Found in the ‘Liberal Vision of Quebec’s Identity’ section (PLQ 1994a, 55), the first 
proposal is an effort by the party to obtain “a greater autonomy for Quebec, founded on the 
principle of subsidiarity, concerning [the policies] which have been entrusted to the federal 
government given their sole jurisdiction as they are best qualified to deliver services effectively, 
and on the affirmation of Quebec society’s distinct character”; the second proposal states that 
allowing Quebec to have more powers over economic, social, and cultural institutions would 
increase Canada’s political stability by recognizing Quebec’s rightful place within the “national 
compact” (PLQ 1994a, 55). Like the PLQ, policy autonomy over immigration continued to be 
emphasized by the PQ in the post- Canada-Quebec Accord climate. In 2008 (PQ 2008, 25), the 
party promised to “fight to recuperate all the powers that Quebecers consider essential to 
preserve their identity, continue to defend their interests, and ensure their future: […] 
immigration […]”. 
 Evidently, the PLQ demanded policy autonomy from the federal government in areas not 
relating to immigration which allowed the Party to espouse nationalist proposals which sought to 
differentiate themselves from their federalist banner. This, in essence, allowed the PLQ to be 
both federalist and nationalist by promoting a strong and more autonomous Quebec within 
Canada. Where the PQ is committed to sovereignty and policy autonomy, three of the four 
immigration accords signed between the federal government and Quebec were signed by the 
PLQ—in fact all of which were signed by Premier Bourassa—with the exception being the 1979 
Cullen-Couture Agreement. No party has been more instrumental at successfully increasing 
Quebec’s immigration autonomy than has the PLQ, particularly when one considers the scope 
and reach that the Canada-Quebec Accord had specifically as a result of the demands the 
Bourassa government brought to the Meech Lake negotiations. 
 Although the parties may not have framed their immigration policies in a similar fashion 
from 1976-1985, they nevertheless did eventually converge. The 1989 election saw both the PQ 
and PLQ identify a demographic crisis and, as a result, immigration was to be a considerable 
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factor in reversing this crisis. The parties subsequently proposed policies which, on the one hand, 
sought to address the crisis by remaining open to immigration while, on the other hand, ensuring 
that immigration did not contribute to Quebec’s precarious situation as a French speaking nation 
within Anglophone North America. 
 
Theme III: Demographic Challenges, 1989 and 2003 
For the PQ, the 1985 election demonstrated a significant change in their proposed immigration 
policies. Where the PLQ addressed immigration policy only through a policy-autonomy lens, the 
1985 election continued the PQ’s preference for in-Canada immigration but also proposed that 
immigration policy must take Quebec’s French character into account by encouraging both the 
immigration of already established Canadian Francophones and of foreign Francophones, all the 
while maintaining a welcoming attitude towards non-francophone immigrants (PQ 1985, 31). 
From 1985 onwards, the PQ began to promote with insistence the recruitment and selection of 
Francophone immigrants as a tool to reinforce and protect Quebec’s cultural uniqueness. Indeed, 
the PQ’s shift towards international Francophone immigration was eventually echoed by the 
PLQ in 1989 (PQ 1989, 55-56) through its proposal to actively recruit immigrants from 
francophone countries given that “francophone immigrants integrate more easily into Quebec 
society” (PLQ 1989a, 55-56). However, while the PQ and PLQ both effectively proposed 
international efforts to recruit Francophones to Quebec, the 1989 election’s immigration policies 
were influenced by the province’s low birthrate, which in turn created a perceived demographic 
crisis. This demographic crisis was recognized by both parties who offered solutions with which 
to address the crisis (PQ 1989, 77, 84, 85; PLQa 1989, 48, 55-56). 
 Under the umbrella of this demographic crisis, four immigration proposals by the PQ 
were identified; two of which were found in the ‘Population and Immigration’ section and two 
were found in the ‘Immigration and Cultural Communities’ section. The first proposal is a 
recognition that Quebec was going through a “major demographic crisis which risks to alter the 
force and fibre of our society” and that if said crisis is not reversed, Quebec risks losing its 
influence within North America (PQ 1989, 77). Concretely, concerning immigration, the party 
stated that “immigration has to contribute to the cultural reinforcement and consolidation of 
Quebec’s French character as well as its demography” (PQ 1989, 77). Even in the face of a 
considerable demographic challenge, where the PQ had again committed itself to the reception 
and recruitment of immigrants as a means to reduce or overturn demographic decline, the 
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proposed policies are still to take the imagined community and Quebec’s unique culture and 
language into account—thus the crisis needed to be rectified while still minimizing exogenous 
threats to the community. This rectification strategy was mirrored by the PLQ who both 
proposed a policy which aimed to maintain pluralist and open integration strategies (PLQ 1989a, 
48) but was simultaneously committed to increasing the number of French speaking immigrants 
(PLQ 1989a, 55-56) as a means of both addressing the crisis and protecting Quebec’s French 
fact. Both the PQ and PLQ converge on this question: the crisis needed to be addressed but not at 
the expense of the French language. The remaining PQ immigration proposals explicitly sought 
to (i) give priority to Francophone immigrants and (ii) to increase the points allotted to the 
knowledge of French within the selection criteria while increasing Quebec’s representation 
within targeted immigration countries (PQ 1989, 84).  
 As winners of the 1989 election, the Liberals committed themselves to reversing 
demographic decline through immigration in Premier Bourassa’s inaugural address to the 34th 
legislature’s first sitting (PLQ 1989b). The province, however, was in the midst of the Meech 
Lake Accord and this gave Bourassa ample opportunity to argue that the rectification of the 
demographic crisis would be made easier with increased powers from the federal government: 
 Compte tenu du contexte démographique qui prévaut présentement au 
Québec et compte tenu des difficultés que représente l'intégration des 
immigrants à la société québécoise, la ratification de l'accord du lac Meech 
revêt également une grande importance parce qu'il permet, en matière 
d'immigration, de sécuriser les pouvoirs que le Québec détient en vertu de 
l'entente Cullen-Couture. Il ne sera plus possible, si l'accord du lac Meech 
est ratifié, de subordonner ces pouvoirs au bon vouloir d’un gouvernement. 
Il y aura donc une sécurité absolue pour l'avenir de la francophonie 
québécoise. Toujours dans le même contexte, cet accord est également 
important parce qu'il confère au Québec des pouvoirs additionnels qui 
permettent un contrôle et une planification de l'immigration compatibles 
avec ses besoins (PLQ 1989b). 
For the Bourassa government, then, the success of the Meech Lake Accord was an essential 
means in which to combat both the demographic crisis and the “difficulties of integrating 
immigrants into Quebec society” (PLQ 1989b). Bourassa couched this belief within nationalist 
terms which argued that the Accord would allow for Quebec to have sole and unique powers 
over immigration which could not be subordinated by the federal government, and, furthermore, 
that the Accord was essential for Quebec to “receive additional powers that allows Quebec to 
plan an immigration policy which is compatible with the province’s needs” (PLQ 1989b). 
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 While the PQ and PLQ demonstrated considerable convergence during the 1989 election, 
this was not to be the sole election in which the demographic crisis would be a factor. In 2003, 
the PQ conceived its immigration policy proposals through a different demographic crisis. 
Instead of demographic decline, the PQ proposed three immigration policies, all found in the 
‘Rejuvenate Quebec’ section (PQ 2003, 35-37), which were attempts to address Quebec’s rapidly 
aging society. In order to address this crisis, the PQ first recognized that “immigration is an 
enrichment for Quebec” and promised to welcome 50,000 immigrants by 2005 (PQ 2003, 35). 
The platform then proposed to “better promote Quebec as a destination for potential immigrants” 
and to “enrich Quebec through immigration” (PQ 2003, 37). The 2003 demographic crisis 
demonstrates two significant changes from 1989. First, the PQ offered to address the 
demographic issue without specifically ensuring that immigrants were Francophone—nor did 
they mention recruitment efforts in Francophone countries. Two subsequent things can be 
extended from this. First, the province’s integrative measures may be strong enough to 
effectively ensure the integration of newcomers into the Francophone majority thus reducing the 
necessity for Francophone immigrant recruitment. Second, the proposition of 50,000 immigrants 
over a two-year period may have led to the imposition of a target that could not have been filled 
solely though Francophone immigration. Finally, the second change during the 2003 election is 
that the PLQ did not, in fact, recognize this demographic challenge in their platform—instead 
opting to focus on immigration as an economic issue. Economics became the lens through which 
immigration proposals would be viewed through over the proceeding election cycles and 
ultimately continued through Jean Charest’s tenure as Premier of Quebec.  
 
Theme IV: Economic changes, 2003, 2007, and 2012 
With Jean Charest’s selection as leader of the PLQ in 1998, the party underwent a significant 
change. Altering its previous positions issued under Bourassa, the PLQ began to frame 
immigration in terms of economics. Yet prior to Charest, Daniel Johnson Jr., addressing the 
Third session of the 32nd legislature, briefly casted immigration through an economic lens by 
hoping that “des politiques d'ouverture et d'intégration calme, sereine, d'immigrants, faire [sic] 
en sorte que la croissance démographique ne soit pas un rêve, mais une réalité qui, là aussi, 
permettra la relance de la consommation” (PLQ 1994b). This “relance de consommation” would 
spur economic growth as new consumers would buy more goods and the successful integration 
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of immigrants would be an economic net-benefit for the province as a whole. Concrete change in 
immigration proposals within electoral platforms would take place in 2003 under Charest’s 
leadership.  
After nine years out of office, the 2003 election saw the PLQ shift from the traditional 
tactic of deploying a single policy platform and instead propose seven different individually 
focused platforms. These micro-platforms included a document concerning integration: Pour une 
intégration harmonieuse (PLQ 2003a). The 2003 micro-platform proposed four immigration 
policies, included was a recognition that by selecting people who “may fit more easily in 
employment, we are evidently increasing the chances of a quick and successful integration” (PLQ 
2003a, 13, emphasis added). The micro-platform further included recognition that the province 
needed Francophone immigrants, but warned against Francophone immigration targets becoming 
“exclusive quotas which lead us to refuse someone who could fill a job in which there is a 
shortage in Quebec and, because they are not French, has the desire to learn the French 
language” (PLQ 2003a, 13). Concretely, the PLQ proposed that the Organismes communautaires 
d’accueil et d’intégration (OCAI) become involved with the search for immigrants. It argued 
that they can, “with their contacts in their homeland, and in collaboration with the chambers of 
commerce and community professional associations, help the government identity the type of 
person which would best adapt to Quebec” and increase the recognition of foreign diplomas 
within Quebec (PLQ 2003a, 13; 14). While the 2003 platform’s economic emphasis becomes 
more apparent when looking at the integrative measures, the link between immigration and 
economics cannot be denied. For the PLQ, beginning in 2003, immigration was to be tied with 
economic integration—but this economic integration would be facilitated through the 
recruitment and selection of immigrants with the highest economic potential which led to de-
emphasizing the onus on the selected immigrant to already be familiar with the French language. 
 Similarly to the 2003 platform, the 2007 election saw the PLQ offer both a general 
electoral platform, S’unir pour réussi le Québec de demain (PLQ 2007a), and six targeted 
platforms including Unis pour réussir la diversité (PLQ 2007b) which concerned immigration 
and integration. The 2007 election continued the Party’s commitment to economic immigration 
through the proposal of two immigration policies. Found in Unis pour réussir la diversité, the 
proposals included increasing the number of immigrants in order to support Quebec’s economic 
development, and to continue to select immigrants based on the grid-system but to put in place a 
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review of this system which will allow for the recruitment of immigrants who are the best 
candidates available for the Quebec job market (PLQ 2007b, 2). These proposals are further 
bolstered by a host of integration policies which sought to facilitate integration, rapprochement, 
and economic integration both in the general election platform (PLQ 2007a, 69) and the policy-
specific platform (PLQ 2007b, 2). The 2007 election resulted in a PLQ minority government—
the first minority government since 1878—and would ultimately fall, triggering an election in 
2008. The preceding 2008 election would not see the PLQ propose a single immigration nor 
integration policy apart from two immigration policies, which were similar to the PQ, concerning 
the recruitment of foreign university students.  
 Viewing immigration through an economic lens is continued in the 2012 election. In what 
would ultimately be Jean Charest’s last election as leader of the PLQ, the 2012 platform 
proposed three pluralist immigration policies. The immigration policies are found under the 
“Facilitating the Integration of Newcomers into the Labour Market” section (PLQ 2012, 8). 
These policies included proposals to revise the selection grid so that more points could be 
awarded to immigrants who have already received a job offer while awarding more points for 
those which job offers outside of Montreal; to intensify discussions with the federal government 
in order to facilitate awarding student visas to those who have enrolled in trade schools; and to 
“increase the number of foreign recruitment missions […] and will diversify the destinations” 
(PLQ 2012, 8). Within this economic reality, then, the proposed policies are pluralist in nature in 
that they primarily sought to both increase immigration by not being restrictive nor exclusive, 
and sought to increase the likely chances of settlement by awarding visas for students training for 
jobs that were much needed within Quebec. 
 The Liberals effectively changed how they conceptualized immigration policy while 
under the leadership of Jean Charest. Gone were overt concerns for the protection of the 
imagined community through immigration policy. They were replaced instead with economic 
considerations—that selection and recruitment efforts should reflect the province’s economic 
needs. But the economic imperative that the Charest Liberals identified was not echoed 
throughout the electoral cycles by the PQ who had a new leader in 2007 and finished with the 
third most seats in the National Assembly while Mario Dumont’s Action Démocratique du 
Québec became Official Opposition. The 2008 election saw Pauline Marois head the party for 
her first election. Yet with these leadership changes, and with a period of consistency under 
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Marois through three elections, the PQ did not conceptualize immigration as an economic 
necessity until the 2014 election through a brief, and vague, promise to create a modern 
immigration system which sought to “review the [immigration] process in order to ensure their 
francization, their integration and professional insertion, as well as to better respond to Quebec’s 
needs” (PQ 2014, 22, emphasis added). Ultimately, the PLQ was able to promote economic well-
being as necessity—particularly in a decade long electoral cycle which was often framed through 
economic recession and post-recession recovery. Regardless, even throughout periods of 
economic recession and recovery, neither the PQ nor PLQ proposed policies which sought to 
restrict immigration. To the contrary, the PLQ actively encouraged immigration as a means to 
relaunch the economy—in essence echoing the words of Daniel Johnson Jr.—while the PQ 
remained mute on the issue throughout the 2000s.  
 Curiously, while both parties mirror each other early on in recruitment efforts for 
Francophone immigrants, they both conceptualize immigration differently over different periods 
of time. The PQ first committed itself to intra-Canada immigration and the recruitment and 
selection of Francophone immigrants while the PLQ was committed to demanding policy 
autonomy before subsequently focusing their proposed recruitment efforts on Francophones. For 
both parties, essential elements of immigration were to get more powers for the province and to 
protect the nation by ensuring that immigrants will contribute to Quebec’s French character. As 
the PLQ began to identify immigration as an economic necessity, the PQ showed little concern 
for the issue. However, neither the PQ nor PLQ ever proposed to curb the total number of 
immigrants, to only target Francophone immigrants, or enforce restrictive immigration policies. 
In effect, both the PQ and PLQ prefer policies which encourage immigration but through 
different lenses. The overarching similarity, however, is the necessity of the survival of both the 
French language and culture—and that immigrants were assuredly going to contribute to this 
linguistic survival even if the PLQ de-emphasized the importance of Francophone recruitment 
under Charest’s leadership.  
 
Theme V: The Importance of Language 
Over the course of the studied elections, the PQ and PLQ had little overlap in how they 
formulated their immigration policies. Where the PQ initially determined immigration policy 
through the prioritization of intra-Canada Francophone immigration; the PLQ determined their 
policies through demands for increased policy autonomy. The two parties did, however, both 
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offer policies within the same situational framework in the 1989 election concerning the 
province’s demographic crisis. Yet the PQ’s later identification of another demographic crisis 
was not mirrored by the PLQ who instead opted to shift its focus towards economic necessity. 
What has yet to be explored, however, is the role played by the French language during the 11 
elections studied.  
Given that the French language is one of the most obvious areas which binds the 
Quebecois imagined community, and given that Quebec remains a linguistic majority while 
being a minority within Canada and North America, one may assume that protecting the French 
language would be of the utmost importance to both parties. Although the protection of the 
language may be achieved through a host of non-ethnocultural diversity management policies, 
one could expect both parties to extend protectionist measures into immigration policy either by 
prioritizing the selection and recruitment of Francophone immigrants or by placing barriers on 
non-Francophones—essentially making Francophone immigration easier at the expense of non-
Francophones. What emerged from 1976 onwards, however, is that the PQ largely proposed 
immigration policies which engaged with protecting Quebec’s French fact while the PLQ, 
instead, did not employ immigration policy proposals which sought to promote Francophone 
immigration with the exception of 1989, instead the Party focused their immigration policies on 
constitutional and economic matters. 
 The importance of the preservation and protection of the French language was made 
apparent in the PQ’s earliest formulation of immigration policy. For the PQ, efforts to prioritize 
Canadian Francophone immigration was eventually met with expanding this to North America 
and rest of the world (PQ 1985, 31; PQ 1989, 85). But the link between the prioritization of 
Francophone immigration, specifically within Canada, is made explicit in the 1985 platform: that 
immigration policy must take “Quebec’s French character into account. With this in mind, 
immigration policy will encourage Canadian Francophones from the rest of world to immigrate 
to Quebec all the while maintaining a welcoming attitude towards all other immigrants” (PQ 
1985, 31). In the face of the 1989 demographic crisis, the PQ’s continued insistence that 
immigration policy has to “contribute to the cultural reinforcement and consolidation of 
Quebec’s French character as well as its demography” (PQ 1989, 77) indicates that the 
rectification of this demographic crisis must be done through an approach which seeks to ensure 
that the French language is not sacrificed in the name of immigration—even while actively 
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looking for newcomers to immigrate to Quebec. The PQ actively proposed policies which either 
sought to recruit, increase, or target Francophone immigrants in 1976, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1994, 
and 1998. As previously discussed, the 1976, 1981, and 1985 platforms proposed policies which 
promoted the immigration of Canadian Francophones.  
The 1989 platform proposed a significant policy change for the PQ. Where the Party 
previously promoted Francophone immigration, the 1989 platform now concretized this by 
proposing to “increase points awarded to those who know French” and to “increase Quebec’s 
representation within targeted countries” (PQ 1989, 85). In a similar vein, the 1994 platform 
proposed an immigration policy which sought a “better integration into Quebec society by 
prioritizing, on the one hand, immigrants who already know French and, on the other hand, 
family reunification” (PQ 1994, 68-69). This sentiment is echoed in the 1998 election through an 
immigration policy which intended to “increase the proportion of immigrants who understand 
French” (PQ 1998, 63). For the PQ, targeting, recruiting, and selecting Francophone immigrants 
was an essential part of immigration policy from 1976 through 1998. This prioritization of 
Francophone immigrants is essentially the solidification of their 1989 declaration that 
immigration must “contribute to the cultural reinforcement and consolidation of Quebec’s 
French character as well as its democracy” (PQ 1989, 77). The protection, growth, 
reinforcement, and fortification of the French language was not separated from immigration by 
the PQ and would, in fact, be a significant factor in determining what specifically immigration 
was to accomplish. 
 Where the PLQ framed their immigration proposals through the demand for increased 
policy autonomy and through economics, the Party came to concretely propose policies which 
sought to recruit Francophone immigrants in 1989 (PLQ 1989, 55-56). The 1989 platform 
proposed to dynamically recruit immigrants from francophone countries given that “francophone 
immigrants integrate more easily into Quebec society” (PLQ 1989a, 55-56). As a whole, 
however, the PLQ was quiet concerning efforts to recruit Francophone immigrants into the 
province aside from the 1989 electoral platform instead largely focusing their efforts to protect 
Quebec’s distinct cultural and linguistic uniqueness through integrative measures12. 
 What emerges are immigration proposals from two different political parties which 
fundamentally sought to achieve different things concerning language. The PQ actively 
                                                 
12
 As will be made more apparent in the proceeding chapter. 
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promoted immigration policies which prioritized the selection and recruitment of Francophones, 
but the PLQ instead opted to ensure the francization of immigrants through integrative measures 
which de-emphasized the need for Francophone immigrants. The Liberals provided measures 
such as language training and the facilitation of employment. These measures allowed 
integration into the cultural and linguistic majority which led to the consolidation and protection 
of the French language from within.  
Concerning language, what emerges is a series of divergent policy proposals concerning 
the ways in which to protect the imagined community. Although the PQ was committed to 
protecting the imagined community through seeking immigrants who are familiar with the 
French language, they did not propose policies which restricted non-Francophone immigration 
nor restricted immigration in general as a means to protect Quebec from perceived exogenous 
threats. Indeed, the PQ recognized that immigration was essential for addressing two 
demographic crises but proposed different means that be employed to address the respective 
crises. The 1989 sociodemographic decline needed to be met with Francophone immigration—
that rectifying this decline should not come at the expense of the French language, a sentiment 
which was mirrored by the PLQ in 1989 as well—but the 2003 demographic crisis would be 
addressed through immigration as a whole and the PQ did not prioritize, nor emphasize, 
Francophone immigration as the primary way to combat the crisis.  
In sum, policy divergence concerning the importance that language had on immigration is 
exemplified concerning where the parties focus their recruitment efforts. Essentially, the PQ 
proposed policies which explicitly prioritized Francophone immigration from 1976-1998 where 
the PLQ instead couched their immigration policies within demands for greater autonomy and 
economics while explicitly proposing to recruit newcomers from Francophone countries as a 
means of facilitating integration in 1989. Language, then, permeated immigration policy for the 
PQ more so than it did for the PLQ. However, as will be made evident later, language proved to 
be an extremely important issue in the parties’ framing of ethnocultural diversity management 
proposals. But the PLQ took a more activist role in the francization of immigrants through their 
integrative measures.  
The link between ethnocultural diversity management and language is made more tenable 
through the integration policies that each party proposed over time—and indeed these policies 
have significant overlap and convergence. The PQ effectively proposed policies which sought to 
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protect the nation through immigration where the PLQ did not. However, the protectionist 
measures were not met with policies which sought to select those who were sympathetic to the 
sovereignty project. From 1998 onward, the PQ and PLQ effectively converged concerning their 
recruitment strategies by either refusing to put forward proposals with recruitment targets by 
land of origin or by proposing policies which sought to increase the total number of immigrants 
regardless of their linguistic background (PQ 2003, 35-37; PLQ 2003, 13). As a result, the PQ 
mirrored the PLQ’s prioritization of making francization part-and-parcel of their integrative 
measures. 
 
On the Other Hand…: Openness and the Desire to Protect 
At their core, the proposed immigration policies fundamentally sought to protect the Quebec 
nation’s imagined community. Be it through intra-Canada or Francophone immigration, or 
demands for policy autonomy, these immigration efforts were made in order to protect Quebec’s 
French fact. The prioritization of the immigration of Francophone Canadian, and eventually 
international Francophones, was an explicit attempt to ensure that newcomers coming to Quebec 
were already familiar with the French language—a non-negotiable aspect of Quebec citizenship 
of which newcomers are expected to participate. Although the link between language and the 
newcomer becomes more apparent when looking at the parties’ proposed integrative measures, 
language’s relevance concerning immigration cannot be denied. And yet in an opposite direction, 
the PLQ’s changing approaches towards an immigration policy based primarily on economic 
necessity divorces the importance of language from immigration, instead proposing policies 
which sought to facilitate immigrant job placement and curbing possible economic disadvantages 
immigrants face such as skills recognition and foreign diploma recognition. The changing 
approaches to immigration implies that, on the one hand, the parties were systematically seeking 
to protect the Quebecois nation’s cultural and linguistic uniqueness while, on the other hand, 
they refrained from proposing restrictive policies which sought to limit total immigration 
numbers or only allow for a certain type of immigrant. 
 Over the 11 elections studied, the PQ proposed 12 nation affirming and nation protecting 
immigration policies and six pluralist policies whereas the PLQ proposed seven nation affirming 
and nation protecting immigration policies and 13 pluralist policies. The employed nation 
affirming and protecting approaches are formulated from Benedict Anderson’s (2006) argument 
that a nation is formed by a community which is linked through a common collectivity with a 
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communal sense of attachment to their territory and this attachment is maintained even though 
the nation is too large for all members to have interacted with each other. Although not all 
members of the Quebecois nation are sovereignist, they are still members of the same collective 
nation, or imagined community, forged together through a common history and a language 
which has come to define Quebec since Champlain settled Quebec City in 1608. These 
approaches are comprised of three aspects: protectionist proposals, nationalist proposals, and 
proposals which seek to limit cultural differences.  
Of the 12 affirmationist and protectionist policies proposed by the PQ, those which 
sought to prioritize the immigration of Canadian Francophones and international Francophones 
have been identified as affirmationist or protectionist due to their inherent attempt to protect the 
French language by ensuring an easier immigration effort was made to select and recruit those 
who did not need language training and would not threaten the French language by adding to its 
precarious situation as an endogenous threat. These measures were found in the 1976, 1981, 
1985, 1994, and 1998 elections representing seven of the 12 total policies. Two proposals sought 
greater policy autonomy (1981 and 2008) and have been identified as protectionist. The 
remaining three policies are found in the 1989 platform. One such proposal was a recognition 
that Quebec’s demographic crisis put the province at risk of a demo-linguistic crisis—efforts 
needed to be made to ensure that Quebec’s linguistic reality was able to survive well into the 
future and immigration acted as a means to ensure this, thus protecting the nation’s French fact 
(PQ 1989, 77). The second policy is one which proposed that immigration had to account for 
cultural reinforcement—a recognition that an end result of immigration was the continued 
survival of the French fact (PQ 1989, 77). The final proposal was a nationalist recognition that 
addressing the 1989 demographic crisis would be more easily addressed by an independent 
Quebec which would have full control over the levers of immigration policy given that this 
would lead to “incontestably affirming our nation’s personality” (PQ 1989, 84).  
On the contrary, the proposed pluralist immigration policies were to create a ministry to 
deal with immigration in 1981, but five proposals were explicitly pluralist in their intents, in fact 
promoting immigration, increasing the number of immigrants, and building an immigration 
policy based on diversity, openness, facilitating integration, and included a recognition to “enrich 
Quebec through immigration” (PQ 2003, 37). The PQ was capable of attempting to both protect 
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the nation while maintaining a delicate balance of remaining open to pluralist immigration 
policies. 
 Of the PLQ’s seven proposed affirmationist and protectionist policies, six proposed 
increased policy autonomy and have as such been identified as protectionist (PLQ 1976, 55-56; 
PLQ 1985, 11, 13; PLQ 1989, 56; PLQ 1994, 55); one of which proposed the prioritization of 
Francophone immigrants (PLQ 1989, 55-56). Much like the PQ’s immigration efforts, the 
policies proposed are not restrictive efforts to protect the nation, instead offering to protect the 
imagined community through policy autonomy given that they argued that the province had a 
better understanding of the province’s policy needs than did the federal government. In effect, 
the PQ and PLQ’s demands for increased policy autonomy mirror each other in intent but with 
different means. The PLQ committed itself to either maintaining the conjoint agreement with the 
federal government while seeking to ensure that Quebec’s needs were better represented, or 
through incremental change resulting from agreements with the federal government. The PQ, 
instead, opted for policy autonomy through independence. The remaining protectionist policy 
was a 1989 proposal to prioritize the immigration of Francophones given that they more easily 
integrate into society (PLQ 1989, 55-56). Framed through a demographic crisis, this was an 
attempt to ensure that the crisis was addressed but not at the expense of the French language—
indeed the same logic employed the PQ. Thus, convergence occurs when one compares the 
affirmationist and protectionist immigration policies that the parties propose. Both sought 
increased autonomy, both sought to prioritize Francophone immigration, and fundamentally both 
sought to ensure that immigration policy did not lead to place the French language under any 
more threat than it was already. 
 Of the PLQ’s 13 proposed pluralist policies, two involved the creation of a ministry 
which was to deal with immigration (PLQ 1976, 55), two were explicitly pluralist in nature or 
promoted the openness of the citizens thus promoting immigration as a whole (PLQ 1989, 48; 
PLQ 1998)
13
, and nine concerned economic immigration. The ministerial proposal, much like the 
one put forth by the PQ in 1981, is an institutional recognition that immigration was to become 
both a political and policy reality for the province—thus the creation of a ministry which was to 
help in the management of immigration was a pluralist recognition that immigration was not 
going to be discouraged in the future. The 1989 and 1998 platforms see the PLQ propose policies 
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which facilitate the integration of newcomers due to the openness of the Quebecois people and, 
more explicitly, promise to remain committed to its “tradition of openness” (PLQ 1998). The 
remaining economic policies have been identified as pluralist because they actively promote the 
selection and recruitment of economic immigrants instead of attempting to protect the nation 
from perceived threats of the Other who may incite nativist fears of ‘stealing’ employment from 
members born into the Quebec nation. What emerges from the Charest era are hosts of economic 
immigration policies which seek to facilitate economic integration through the recruitment of 
skilled individuals while consciously distancing the proposals from the notion of prioritizing 
Francophone immigrants. Simply put, the economic proposals seek to make Quebec’s economy 
stronger through immigration regardless of the immigrant’s origin.  
 By looking at the coding process—the parcelling out of proposed policies into two 
different typologies—one could determine that the PQ proposes more policies which seek to 
affirm or protect the nation more so than does the PLQ. While this is technically correct given 
the identified totals, this does not reflect the complex and nuanced reality of the policies 
proposed by both parties.  
Although a divergence is evident in their proposed policies due to the coding process, 
there still exists similarities. First, both the PQ and PLQ promoted the importance of 
Francophone immigration. Although the PQ were more vocal in their support for prioritizing the 
immigration of Francophone Canadians, and international Francophones, from 1976-1998; the 
PLQ proposed to prioritize Francophone immigration in 1989 alongside the PQ. Second, both 
parties sought to address the 1989 demographic crisis through immigration—but through an 
immigration policy that both rectified the crisis while ensuring that immigration did not threaten 
the French fact within Quebec.  
Third, both parties fundamentally agreed that the province should be responsible for its 
own immigration policy concerning the selection and recruitment of newcomers and 
both couched these demands within the greater context of preserving the French language and 
Quebec’s demographic weight—indeed, the “preservation of Quebec’s demographic 
importance” is explicitly mentioned in the Canada-Quebec Accord (Government of Canada 
1991). Fourth, both parties effectively promoted immigration and did not actively try to limit 
immigration nor propose restrictive immigration policies. Both parties, by extension, agreed that 
immigration was a necessity for the survival and continuance of the Quebecois nation and did 
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not offer nativist policies which could have played to the fears of the Quebecois nation by 
seeking to limit immigration as means to protect said nation from within. While significant 
difference exists in terms of the identified affirmationist, protectionist, and pluralist typologies, 
there also exists areas of similarity which show that both parties accepted and promoted 
immigration, sought increased policy autonomy, and were both committed to protecting 
Quebec’s precarious situation within both Canada and North America. 
 With the study of the changing themes and the amount of affirmationist, protectionist, 
and pluralist policies proposed over 11 elections spanning nearly 40 years, the first research 
question can effectively be answered (Does nationalism affect immigration and integration 
policy proposals and if so, to what extent?). Aspects of nationalism are evident in the proposals 
put forth by both parties given that they both promote, over time, policies which take the Quebec 
nation into account and it is clear that nationalism does indeed affect immigration policy 
proposals. The parties both espouse immigration policies which interact with the idea of the 
nation, that immigration policies can be proposed which seek to protect and fortify the nation. 
These fortification efforts include the prioritization of Francophone immigrants, whether through 
proposals to increase their numbers through selection efforts in targeted countries or through 
awarding more points to Francophones thus making the likelihood of being accepted for 
immigration easier, or through demands for increased policy autonomy as a means to increase 
the policy powers that the province maintains over a certain jurisdiction. These policies are 
nationalistic policies which seek to make the nation stronger either through protecting the nation 
or through increasing its legislative ability to control its own demographic weight.  
 Simply put, nationalism does affect immigration policy proposals and to a significant 
extent as evidenced by proposals which actively seek to either protect the nation or allow the 
nation to receive greater political autonomy from the federal government. This, however, is not 
nationalism in a restrictive sense, it does not create a binary distinction between favourable 
immigrants and non-favourable immigrants; both parties remain committed to all forms of 
immigrants thus allowing them to prioritize Francophone immigrants while not rejecting the idea 
of immigration altogether. As a whole, however, the link between nationalism and ethnocultural 
diversity management is more apparent when looking at the proposed integrative strategy 
particularly given that the integration strategies seek to address how to integrate a newcomer 
once the newcomer arrives in his new homeland. Integration proposals more actively engage 
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with nationalism and citizenship given that these policies are ultimately responsible for either 
extending or reducing citizenship to the newcomer, either being pluralist or exclusive, either 
extending the borders of the Quebec nation to newcomers or instead turning inwards and valuing 
membership only among those with linguistic and ancestral ties to the foundation of the nation in 
the early 17th century. 
 The policies proposed by both parties in their platforms over the 11 elections from 1976-
2014 represent varying degrees of divergence and convergence. At their core, however, both 
parties agreed that immigration was a necessity and did not seek to restrict immigration. Nor did 
the parties propose policies that played to the possibly existing latent nativist fears that may have 
existed among members of the nation whom may have feared for their imagined community. 
What is evident is that the parties differed in how they framed their immigration policies over 
time, rarely offering overlapping proposals which sought to address a common end with the 
exception of rectifying the 1989 demographic decline. Over time, however, the areas of 
similarity become apparent.  
 With the similarities an obvious question arises: What explains these similarities? Simply 
put, brokerage politics acts as an effective tool to explain why there exists similarities concerning 
immigration policy between a federalist party and a sovereignist party. The parties, as will 
become apparent in a later chapter, look to limit the differences between themselves by 
presenting similar policy proposals to the voting public in hopes of obfuscating the differences 
between them in order to try and maximize the total number of available votes. Under the 
brokerage theory, then, this allows the PQ to propose non-nativist, centrist, and pluralist policies 
of which the voting population may be in favour. These policies include protectionist measures 
including prioritizing Francophone immigration and simultaneously being open to immigration. 
This allowed the PQ to account for the protection of the imagined community—and pluralist, 
thus providing them a large voting block of nationalists and possible newcomers. In a similar 
fashion, the PLQ proposed policies which were similar to the PQ in order to protect the nation 
through demands for policy autonomy while simultaneously remaining open to immigration as a 
means of being both nationalist and pluralist in order to acquiesce to soft-nationalists, maintain 
their federalist support, and maintain the support of immigrant voters at large who may feel more 
sympathetic to Canada than Quebec and thus may reject the notion of Quebec sovereignty as 
well as the PQ. 
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 Given that Quebec is a substate nation with a sizeable portion of the population desiring 
political sovereignty, the similarities between the sovereignist PQ and federalist PLQ are 
striking. The similarities and differences outlined in this chapter, however, are limited to the 
policies proposed which dealt with the selection and recruitment of immigrants over time. Where 
immigration policy seeks to determine whether immigrants are wanted, integration policy seeks 
to determine what is to be done once the immigrant arrives. In terms of the differing political 
ideologies espoused by the PQ and PLQ, one expects to see significant divergences in the 
integration policies proposed by the PQ and PLQ over time. Indeed, significant questions arise 
concerning integration policies: What are the best ways to integrate newcomers, laissez-faire or 
through an interactive and intervening state? What role ought the private citizen to play in the 
integration of newcomers? How has integration changed over time? One expects that the PQ 
would propose integrative strategies which would seek to promote the sovereignty project, in 
essence extending the Party’s predisposition to political independence to the newcomer. But if 
this would be the case, it would be counter to the immigration policies they propose. No such 
proposed immigration policy sought to weave the independence project with immigration apart 
from one which argued that an independent Quebec would have full control over immigration 
policy—a claim which is objectively true. The PQ’s refusal to tie the independence project to 
immigration demonstrates that these two issues are fundamentally separate. That immigration is 
not a tool to try and promote sovereignty. In contrast, the PLQ, then, extended their ideological 
predisposition to federalism to the newcomer by proposing integrative measures which counter-
acted the PQ’s ambitions by proposing policies which facilitated integration into Canada. The 
next step in determining the similarities and differences in the parties’ proposed ethnocultural 
diversity management policies, then, is to comprehensively study the proposed integration 
policies over the 11 elections from 1976 onward.  
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IV. Integration 
Before settling on an immigration policy, policy-makers must first decide whether immigration 
is desirable. If policy-makers decide that immigration is desirable, then they most often try to 
determine what is to be done once the newcomer lands in their new home country. Particularly 
sensitive to integrative measures are substate nations given that these nations are forged on the 
basis of some form of communal identity, the survival of the nation often rests on the nation’s 
ability to successfully integrate newcomers—to extend this bond of citizenship to the newcomer, 
in effect offering a civic form of integration (Seymour 2002) by not restricting citizenship to the 
Other.  
 With the province’s considerable success in gaining increased autonomy over 
immigration policy came increased responsibility over integration policy as well with the 
Canada-Quebec Accord (Government of Canada 1991). Yet, both the PQ and PLQ had been 
proposing numerous integrative measures well before the Accord was signed. Where the 
previous chapter determined that the parties’ ideological dispositions towards sovereignty and 
federalism are not represented within their proposed immigration policies—both parties sought 
increased policy autonomy and sought to protect the Quebec nation—this chapter aims to extend 
this analysis to integration policy proposals. This chapter argues that the PQ and PLQ effectively 
proposed similar integrative strategies. As a result, significant convergence occurs over time but 
brief periods of divergence do occur. This argument is surprising given that one expects political 
ideology to play a significant role in integrative policy proposals. One expects the PQ to be more 
nationalist than the PLQ in this policy area, and for the PLQ to present policies which add to the 
pan-Canadian multicultural mosaic. On the one hand, one might expect nationalism to permeate 
this policy area offering a considerable contrast between ethnic forms of citizenship which bind 
the already settled members of the nation together at the expense of the new members. On the 
other hand, inclusive forms of citizenship might be proposed as a means to unite citizens with 
newcomers as a means of strengthening a Quebec-Canadian identity, or strengthening the 
Quebec sovereignty movement by extending the nation’s boundaries to the newcomer. Yet this is 
not the case. The PQ and PLQ, for the most part, proposed integrative policies which extend the 
civic boundaries of the nation to the newcomer at the expense of the sovereignty project resulting 
in explicitly pluralist attempts to make language, employment, and the state itself active 
members in integration while allowing for, and promoting, cultural difference. This, however, is 
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subject to considerable change the farther the analysis gets from 1976 resulting in a possible 
reconceptualization of integration policy beginning with Pauline Marois’ time as leader of the 
PQ. 
 This chapter offers a study of integration policy proposals by parcelling the analysis into 
four subsections. These four sections will demonstrate the changing areas of convergence and 
divergence, arguing that periods of convergence are met with brief divergence before ultimately 
returning back to convergence between the two parties. Using 1976 as the base year, the first 
subsection argues that the PQ and PLQ converged towards pluralist cultural integrative measures 
throughout the 1980s. The second subsection argues that 1994 served as an election of brief 
divergence for both parties. The third section shows that the 1998 and 2003 elections 
demonstrated a return to convergence. Finally, the fourth section argues that the 2007 election 
was a period of significant divergence that may account for a new path in which both parties will 
converge in a reconceptualization of citizenship and integration. 
 
Integrating the Newcomer, Convergences and Divergences, 1976-2014 
The 1976 Quebec provincial election was a pivotal moment in the province’s history. As the 
Parti Libéral du Québec maintained the levers of government under Premier Robert Bourassa 
from 1970-1976, the Parti Québécois under René Lévesque won the party’s first majority 
government in 1976. This election was a critical juncture as from 1976 onwards, Quebec, which 
saw numerous third parties with varying degrees of success, only had two parties form 
government. The dichotomy that resulted from this dual party system was one in which there was 
a clear delineation between the parties’ positions on both ideology and federalism. What emerges 
from 1976 onward is nearly 40 years of similar integration proposals which sought to expand the 
boundaries of citizenship for newcomers, effectively making the Other a member of the Quebec 
nation while promoting cultural difference instead of actively seeking to assimilate or reduce 
differences. This path of pluralist integrative strategies, however, is met with policies which 
affirm or protect the nation and accounts for periods of brief divergence. A period of temporary 
divergence begins under Jean Charest’s leadership of the PLQ. His successful 
reconceptualization of ethnocultural diversity management policies as a means in which to 
address economic necessity is ultimately the first concrete and sustained difference away from 
the PQ’s proposals which lasts over numerous election cycles—and is rewarded with multiple 
terms in government. Indeed, during Charest’s tenure, and the eventual Marois leadership, a 
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recent trend towards more restrictive integrative measures have come to define Quebec’s 
integration policies both in terms of proposals within platforms and proposed legislation within 
the National Assembly. Under this leadership era, a temporary divergence occurred between the 
two parties. However, this temporary divergence eventually returned to the patterns of 
convergence which had come to define the parties’ policy proposals. 
  
1976-1989: The PQ’s Shift, Integrative Pluralism, and a Decade’s Long Convergence 
Concretely, the PQ offered four proposals in 1976 concerning integration. These included to: 
“make French the official language of Quebec […] after a transitional period of five years 
French will be the sole language of the state”; “legislate to effectively make French the language 
in the workplace […]”; “make French the public language of radio and television and to limit the 
number of private non-francophone stations in order to make ethnic stations proportional to the 
community they serve”; and “guarantee to all Québécois workers the right to work in French” 
(PQ 1976, 304, emphasis added). While these policies are overwhelmingly concerned with 
language, they have been identified as integration proposals because they are located in the “Our 
Cultural Life” section of the platform. As a result, these proposals have been promised as a 
means by which to protect the Quebecois nation’s culture. Interestingly, the PQ declared that 
“[i]n a normal country […] immigrants naturally integrate into the linguistic majority” (PQ 
1976, 303, emphasis added). This is an explicit rhetorical recognition by the PQ that the province 
is abnormal and is a recognition that newcomers were not, in fact, integrating into the linguistic 
majority—therefore the successful integration policies would ensure this proper integration. 
 Where the PQ proposed integrative measures which sought to fortify the French language 
through the imposition of it onto the newcomer, they also offered open and pluralist policies 
which sought to make the state more accessible to minorities in languages other than French (PQ 
1976, 304). Similar measures to extend citizenship to newcomers included recognitions that “a 
grown population, who are secure in the future of their culture, has to treat minority groups who 
share their destiny and contribute to their development with respect”; “ensure that the public 
network and private television and radio channels broadcast cultural programs specifically for 
minority groups”; and a recognition that “all minority groups can enrich Quebec society with 
their different cultures” (PQ 1976, 304-305).  
 The PQ’s proposal to legislate that the French language becomes the “sole language of 
the state” (PQ 1976, 304) was, in fact, mirrored in the PLQ’s 1976 platform given that the PLQ 
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proposed to “continue to prioritize and promote Quebecois cultures. The law which makes 
French the official language of Quebec, and which is committed to the protection of minority 
rights, is dedicated to Quebec’s French character” (PLQ 1976, 35). The Party’s commitment to 
the prioritization and promotion of Quebec culture, while implicitly accepting and promoting a 
law to make French the province’s official language, is similar in terms of rhetoric and strategy 
to the PQ’s language policy proposed in their 1976 platform. An early convergence occurs in 
1976 given that these two parties remain committed both to Quebec culture but to ensuring the 
survival of the French language specifically through legislation. While this policy remains a 
somewhat vague policy declaration with little substance, the PLQ offered more concrete 
proposals concerning integration, including ensuring that Quebec is a welcoming place for those 
who wish to immigrate; to reduce the disorientation of immigrants through the humanization of 
the welcome structures which are in place; develop the Centre d’orientation et de formation des 
immigrants (COFI)
14
 and set up special classes design to facilitate the integration of immigrants; 
help ethnic communities to assure that their cultures and traditions are protected; normalize 
foreign diplomas; and prioritize immigrants’ access to Quebec’s public service (PLQ 1976, 56). 
 The PQ and PLQ effectively branded themselves as protectors of the nation’s language 
and culture through the proposal of language policies which sought to make French the sole 
language of the state. In the face of this proposal, which eventually became law, Lévesque still 
maintained his party’s position on integrative pluralism in his inaugural address to the 31st 
legislature’s second session, stating: 
  Aussi, pour ces minorités actuelles de notre peuple qui sont d’autres   
  souches et qui ont conservé ou adopté l’anglais comme langue principale,   
  la loi devra également, avec sérénité, et pourquoi pas avec générosité, leur  
  permettre de maintenir, à l’école et ailleurs, leurs propres identités. En y   
  mettant de part et d’autre toute la bonne foi et la compréhension dont nous  
  sommes capables, je sui [sic] sûr que nous arriverons à résoudre    
  convenablement cette apparente quadrature du cercle (PQ 1977). 
And further announcing, in his inaugural message to the sixth session of the 31st legislature in 
1980, a new integration policy which created a “plan d’action pour assurer, dans notre société 
majoritairement française, le plein épanouissement de nos concitoyens des communautés 
ethniques et de la grande minorité anglophone” (PQ 1980). The second area of convergence is 
demonstrated in both parties’ ability to carefully balance protective predispositions towards the 
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nation with promises to remain open and receptive to newcomers—indeed, both parties make 
reference to ensuring the cultural development of minorities given that the nation itself is strong 
enough to support it, thus explicitly attempting to reduce the fear of the Other that settled 
Quebecers may have. The PQ proposed a host of policies which sought to reduce difference, or 
favourable media institutions, towards non-Quebecers. With 1976 serving as the base year, 
Lévesque’s PQ was concomitantly committed to integrative pluralism and the protection of the 
nation by proposing, on the one hand, policies which sought to fortify the nation specifically at 
the expense of the newcomer and, on the other hand, proposing proposals which sought to 
facilitate integration while touting the nation’s ability to allow non-Quebecois culture to prosper. 
 The PQ continued its preference for pluralist integrative measures in the 1981 election 
through the proposal of a host of policies which sought to: treat ethnic minorities with dignity 
and protect all Quebec citizens from discrimination; institutionalize COFI and increase access to 
French language training as a means to facilitate integration; allow for ethnic minorities to 
maintain their respective native language; the creation of integration policy based on the respect 
of cultural differences which includes announcing the services offered within the civil service in 
ethnic media; financial support for cultural groups and prioritize interactions between these 
groups and the francophone majority; recognizing the importance of ethnic media; facilitate 
access to the civil service for allophones; “establish a consultation mechanism for new 
Quebecers with the provision of the formation a global immigration policy”; and to “assure that 
future arrivals, before their immigration, are knowledgeable of Quebec society” (PQ 1981, 49).  
 The PLQ proposed policies which were, interestingly, similar to the ones that the PQ 
proposed. The similar policies included the PLQ proposing to facilitate the expression of 
different cultural values espoused by the various cultural communities through financially 
supporting their initiatives; and to hire individuals who speak and are familiar with different 
ethnic groups in order to assure that social services are available in languages other than French 
and English. The PLQ proposed more measures with concerned integration “Quebec’s Ethnic 
Minorities” (PLQ 1981, C-IV/1-C-IV/2)15. These proposals recognized that “governments of 
Quebec have had the tendency to treat ethnic communities as spectators even in areas in which 
they are primarily concerned. In fact, these communities desire to participate within Quebec 
society and to break, among others, their isolation from public and semi-public institutions”, and 
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“the [PLQ] recognizes that Quebec is a pluralist society, enriched by persons of diverse ethnic 
origins. [The party] reaffirms the principle by which people of ethnic origin, other than French or 
English, should, all the while preserving their cultural identity, be able to integrate into Quebec 
society, assured of their equality and equality of opportunities that have been accorded to 
Quebecois of French and English descent” (PLQ 1981, C-IV/1).  
 The platform promised to allow for the teaching of languages and history of ethnic 
communities within academic curricula and to consult with ethnic communities on these 
programs; to improve the quality of French within COFI; to prioritize a greater equal 
representation of ethnic groups within organizations that are responsible for the coordination and 
administration of social services, and to make the public and semi-public sector more 
representative of Quebec society by putting in place programmes which ensured the hiring of 
people of “ethnic origins”; and to support efforts to have a better representation of ethnic 
communities within the judicial system, police system, and within the ministries and public and 
semi-public institutions (PLQ 1981, C-IV/1; C-IV/2). A further proposal which sought to 
“regulate […] the case of children who attend English schools even if they are not legally 
enrolled” (PLQ 1981, C-IV/1). This proposal was identified as pluralist due to the underlying 
context of the document’s section—that regulating this issue will be done as a means of 
integration and, perhaps more convincingly, because these enrolments were illegal nonetheless. 
 The 1981 election was a considerable shift. Both parties effectively limited their rhetoric 
towards the protection of the nation through integration, instead opting for pluralist policies 
which sought to facilitate integration but, most importantly, actively engaged with the state 
through financial remuneration, employment, and expanded the state’s role to newcomers by 
offering services in languages other than French—directly contradicting the vociferously 
nationalist rhetoric from the PQ and PLQ’s 1976 platforms which desired to make French the 
province’s only language. The parties’ 1981 platforms not only proposed two overlapping policy 
proposals, but as a whole both parties had effectively begun to prioritize and promote pluralist 
integrative measures—none of the policies proposed sought to reduce difference, impose the 
nation onto newcomers, nor sought to advance sovereignty through integration. Instead, 
integration was to serve as a way to ensure that newcomers fluidly integrated into the nation with 
the help of both private and civil society. The state was to become a more important actor and 
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take on an increased role in integration thereby ensuring that the boundaries of the nation were 
extended to newcomers by a legitimate institutional actor. 
 The PQ’s commitment to integrative pluralism was further strengthened by Lévesque in 
his 1984 inaugural address where he announced the creation of the Conseil des Communautés 
culturelles et de l’Immigration (CCCI), a “permanent and autonomous body comprising 15 
members who represent different sectors of Quebec. Its function was to advise the minister on 
issues related to the integration of immigrants and intercultural relations” (Juteau 2002, 444): 
  Dans un tout autre ordre d'idées, je m'en voudrais de ne pas mentionner    
  spécifiquement un projet qui nous tient à cœur, c'est-à-dire l'instauration d'un  
  conseil des communautés culturelles et de l'immigration. Il s'agit là de doter nos  
  concitoyens de diverses origines ethniques qui sont venus au cours des ans si bien  
  enrichir notre société, d'un organisme à la fois autonome, représentatif et muni de  
  pouvoirs qui lui permettent de jouer un rôle actif et bien concret (PQ 1984). 
 Where the 1981 election cemented the PQ’s transition from proposing protective 
integration measures to one which emphatically proposed pluralist policies, the 1985 and 1989 
elections continued this commitment—both for the PQ and PLQ. The parties’ convergence 
towards pluralist integrative measures were exemplified in similar policy proposals which 
favoured access to the civil service and representative bureaucracy (PLQ 1976, 56; PLQ 1981, 
C-IV/2; PQ 1985, 32; PLQ 1985, 38; PQ 1989, 85; PLQ 1989a, 58; PLQ 2003a, 18; PLQ 2007b, 
2; PQ 2008, 27). The PQ’s commitment to ensuring a public service that is more representative 
of the province’s various cultural communities is seen as a priority by premiers Parizeau and 
Bouchard. In his inaugural addresses
16
, Parizeau mentioned immigration and integration a single 
time. This reference was a recognition that “au sein de la fonction [il y a] publique moins de 
citoyens d'origines diverses que lorsque le Parti québécois a quitté le pouvoir il y a neuf ans” and 
that this was “en dépit des engagements à répétition qu'avait pris le gouvernement libéral”; 
Parizeau promised to pick up again “notre travail et notre objectif que ces Québécois 
représentent leur juste proportion de toutes les catégories d’emplois” (PQ 1994b). Parizeau’s 
comments were a pluralist recognition that cultural communities were not represented enough 
within the public sector, and a commitment that his party would work to rectify this issue. This 
promise was continued by Lucien Bouchard who, in his 1999 inaugural address, promised to 
                                                 
16
 Inaugural addresses are used as an analytical tool in which to see how the elected government prioritizes 
immigration and integration. Although inaugural messages are, in effect, government statements and not party 
statements, they demonstrate the amount of concern the elected party gives to their proposed policies in their 
electoral programs. Furthermore, the inaugural messages present the elected party with the opportunity to clarify 
their positions or to announce new policies that may not have been part of their program. 
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“faire une place équitable à la diversité québécoise” within the public service by ensuring that 
the “Ministre des Relations avec les citoyens et le président du Conseil du trésor proposeront un 
calendrier et des moyens pour y arriver” (PQ 1999). Jean Charest further echoed these 
sentiments in 2003 during his first inaugural address as Premier: 
Et je voudrais aussi, M. le Président, que l'État québécois, de par ses effectifs, soit le 
plus juste reflet possible de la diversité de notre société. Les Québécois aiment à se 
voir comme une société ouverte, accueillante, tolérante. Cette image qu'ils se font 
d'eux-mêmes n'est pas surfaite. Au cours des 10 prochaines années, 44 % des 
employés de l'État prendront leur retraite. Si ce contexte nous fournit une occasion 
historique de réduire la taille de notre État sans brusquer personne, il  nous place 
aussi dans la situation de devoir préparer une relève importante. Les communautés 
culturelles, les autochtones ainsi que les anglophones du Québec doivent être 
représentés à tous les niveaux de l'État québécois. On doit refléter l'ensemble des 
composantes de la société (PLQ 2003c). 
There is a recognition that Quebecers seemingly want a pluralist, open, and inclusive state and 
the state ought to couple this pluralism within the public sector. 
 Similar policy proposals concerning fighting against racism and discrimination (PQ 1989, 
84; PLQ 1989a, 56) and ‘sensitization programs’ (PQ 1989, 85; PLQ 1989a, 58) which sought to 
“sensitize Quebec’s population to other cultures, notably by making the teaching of other 
languages available to all Quebecers because mastering other languages leads to understanding 
other cultures” (PQ 1989, 85) and that the government will create “sensitization campaigns, and 
government information, which will reflect Quebec society’s pluricultural nature” (PLQ 1989a, 
58) demonstrated further convergence. The onus of accepting and integrating newcomers was 
now, in part, shared by both society and newcomers. Newcomers were still fully expected to 
integrate into the Francophone majority but these sensitization programs, either through access to 
other languages or through government information, acted as a means in which to get the 
mainstream population more used to various cultural communities—thus the familiarity with 
these cultures breeds tolerance and an easier and more inclusive society which facilitated the 
newcomers’ desire to integrate. 
 Overall, 1981 was the election which set the two parties down a clear path where they 
both proposed similar pluralist policies. The 1980s, then, were marked by overarching policy 
convergence between the two parties given the similar policies they proposed throughout the 
decade. While the majority of the policies proposed may not have been identical copies of one 
another, they were nevertheless explicitly pluralist and sought the successful integration of 
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newcomers into Quebec society either through job placement within the civil service, extended 
the civil service to newcomers (PQ 1985, 31, 32; PLQ 1985a, 38); the offering of French 
language courses as a means to facilitate the integration of the newcomer into the Quebec nation 
without couching language policies within a greater narrative of protection or survival (PQ 1985, 
32; PQ 1989, 85; PLQ 1989a, 56); and engaged with policy recognitions that, overall, 
immigration is a net-benefit for Quebec and different cultures should be encouraged (PQ 1989, 
84; PLQ 1989a, 58). For the PLQ, their commitment to pluralism was made explicit in two 
inaugural messages. Most notably, Deputy Premier and Minister of Cultural Affairs, Lise Bacon, 
speaking for Premier Bourassa in the government’s first inaugural message to the National 
Assembly in the wake of their 1985 election victory said, in English, that: 
  Finally, one of the greatest concerns of our government will be the need to reinforce 
the ties between all Quebeckers. Too many political attitudes have in the past caused 
a great number of our fellow citizens to feel that they were being considered as 
second class citizens. For example, certain linguistic regulations will have to be 
corrected with a view responding to the profound values of justice in our society and 
the desire of all Quebeckers to be citizens of equal status (PLQ 1985b). 
This was further elaborated upon in French by stating that it was now the government’s duty to 
integrate “pleinement les membres des différentes communautés culturelles à la vie de la société 
et leur permettre d'apporter l'inestimable contribution économique, sociale et culturelle que nos 
concitoyens d'origine autre que française et anglaise veulent fournir au Québec” (PLQ 1985b). 
With both parties effectively agreeing that diversity-embracing measures were essential for the 
integration of newcomers into the Quebec nation, it became apparent that the parties’ policy 
similarities were ultimately trying to achieve the same ends: the expansion of citizenship to the 
newcomer through means which made the province appear to open, welcome, and 
accommodating. 
 Although the proposed policies were generally pluralist in nature, there still did exist 
policies which fundamentally sought to protect the Quebec nation. These included a proposal by 
the PLQ (1985a, 38) that a “[PLQ] government will continue to assume the role of protector of 
Quebec’s French language and culture”. Protector of the French language and culture, then, was 
a continued theme in the 1989 election which emphasized the demographic crisis. The role of the 
government being protector of the French language and culture was mirrored in the PQ’s 1989 
platform (PQ 1989, 85) which insisted that “without a French culture enriched by the diversity of 
its origins and reinforced by the convictions one has from a common project, our chances of 
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survival are limited” (PQ 1989, 85), and that “significant effort needs to be made so that 
newcomers integrate into the Francophone majority” (PLQ 1989a, 49). The PLQ’s 1989 
platform further stated that: although access to the French language among immigrants has been 
increased, “more has to be done” in order to “ultimately allow the French fact to survive in North 
America” (PLQ 1989a, 56). Although a vague recognition, it is nevertheless a protective effort 
by the PLQ to ensure that increased efforts concerning language training are made not as a tool 
of integration but as a tool of protection. 
 The 1981 election served as the election which shifted the PQ from a party which 
proposed pluralist and protectionist policies, to one which became considerably more pluralist 
throughout the remainder of the 1980s. The preferred method of integrative pluralism was 
echoed by the PLQ and thus demonstrated significant areas of convergence between the two 
parties. This convergence, however, abated in 1994 when, now under a new leader and in the run 
up to the 1995 sovereignty referendum, the PQ first tried to incorporate its sovereignist agenda 
with its integration proposals. 
 
1994: The Referendum and Brief Divergence 
The 1990s proved to be a significant era both for Canadian and Quebec politics. With the 1980s 
being defined through constitutional negotiation, the early 1990s were marked by the arduous 
attempt to receive Quebec’s signature on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms through the 
Charlottetown Accord in 1992. The Accord ultimately failed in a public referendum and by then 
the decade-long constitutional failure elicited increased sentiments in favour of sovereignty 
(Meadwell 1993). Culminating in the failures of the Meech and Charlottetown Accord was the 
emergence of the Bloc Québécois (BQ) in 1991 and the PQ’s commitment to holding a public 
referendum in 1995 concerning Quebec’s constitutional place within Canada where the PQ led a 
campaign for Quebec’s political independence. 
 The integration policy proposals that the PQ proposed in the election immediately 
preceding the 1995 referendum was strikingly different from the ones proposed by the Lévesque 
government before the 1980 sovereignty-association referendum. Although the PQ’s 1976 
platform did maintain integrative elements which sought the protection of the French language 
and the reduction of differences (most notably the limiting of ethnic media), the platform did not 
attempt to increase sentiments of either nationalism or sovereignty amongst newcomers through 
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their integrative measures. The 1994 elections, however, marked both a discursive and policy 
shift for the PQ. 
 Although the parties’ role as defenders of the nation had already been well-established 
both in terms of immigration and integration policy, in 1994 they diverged in the way they 
conceptualized their roles. The PQ proposed two policies which fundamentally sought to 
“Encourage the Dynamism of a Francophone and Pluralist Society” (PQ 1994a, 57). The first of 
these proposals implied recognizing that Quebec has historically found itself in a precarious 
situation by being a majority francophone minority within a large English hegemon both within 
Canada and North America. As a result, Quebec has “for a long time sought various guarantees, 
first for its survival, and now for the blossoming of Quebec as a French language and cultured 
country” (PQ 1994a, 57). Found in the “Encouraging the Dynamism of a Francophone and 
Pluralist Society”, this was a recognition by the PQ that receiving said guarantees for the 
“country’s” (PQ 1994a, 57) survival was essential—and these guarantees would lead to the 
blossoming of the French language and French culture. These nationalistic demands for greater 
policy autonomy done through political independence were, in effect, promoted as a means to 
ensure the survival of the French language and culture without mention of how this would affect 
cultural pluralism. The second proposal was a weaving together of the sovereignty project with 
integration: “A [PQ] government will make immigration and the integration of Quebec’s citizens 
of all origins an essential aspect of its societal project and the realization of sovereignty for 
Quebec” (PQ 1994a, 68). This proposal marked the first time in the PQ’s electoral programs that 
they attempted to make immigration and integration part of the party’s plan to achieve political 
independence. 
 The protection of the nation either through policy autonomy or integrative measures was 
mirrored by the PLQ who in 1994 (PLQ 1994a, 60) proposed a ‘moral contract’ that newcomers 
are expected to sign if they wish to integrate into Quebec society (PLQ 1994a, 60). This moral 
contract was situated within “Quebec society’s fundamental liberal values” in order to ensure 
that the “means of intercultural diversity are for the benefit of the entire collectivity” (PLQ 
1994a, 60). The ‘moral contract’ served as a way of protecting Quebec’s liberal values through 
the imposition of them onto new arrivals—instead of facilitating the integration of newcomers 
into these values like in platforms past, the moral contract, however, is a protectionist measure 
designed to impose these values onto the newcomer. 
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 The convergence that occurred in the 1994 election was one where parties sought to 
protect Quebec’s French character but chose to do so through different means. Yet the PQ’s 
attempt to weave together sovereignty and integration did not stop the Party from proposing 
pluralist integrative policies. In the same vein, the PLQ’s proposed a ‘moral contract’ which 
sought to reinforce and codify Quebec’s liberal values did not prevent the party from proposing 
pluralist policies as well. Both parties proposed pluralist integrative measures which sought the 
participation of all Quebecers, whether through promotion of intercultural exchanges (PLQ 
1994a, 80) between all citizens, or through the province counting “on the full and total 
participation of its citizens, independent of where they come from, for the constitution of a just, 
francophone, pluralist, and democratic society” (PQ 1994a, 68). The PQ offered to facilitate 
integration through measures targeting employment, institutional changes to the CCCI by 
making it the Conseil de l’immigration, de l’intégration et de relations ethnoculturelles, and to 
fight against racism and discrimination (PQ 1994a, 69). The PLQ offered more vague and 
opaque proposals but put forward significant open and pluralist recognition that “each generation 
of Quebecers, born here or elsewhere, can each influence [Quebec’s history]. Our common 
culture is not fixed and defined once and for all. Accepting difference is part of the system we 
proudly offer to share” (PLQ 1994a, 60-61); and that the time in which the state sought to “on 
one hand support a ‘pure laine’ culture while, on the other hand preserving the cultures of origin 
of immigrants is now over. The time has now come for intercultural exchanges and for the 
promotion of a Quebecois culture enriched by all cultural communities, current and future” (PLQ 
1994a, 61). In essence, the pluralist proposals and recognitions put forth but the PLQ were less 
concrete than were the ones put forth by the PQ. Regardless, their proposals not dealing with a 
‘moral contract’ or sovereignty cum integration were open and sought to facilitate integration 
into the nation.  
 Following the 1994 election came the 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum. In the face 
of an incredibly close result (with the ‘NO’ side winning by slightly more than a single 
percentage point), Premier Parizeau came to utter one of the most infamous phrases in modern 
Quebec political history, that the referendum loss was a result of “money and the ethnic vote” 
(CBC Archives 1995). Parizeau’s comments were seen as xenophobic and typified the exclusive 
form of nationalism that the PQ had long been trying to avoid for nearly twenty years. Yet 
Parizeau’s comments were not indicative of the PQ’s 1994 platform which explicitly proposed to 
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make the immigration and integration “of people of all origins an essential element for [the 
Party’s] societal project and the realization of Quebec’s sovereignty” (PQ 1994a, 68).  
 The proposal to effectively weave integration into the sovereignist project was a first for 
the PQ; previous electoral platforms actively promoted cultural differences and sought to 
integrate newcomers into Quebec society but did not propose, neither explicitly nor implicitly, 
that this integration was to benefit the sovereignist project. It is perhaps not surprising why 
Parizeau spoke as he did. With the PQ actively trying to recruit newcomers to the sovereignist 
side, and the “strategy to woo immigrants and ethnic groups in Quebec did not swing their vote; 
it did not bring them to embrace the nationalist project” (Juteau 2002, 446, emphasis in original), 
then these efforts were for naught given that “[g]overnmental discourses and actions did not 
induce immigrants and ethnic minorities to identify with Quebec to the extent of supporting 
independence” (Juteau 2002, 446). Parizeau’s frustration with a failed attempt to successfully 
bolster the sovereignist cause by attempting to make integration a part of the sovereignist project 
manifested itself in the “money and the ethnic votes” comment. Parizeau eventually resigned 
from party leadership and, consequently, as Premier of the province. Lucien Bouchard replaced 
him as the head of the PQ, and Premier, and went on to win the 1998 election—and, much like 
the election immediately after the 1985 sovereignty-association referendum, the PQ was returned 
to power with a majority government losing only a single seat. 
 The 1994 election was a moment of temporary difference between the PLQ and PQ on 
the issue of integration. While both parties continued to protect the Quebecois nation, they did so 
through different means which both diverged from each other and from their past policies. The 
PQ’s merging of integration with the sovereignty projection was a policy first for the party which 
had historically kept these two issues separate since 1976. The PLQ’s proposal of a ‘moral 
contract’ was a first for both parties and this notion eventually became increasingly popular in 
the 21st century. Both parties were careful, however, to ensure that these policies which were 
both nationalistic and restrictive were matched with pluralist integration policies which did not 
seek to make integration harder. The parties were committed to ensuring that on-the-ground 
integration was still facilitated through employment but now all citizens had a role to play in 
successful integration, largely through the rapprochement between the mainstream population 
and newcomers.  
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The formal extension of integration into the sovereignty project—the attempt to ensure 
that integration facilitates separation—is a clear manifestation that the PQ opted not to 
disassociate integrative measures from their larger political ambition. This weaving together of 
integration and sovereignty represents two forms of divergence. First, the PQ diverged from its 
past proposals which maintained a frontier between ethnocultural diversity management and the 
achievement of sovereignty. Second, it offered a clear delineation between the PLQ and PQ in 
terms of proposed policies. But even with the noticeable policy difference, the PLQ still offered 
a fundamentally protectionist measure: the ‘moral contract’. The 1994 election, then, is noted as 
a small and temporary divergence. Small because the PLQ was, itself, committed to ensuring that 
ethnocultural diversity management proposals protected the nation. Temporary because from 
1994 onwards, the parties converged again, this time in two forms: through pluralist proposals 
and the removal of integration proposals from electoral programs altogether. 
 
1998-2003: Convergence in Two Forms 
The path which was set in 1981 by both the PQ and PLQ was one that promoted pluralist 
integrative policies throughout the 1980s. This path took a brief divergence in 1994 but 
convergence occurred once more after the 1994 election. This convergence, however, would not 
be a result of proposals suggesting similar pluralist, or restrictive, integrative measures. Instead, 
convergence occurred due to the parties’ simultaneously limiting the total number of policies 
proposed during the 1998 election. The effective removal of ethnocultural diversity management 
proposals effectively mirrors Freeman’s (1995) assertion that there “is a strong tendency […] for 
the major political parties to seek a consensus across the political spectrum that has the effect of 
taking immigration conflicts off the agenda” (Freeman 1995, 884). 
 The 1998 election saw the PQ propose two integrative policies: to “concretize the 
harmonization of employment-integration services to new arrivals and to immigrants by the 
ministères de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité et des Relations avec les citoyens et de l’Immigration” 
as well as ensuring that all citizens, regardless of origin, have equitable access to the civil 
service; and that a PQ government would intensify “its francization efforts towards new arrivals 
and immigrants who have lived in Quebec for a long time, particularly within the workplace” 
(PLQ 1998, 63). While the PLQ proposed to “reform COFI to make it more efficient and to 
better target its role in relation to the integration of immigrants” (PLQ 1998, 63). The PQ won 
the 1998 election and presented an electoral program which was quiet concerning their 
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ethnocultural diversity management policy proposals both in terms of total volume and rhetoric. 
Once in government, Bernard Landry was succeeded by Lucien Bouchard as leader of the PQ 
and Premier of the province. In Landry’s inaugural address as Premier to the 36th legislature’s 
second session, he explicitly endorsed pluralism and reject the notion of Quebec being an ethnic 
nation: “plus qu'à aucun autre moment de notre histoire il est admis que le Québec forme une 
nation, une nation civique, inclusive, et qui transcende toute forme d’ethnicité” and thus rejects 
the notion of an ethnic Quebec nation (PQ 2001). In the same address, Landry further announced 
an institutional change: 
  Un de nos défis collectifs consiste également à bien accueillir et intégrer les 
immigrants. Le gouvernement a donné mandat au ministère des Relations 
avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration d'intensifier les efforts visant à lever 
les obstacles empêchant les personnes immigrantes de faire valoir 
pleinement leurs compétences. À cette enseigne, je souligne que le 
gouvernement a créé le poste de secrétaire d'État à l'Accueil et à 
l'intégration des immigrants (PQ 2001). 
 These promises to create the Secretary of State for the Reception and Integration of 
Immigrants and to remove barriers concerning skill recognition is expanded upon in the 
announcement of the “Loi sur l’accès à l’égalité en emploi dans les organismes publics” (PQ 
2001). This law would allow for increased cultural diversity within the public sector, ensuring 
that “Les femmes, les minorités visibles, les autochtones et les allophones doivent bénéficier de 
cette législation.” (PQ 2001). With the 2003 election looming, Landry’s 2001 inaugural address 
which stressed civic integration would be a precursor for the 2003 election in terms of programs 
emphasized. 
 Where the parties converged in 1998 through limiting their policy proposals, they 
continued to converge in 2003 but this time by returning to proposing pluralist policies. 
Although limited in the total volume of policies proposed, the PQ’s 2003 platform is inherently 
civic and inclusive in nature. Although a restrictive integrative measure did exist concerning the 
intensification of the French language specifically in areas of employment “where we find 
immigrant workers” (PQ 2003, 85), the platform proposed the learning of French as a tool of 
integration (PQ 2003, 37). Furthermore, specifically in the platform’s “A Pluralist Identity” 
section, the PQ recognized that the party “also values belonging to the Quebec nation by all 
peoples who have chosen Quebec as their adopted home. Their particular contribution adds to 
our collective quality of life and promotes the openness of our society to the world. We must 
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make sure that these new fellow citizens feel welcome and that they can develop a sentiment of 
belonging in Quebec. That they feel Quebecois!” (PQ 2003, 84). A PQ government, the platform 
further submits, will facilitate integration into the Quebec nation through reinforcing the French 
language’s power of attraction (PQ 2003, 86).  
 These sentiments of creating a welcoming society through openness and reception are 
echoed by the PLQ who offered a policy-specific document alongside a general election 
platform. This document divided integrative measures into two major sections: “Partnerships” 
and “Participation”. The Partnerships section proposed pluralist policies designed to empower 
organizations like the Organismes communautaires d’acceuil et d’intégration (OCAI) through 
increasing their ability to deliver services to cultural communities (PLQ 2003a, 9) and more 
actively engage with the integration of newcomers (PLQ 2003a, 10). In addition, the PLQ 
proposed to review and evaluate the existing integrative services (PLQ 2003a, 10) and promised 
to ensure that corporations, businesses, and professional associations “[…] absolutely have to 
contribute to the harmonious integration of newcomers” (PLQ 2003a, 10); and accelerate the 
recognition of foreign diplomas along with the recognition of foreign skills (PLQ 2003a, 12).  
 Under Participation, the party proposed to facilitate the participation of newcomers within 
Quebec society through continuing the fight against racism and discrimination (PLQ 2003a, 16), 
to create a multilingual communication network and to use said network to increase cultural 
communities’ employment in the public sector and to acknowledge the mastery of another 
language other than French or English (PLQ 2003a, 18). The platform’s commitment to 
representative bureaucracy is expanded to political offices given that the PLQ proposed to 
increase the number of visible minorities in “high level public service positions and within the 
administration of Crown Corporations” (PLQ 2003a, 18-19). More generally, the PLQ further 
proposed to support Quebec’s different culture and identities, the various forms of cultural 
media, and develop a program of intercultural rapprochement in order to “support outreach 
activities into host society and the rapprochement of these communities” (PLQ 2003a, 19). 
Indeed, the PLQ had an explicit recognition that “cultural pluralism is a richness that a modern 
society needs to know how to cultivate. In Quebec, in contrast to the American ‘melting pot’, we 
value cultural diversity and the newcomer does not have to abandon their differences at the door” 
(PLQ 2003a, 19).  
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 In sum, the PLQ called for a relationship between the provincial government, cultural 
communities, and the private and public sector as a means to facilitate integration, ad aimed to 
facilitate the democratic participation and employment of newcomers by actively engaging with 
the private citizenry—therefore asking that all Quebecers help to extend the boundaries of 
citizenship to newcomers. 
 Coupled with the PLQ’s shift to economic immigration, Jean Charest stated in his 
inaugural address to the 37th legislature’s second sitting, that immigration “contribue, pour les 
deux tiers, à l'augmentation de la population active du Québec, mais elle doit également 
contribuer davantage à notre enrichissement collectif” (PLQ 2006). This collective enrichment is 
to be done through proposing a legislative bill “dans le but de reconnaître la formation et les 
diplômes donc des personnes formées à l’étranger” given that “on a trop attendu au Québec pour 
justement faire une place à ceux et celles qui viennent ici, avec nous, construire le Québec” (PLQ 
2006). Citizen integration and economic wellbeing are now being formally woven together, thus 
for the PLQ “nous pourrons ainsi mieux intégrer nos immigrants. Nous pourrons mieux 
bénéficier de la compétence des personnes qui sont des ponts tendus vers le reste du monde et 
qui veulent, il faut le dire, participer, participer non seulement à la création de richesse, mais 
participer à cette société, participer à leur terre d’accueil” (PLQ 2006). 
 Overall, the 1998 and 2003 electoral promises showed convergence. The 1998 election’s 
convergence was due to the parties’ limited amount of proposals. In the 2003 election’s 
convergence appeared as both parties proposed pluralist policies which recognized, supported, 
and promoted cultural differences, and tried to engage all citizens to make integration easier. 
This convergence, however, did not continue in 2007 where the PQ, now under a new leader, 
opted to remove integration from their policy proposals while the PLQ continued to propose a 
host of pluralist policies. The next election after 2003 proved to be of utmost importance for 
Quebec as the parties diverged from each other within their policy platforms throughout the 
2007, 2008, 2012, and 2014 elections. Yet the 2014 election saw a return to convergence—a 
wholly different form of integrative convergence than was observed from elections past. 
 
2007: A New Path? Divergences and a Return to Convergence 
Overtime, the ethnocultural diversity management policies proposed by both parties have 
remained relatively constant and stable. But for a brief period in 1994, both parties promoted 
pluralist and receptive policies which sought to facilitate integration, promote cultural difference, 
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and used the French language as a tool of integration. While policies were proposed by both 
parties which were restrictive and non-pluralist, these non-pluralist policies were effectively 
counter-balanced with inclusionary integration policies. From 2007 onwards, however, Quebec’s 
political climate began to change. The 2007 and 2008 elections demonstrated significant 
divergence in terms of the policies proposed. The PLQ continued to propose a host of 
ethnocultural diversity management proposals in 2007 while the PQ opted to remove them from 
their agenda, and the opposite occurred in 2008. The 2012 election of Pauline Marois’ PQ began 
a shift away from their historic predisposition in favour of pluralist integrative measures towards 
the imposition of restrictive, exclusionary, and protectionist integrative measures onto 
newcomers. These measures eventually culminated into Bill 60
17
 and saw the PLQ remain quiet 
within their proposals, before effectively proposing a similar legislative bill after winning 
government in 2014.  
 However, the PQ’s Bill 60 was not altogether different from the PLQ’s proposed Bill 94 
in 2010 (Government of Quebec 2010). Bill 94, the “law establishing the guidelines governing 
accommodation requests within the public service and certain establishments” (Government of 
Quebec 2010) attempted to codify that people receiving or administering government services 
had their faces uncovered, in effect ensuring that “Muslim women or others who wear face 
coverings in Quebec will have to remove them if they want to work in the public sector or do 
business with government officials” (CBC 2010). The PQ’s Bill 60, then, is in fact quite similar 
to Bill 94 proposed by the PLQ in 2010. Beginning with Bill 94 in 2010, and becoming more 
apparent with the leadership of Pauline Marois, a shift, for both parties, occurred. This shift was 
one which moved away from notion of integrating newcomers without legislation which 
enforced state religious neutrality, or made explicit Quebec’s liberal values (i.e. gender equality 
and maintaining uncovered faces when one received government services). Instead, the parties 
shifted to a notion where Quebec’s demands were to become obvious to newcomers. Passing 
these bills were imperative for imposing common values onto newcomers, in effect levelling 
non-mainstream values through legislative fiat by targeting individuals that the government 
                                                 
17
 Bill 60, or Quebec’s Charter of Values, was a legislative attempt by the PQ to pass a bill which aimed to, per the 
title of the bill, “affirm the values of state religious neutrality as well as equality between men and women while 
framing accommodation demands” (Government of Quebec 2013). Included in the Bill were provisions to limit the 
wearing of religious symbols by public sector workers, “make it mandatory to have one’s face uncovered when 
providing or receiving a state service”, and to amend Quebec’s Human Rights Code (CBC 2013). 
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believed were practicing illiberal activities which ran counter to the values that bound the 
imagined community. 
 The PQ’s 2007 electoral platform was a muted document concerning integration policy 
proposals. Now under the leadership of André Boisclair, the Party proposed but a single policy: 
to prioritize the “scholastic promotion of culture, identity, and Quebecois values (notably 
equality between men and women, language, State religious neutrality [laïcité], and the 
protection of the environment)” (PQ 2007, 11). This proposal was, in effect, an attempt to protect 
Quebec’s common values—of which this would extend to newcomers given that children, under 
Law 101, have to receive an education in French. This education would ensure that Quebec’s 
values would remain protected through a significant form of integration for children: education. 
The PLQ proposed a similarly limited platform in 2008—in fact, the Party did not propose a 
single integration proposal in the document. 
 While the PQ’s 2007 platform was silent on matters of ethnocultural diversity 
management, the PLQ proposed a host of policies. Although the proposals were overwhelmingly 
pluralist, the 2007 policy-specific platform did offer a recognition that a PLQ government would 
commit itself to the protection and promotion of Quebec’s French character given that it is a 
“liberal value at the base of our political philosophy” (PLQ 2007b, 2).  Within the PLQ’s 2007 
general policy platform, the party makes pluralist proposals ranging from statements such as “our 
identity grows from what citizens from all four corners, who represent different traditions and 
religions, bring to us. Quebec’s diversity is a richness. It is also a permanent challenge, one of 
equality between the majority and minority rights” (PLQ 2007a, 69), and continued fights 
against racism. The policy-specific document proposes to increase visible minorities’ recruitment 
into the public sector, support groups and grassroots organizations, the promotion of educational 
activities (Black History Month), and the creation of an indicator in order to determine which 
private businesses are best handling diversity management (PLQ 2007b, 2).  
 Important in the 2007 campaign, however, was the very public and contentious debate 
surrounding ‘reasonable accommodation’. Fuelling this public debate were the “Hérouxville 
Standards” established in Hérouxville, “a small town near Shawinigan in the region of [the] 
Mauricie” (Bélanger 2008, 73). These standards created a “‘code of conduct’ that asked 
immigrants wishing to establish themselves in the town to conform to the Quebec majority’s 
secular view” (Bélanger 2008, 73). Nieguth and Lacassagne (2009, 6) point to the fact that 
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“contrary to the other two major political parties, the ADQ did not denounce the Hérouxville 
Standards, but instead used them to fuel a populist discourse around the ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ of cultural difference […] which ultimately benefited their electoral fortunes”. 
Even though the 2007 election was partly marked by the reasonable accommodation debate, 
Bélanger (2009, 75) contends that the ADQ’s rise was “impressive given that the reasonable 
accommodations issue played no direct part in the campaign. It must probably be concluded that 
this issue helped the ADQ before the campaign started, by giving the party the visibility and the 
impulse it needed to rival the two major parties”. Although reasonable accommodation played 
“no direct part in the campaign” (Bélanger 2008, 75), its influence on the election is 
undeniable—so undeniable that the PLQ launched the Bouchard-Taylor Commission in 2007 to 
sort out the issue.  
 Commissioned in February 2007, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission had a four-part 
mandate: (i) to “take stock of harmonization practices in Québec”, (ii) to “analyze the issues 
bearing in mind the experience of other societies”, (iii) to “conduct an extensive consultation”, 
and (iv) to “formulate recommendations to the government” (Commission de consultation sur les 
pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles 2008, 7). The chosen approach to 
fulfill this mandate would be to “perceive the debate on reasonable accommodation as the 
symptom of a more basic problem concerning the sociocultural integration model established in 
Québec since the 1970s” in order to “grasp the problem at its source and from all angles, with 
particular emphasis on its economic and social dimensions” (Commission de consultation sur les 
pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles 2008, 8).  
 With the public debate over integration looming large, only the PLQ and ADQ engaged 
with this debate within their electoral platforms. The PLQ maintained its pluralist-economic 
integrative measures while simultaneously ensuring the “reaffirmation of Quebec’s common 
values” while the ADQ proposed a populist message within their electoral platform which 
“exhorted Québécois to ‘be proud of our identity and find ways to reinforce it for the sake of the 
future and the continuance of our society’” (Nieguth and Lacassagne 2009, 6).  It is no surprise, 
then, why within a volatile political climate the two parties which addressed the accommodation 
debate were rewarded while the PQ—who proposed only a single limited policy—suffered its 
worst electoral result in 37 years, capturing 36 seats and 28.3 percent of the popular vote 
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compared to the ADQ’s historic 41 seats and 30.8 percent of the popular vote (Bélanger 2008, 
72; 75). 
 The ultimate outcome of the 2007 election was a poor showing for the PQ and a minority 
government for the PLQ, the province’s first in 129 years. While the PLQ was furthering its 
commitment to economic immigration, it did commit to maintaining cultural diversity through 
financial commitments to cultural groups, combatting racism and discrimination, and promoting 
intercultural rapprochement between newcomers and their new society.  It presented itself as the 
divergent pluralist alternative to the mute PQ and reactionary ADQ. The necessity of 
successfully integrating newcomers in Quebec society was echoed in Charest’s inaugural 
message to the minority government. Charest rejected the notion of an ethnic, or ascribed, nation 
and citizenship: 
  Je suis né à Sherbrooke. Je suis à demi Irlandais. Je le suis de par ma mère dont le  
  souvenir m'émeut à chaque jour. Est-ce que je suis moins Québécois pour autant?  
  Bien sûr que non. Est-ce que quelqu'un né au Québec mais prénommé Mustafa ou  
  Helena serait moins Québécois que vous et moi? On ne peut dresser de telles  
  barrières entre nous (PLQ 2007c). 
Furthermore, Charest explicitly committed himself and the party to integrating newcomers into 
Quebec’s liberal values: 
  Naître au Québec est une chance. Immigrer au Québec est un privilège. Intégrer  
  les immigrants est une responsabilité. C'est un geste réciproque. Pour celui qui  
  arrive, c'est prendre avec le Québec les valeurs québécoises: les libertés    
  individuelles, l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes et la séparation entre la  
  religion et l'État. De façon prioritaire, c'est aussi prendre avec le Québec cette  
  langue qui est le cœur de notre liberté, de notre identité. Intégration égale aussi  
  francisation. Pour celui qui accueille, intégrer les immigrants, c'est s'ouvrir à la  
  différence et aussi et surtout reconnaître les compétences (PLQ 2007c). 
However, Charest was also careful to offer a nuanced position which took into account both 
integration and the protection of these liberal values: 
  Nous allons, par exemple, renforcer le message livré à chaque immigrant à l'effet  
  que nos valeurs fondamentales ne sont pas négociables. Ce message, nous allons  
  le rendre public pour que tous les Québécois sachent ce qu'on attend de ceux qui  
  sont invités à venir partager notre avenir. Nous ferons cela tout en réaffirmant  
  notre conviction à l'effet que le seul Québec possible est un Québec de la   
  diversité. Il n'y a pas plus beau cadeau que le Québec puisse recevoir que les   
  espoirs de quelqu'un venu d'ailleurs. Le Québec n'est jamais aussi grand que   
  lorsqu'il ouvre ses bras. Certains croient qu'on grandit lorsqu'on lève le menton,  
  mais, en agissant ainsi, on ne fait que s'empêcher de regarder l'autre. Moi, je pense 
  qu'on grandit lorsqu'on tend la main. Ma position, c'est celle des rapprochements,  
  des rapprochements indispensables. C'est ça, être libéral (PLQ 2007c). 
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 Charest’s minority government fell, however, triggering the 2008 election. This election 
witnessed a shift in the volume of proposals from the year before, this time with the PQ 
proposing the bulk of ethnocultural diversity management policies while the PLQ proposed not a 
single policy. The PQ effectively began a discursive shift during the 2008 election, further 
leading to increased divergence between both the party’s past policies and with the PLQ. The 
PQ’s 2008 platform sought to modify the Charter of the French Language by “ensuring that 
French becomes the administrative language of interaction between the state and businesses and 
citizens” and to “put in place specific measures to francize businesses (with 1-50 employees) 
while taking into account certain criteria like the number of employees and their direct links with 
costumers. Fiscal measures will eventually be introduced in order to incentivize these 
businesses” (PQ 2008, 25). These measures were not proposed as a means to integrate 
newcomers, but the language measures were, in fact, explicitly placed in the “Reinforcing the 
Status of the French Language” section of the PQ’s platform, therefore making them 
protectionist measures which distanced the Party from previous proposals setting language 
policy as an integrative tool and a way to improve services to the non-Francophone communities, 
even in the face of the Quebec’s peculiar linguistic reality. 
 In the section titled “Ensuring the Full Integration of Immigrants in Quebec”, the PQ 
proposed an “integration contract in order to prioritize their integration into Quebec life” and to 
“make learning the French language a duty18 for newcomers and to take appropriate measures to 
achieve this” (PQ 2008, 27, emphasis added). This policy is, in fact, quite similar to the ‘moral 
contract’ that the PLQ first proposed in 1994. Apart from the PQ’s 1994 proposal to include 
integration as part of the sovereignist plan, this is a rare attempt by the party to fundamentally 
alter the way in which integration into the host society was to occur and was a clear 
demonstration of the Party’s ideology concerning the protection and advancement of the nation. 
In past elections, the PQ was either silent on the issue or continuously proposed to integrate 
newcomers into the Francophone majority. This proposal, however, forces integration onto 
newcomers instead of through more fluid, open, and pluralist means. While it did not explicitly 
reject cultural difference, the notion of an integration contract was nevertheless an implicit 
                                                 
18
 The original passage reads as: “Faire de l’apprentissage de de la langue française un droit pour les nouveaux 
arrivants et prendre les moyens appropriés pour y parvenir” (PQ 2008, 27). The use of “droit” is ambiguous 
because it could mean either ‘duty’ or ‘right’—‘right’ having a more positive connotation than ‘duty’. However, 
‘duty’ has been used due to the document’s overall context—particularly through the proposal of an integration 
contract. 
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recognition by the party that those with cultural differences must willingly integrate immediately 
and the contract, by extension, acted as means in which to level cultural differences by reifying 
Quebec’s values and imposing them onto newcomers. 
 Yet the PQ was, once again, careful to counter-balance restrictive measures with open 
ones. Pluralist integration policies were all found in the “Ensuring the Full Integration of 
Immigrants in Quebec” section (PQ 2008, 27). The platform proposed to offer newcomers the 
resources to learn French upon their arrival to Quebec; encourage community and inter-
community projects, particularly between women and young immigrants; and to continue the 
fight against racism and discrimination (PQ 2008, 27). Evidently, the PQ was aware that 
pluralism still had a role to play in successful integration and that cultural rapprochement 
between the mainstream and newcomers was an enviable way of ensuring successful integration, 
and understanding, into the French majority culture. There was, however, convergence on a 
handful of integrative strategies. Marois’ PQ and Charest’s PLQ adopted similar policies which 
aimed to increase the number of foreign students (PQ 2008, 23; PLQ 2008, 5); facilitate foreign 
diploma recognition (PQ 2008, 27; PLQ 2003a, 12); make it easier for immigrants to work and 
find jobs (PQ 2008, 27; PLQ 2003a, 13-14); and to prioritize hiring of cultural communities in 
the public sector (PQ 1989, 1999, 2003, 2008; PLQ 1989, 2003, 2007). The PLQ’s commitment 
to increasing the number of foreign students was affirmed in Charest’s first inaugural address 
after the 2008 election, stating:  
  Le Québec accueille chaque année 22 000 étudiants étrangers. […] À peine un sur 10 
reste au Québec, alors que plusieurs ont appris une nouvelle langue, alors qu'ils ont 
appris nos valeurs. M. le Président, je veux que, pour eux, le Québec ne soit pas 
qu'un heureux souvenir, mais qu'il soit également un projet d'avenir. Nous allons 
poser un geste audacieux pour garder cette jeunesse et son potentiel chez nous. 
Désormais, un étudiant étranger obtenant son diplôme ici se verra offrir un certificat 
de sélection pour immigrer au Québec. Nous nous fixons comme objectif de tripler le 
nombre d'étudiants étrangers qui font le choix de demeurer au Québec (PLQ 2009). 
 The result of the 2008 election was a PLQ majority government whose tenure in office 
was fundamentally defined by the ongoing economic crisis eventually culminating in the 
recession. The PLQ’s divergence away from cultural integration towards placing emphasis on 
economic immigration and integration came to be reflected in their policy proposals. The PLQ’s 
continued preference for economic ethnocultural diversity management was made clear in 
Premier Charest’s 2011 inaugural address to the 39th legislature’s second session: 
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  Le Québec a besoin de leurs [les immigrants] compétences. Pour certains,   
  décrocher un emploi dans leurs domaines est difficile. Pourtant, nombre    
  d'entreprises recherchent cette main-d'œuvre. Nous faisons le pont : le    
  gouvernement a développé et activé un service de recrutement par Internet. Le  
  Placement en ligne international offre aux entreprises de toutes les régions la  
  possibilité d'embaucher des travailleurs qualifiés, sélectionnés par le Québec avant 
  même leur arrivée chez nous. Avec ce service, nous atteignons un objectif triple :  
  plus d'immigrants en emploi, plus d'immigrants dans nos régions, plus    
  d'entreprises qui trouvent la main-d'œuvre dont elles ont besoin. D'autres mesures  
  actives viendront accélérer l'intégration en emploi des nouveaux arrivants (PLQ  
  2011). 
This sentiment towards economic integration was also echoed by Pauline Marois in her first 
inaugural speech as Premier, stating: “Et puis l’histoire de notre peuple, c’est aussi une histoire 
d’immigration. Nous avons le devoir de recevoir et d’intégrer les nouveaux arrivants à la nation 
québécoise et le gouvernement mettra l’emphase sur l’intégration en emploi” (PLQ 2012b). The 
impact that the recession had on both the 2008 and 2012 election could account for the lack of 
integrative policy proposals from the PLQ, the party could have rightly identified that economic 
issues were of greater salience to the voters and therefore reduced their emphasis on cultural 
integration, instead committing itself to economic immigration and integration.  
 Under Marois’ leadership, however, integration was to be of incredible importance. But 
no longer was integration to be fluid, receptive, and pluralist. Instead the PQ was to impose 
integration as a required necessity for newcomers and these newcomers were to integrate into a 
pre-defined set of codified values which created a binary form of citizenship: those who 
subscribed to liberal values, and illiberal individuals. 
 Although there was significant divergence and convergence in the 2007 and 2008 
elections, the overwhelming reality was that a discursive, rhetorical, and policy shift slowly 
began to emerge during these elections as the parties were effectively beginning to become more 
distinct in how they envisaged successful integration into Quebec society. These divergences 
were further solidified in the 2012 and 2014 elections where the PQ became increasingly more 
non-pluralist in regards to the imposition of codified liberal values onto the newcomer and the 
PLQ did not actively engage the PQ’s policies, either in support or disagreement, in their policy 
platforms.  
 The 2012 election resulted in a minority government for Pauline Marois’ PQ and saw 
Jean Charest resign as leader of the PLQ. Both parties’ electoral platforms contain policies which 
seek to facilitate immigrant employment (PQ 2012a, 24; PLQ 2012, 8) but they fundamentally 
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differ in their proposed integrative measures. The PLQ’s proposed integration policies by 
supporting private sector companies in their diversity management and francization efforts (PLQ 
2012a, 8) whereas the PQ, instead, opted to increase the prevalence of French through the 
legislative power of the state by proposing to extend Law 101 to CÉGEP, trade schools, and to 
adult education (PQ 2012a, 9). Furthermore, the PQ proposed increasingly nationalist integration 
policies including the passing of a Quebec constitution
19
 to establish Quebec’s fundamental 
values, to put in place a Quebec citizenship, and to create a charter of laïcité (PQ 2012a, 9). The 
proposed constitution, charter, and citizenship are all found under the “Affirming our Identity 
and Values” section of the party’s 2012 platform. They are overtly protectionist means dedicated 
to entrenching, codifying, and reifying Quebec’s liberal and secular values in order to protect the 
nation from possible illiberal values that the Other may be bringing to Quebec. To fully ensure 
their integration into the new society, these values are to be imposed onto the Other instead of 
allowing the Other to integrate into society.  
 These proposals, however, are a significant shift away from the PQ’s past proposals 
which emphasized cultural integration into the Francophone majority which allowed for parallel 
cultural traditions and identities to exist alongside the Francophone majority (PQ 1981, 49; 1985, 
32; 1989, 85-85)—but the extension of Quebecois citizenship to the cultural community allowed 
for the Other to both feel Quebecois and of their respective ethnic origin thus allowing for 
democratic participation while the government actively sought to promote cultural difference and 
recognized its value (PQ 1989, 84; 2003, 86). Instead, proposals to “Affirm our Identity and 
Values” and what eventually became Bill 60 were put forward as a means to level differences 
between the Other and the host society, and effectively protect the nation from the Other through 
legislating the core concepts of the nation as a whole—that is, the concepts which bind the 
mainstream members of the nation together in face of threats to the nation’s survival. 
 Heading into the 2014 election, Philippe Couillard was chosen to succeed Jean Charest as 
leader of the PLQ. Couillard, now leader of the Official Opposition, had to compete with the 
PQ’s proposed Bill 60, a bill which sought to codify the state’s religious neutrality, laïcité, 
gender equality, and to “frame the demands for reasonable accommodation” (Government of 
                                                 
19
 The significance of a Quebec constitution is expertly discussed in Nelson Wiseman’s (2010) analytical piece 
concerning the proposed 2007 Quebec constitution. 
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Quebec 2013). This bill was first introduced by Pauline Marois in her first inaugural address as 
Premier: 
  En matière de citoyenneté, notre société n’a jamais règlé [sic] les questions   
  surgies à la suite de la crise des accommodements raisonnables. Pour y remédier,  
  nous avons proposé l’adoption d’une charte de la laïcité, ainsi qu’une loi sur la  
  citoyenneté québécoise. Ces propositions fondamentales doivent bénéficier de  
  l’adhésion du plus grand nombre. Le gouvernement a donc décidé de lancer des  
  consultations pour atteindre un point d’équilibre qui nous permettra d’avancer sur  
  ces questions (PQ 2012b). 
 
 As Marois’ PQ had only won a minority government, the government’s eventually fall 
led to the 2014 election. With failure to pass Bill 60 through the National Assembly, it became 
part of the PQ’s electoral platform in two sections: Dire ce que nous sommes and Affirmer les 
valeurs de laïcité et de neutralité religieuse de l’État where the party proposed to adopt said 
Charter (PQ 2014, 6). Due to the Charter’s popularity, indeed with one polling firm placing 
support for the Charter at 65 percent among Quebecers in September, 2013 (Angus-Reid 2013) 
and the contention of the issue, the PLQ opted to not address the Charter within their electoral 
platform
20
. The party, however, put forward policies which proposed to give Montreal more 
powers over integration and to promote economic immigration through “entrepreneurial 
immigration” by encouraging foreign investors to Quebec and by facilitating their immigration 
process through the ‘start-up visa’ program (PLQ 2014a, 66; 87). The PLQ’s quiet position on 
bill 60 within its electoral platform may have been a calculated attempt to achieve two political 
goals. First, its silence allowed for the immigrant vote to remain supportive of the PLQ. Second, 
by keeping quiet, the PLQ received the vote of those who were against the Charter; while 
coming out in favour of the bill could have alienated anti-Charter party supporters. Once elected, 
the PLQ proposed a nuanced series of integrative strategies (PLQ 2014b). The premier 
committed the party to economic immigration and integration, “[d]ans le contexte de notre 
démographie, où déjà le nombre de personnes en âge de travailler décroît, notre productivité, 
pour augmenter, doit s'appuyer sur une participation maximale au marché du travail […]. […] le 
caractère incontournable d'une immigration soutenue, bien formée, prête à l'emploi, dont les 
compétences sont davantage reconnues”; and the recognition of foreign credentials. Il faut 
                                                 
20
 This is not to say that the PLQ didn’t address the Charter at all. To the contrary, the Charter and integration in 
general were well discussed issues during the numerous leaders’ debates held throughout the election. 
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également agir de façon déterminée dans le domaine de la reconnaissance des compétences” 
(PLQ 2014b). While Couillard continued on the path that Charest created which favoured 
economic immigration and integration, he also mentioned proposals which echoed both the PQ’s 
electoral platforms from 2012 and 2014, and Bill 60: 
  L'accueil et l'intégration des personnes immigrantes doivent se poursuivre bien sûr 
  avec deux ordres de réflexion. […]. Ce qui compte, c'est l'adhésion et    
  l'attachement aux valeurs que nous partageons : le français comme langue   
  commune de notre espace public dans le respect des droits et de la contribution  
  historique de nos compatriotes anglophones; également, le partage d'autres   
  principes, ceux-là partagés avec les autres démocraties du monde, notamment  
  l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes et la neutralité religieuse des institutions  
  de l’État (PLQ 2014b). 
The PLQ adopted a rhetoric similar to that employed by the PQ in 2012 and 2014. Premier 
Couillard stated: 
  Notre gouvernement soumettra à cette Assemblée un projet de loi affirmant la  
  neutralité religieuse des institutions de l'État, la nécessité que les services publics  
  soient donnés et reçus à visage découvert, balisant les accommodements    
  raisonnables et prévoyant des mécanismes de lutte contre l'intégrisme religieux.  
  Voilà ce qu'il convient de faire. Le respect de nos droits fondamentaux, de notre  
  patrimoine et bien sûr l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes seront les principes 
  à la base de ce nouveau projet de loi. La ministre de la Justice et responsable de la  
  Condition féminine, en particulier, et l'ensemble du gouvernement y veilleront  
  (PLQ 2014b). 
This proposed bill eventually took form as Bill 62, Loi favorisant le respect de la neutralité 
religieuse de l’État et visant notamment à encadrer les demandes d’accommodements religieux 
dans certains organismes, a bill similar, both in title and content, to the PQ’s proposed Bill 60 in 
2013 (Government of Quebec 2015). 
 The 2014 election underscored both the continued shift towards immigration as an 
economic necessity and priority, and entrenched the PQ’s move from a party of cultural 
pluralism to one which primarily sought to protect the nation that the newcomer was to integrate 
into. As the PQ explicitly proposed nationalist integrative measures and the PLQ remained silent, 
the election returned the PLQ to power with a majority government—and resulted in a 
commitment from the PLQ to propose a bill that had much of the same rhetoric and principles as 
did the PQ’s bill 60. This election, then, resulted in an interesting phenomenon. The parties 
briefly began to diverge under Charest’s leadership as the PLQ began to promote both pluralist 
integration measures and pluralist economic-immigration measures; the PQ began to promote 
pluralist economic-immigration measures and exclusionary and protectionist integration 
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measures. While the PQ maintained these priorities in the 2014 election and the PLQ did not, the 
PLQ ultimately committed to these very same priorities in the inaugural address. As a result, the 
period of divergence was short-lived and concluded with a return to convergence—this time with 
the PLQ converging to the proposed PQ policies and limiting the past established rhetoric of 
cultural pluralism via integration into the host society. 
 
The Effects of Nationalism, Divergent Integrative Measures, and a New Convergence? 
The integration policies proposed from 1976 to 2014 demonstrated a fairly nuanced and complex 
series of changes over time. Included in these changes were shifts from open cultural pluralism 
which sought a dialogue between the newcomer and the state, to explicit manifestations of 
ideology in 1994, to economic realities, to non-pluralist policies which sought the codification of 
non-negotiable common liberal values. In effect, these changes brought both parties away from 
their early conceptualizations of integration policy as a means of fostering rapprochement and 
the support of ethnic cultures while facilitating integration into the French majority through 
participatory measures such as said rapprochement, sensitization programs, and French language 
courses. 
 Nationalism did indeed have a significant impact on the policies proposed. It took form in 
terms of civic proposals found throughout the 1980s which offered sensitization programs, 
representative bureaucracy, and continued recognitions of Quebec’s multicultural diversity as 
being a benefit for the province—indeed reducing the risk of what could have become a stagnant 
and homogenized culture. Attempts to support different cultures and the offering of French 
language courses not as a means to protect the nation but as a means to facilitate integration are 
indicative of a civic type of nationalism which promoted participation between the state and 
newcomers. This participation sought to extend the boundaries of citizenship to newcomers by 
not limiting differences between the mainstream and the settling—this preference was largely 
prioritized by both parties. For a large part of the period under study (the 1981, 1985, and 1989 
elections), the PQ and PLQ converged in their preference for this participative cultural 
integration and the PQ’s predisposition towards achieving political sovereignty was not 
combined with integration policies either in the election before the 1980 sovereignty-referendum 
or immediately after it. 
 Nationalism as a whole should not be synonymous with racism, xenophobia, 
discrimination, or even political independence. It is a wholly complex phenomenon with 
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numerous identifications and definitions. It can either aim to bring people together in a civic and 
inclusive form, incite violence and divide people, or seek the political independence of a people. 
The various forms of nationalism are manifested within the parties’ integration policies as both 
parties converge from a period of cultural-pluralist integration, to forming a new path come 2014 
where more non-pluralist forms of nationalistic integration become apparent. Yet from the 
Lévesque era of the PQ’s political rule through to Boisclair’s brief tenure, the PQ’s nationalist 
ideology does not permeate integration but for short-lived passage of Jacques Parizeau in 1994. 
And even under the more restrictive Marois era, integration is not woven into the sovereignty 
project which leads to a significant conclusion concerning the impact of ideology on integrative 
measures: much like its immigration policies, the PQ consciously opted to keep political 
sovereignty and integration separate except for the 1994 election. Its nationalistic ideological 
predisposition had little effect on its policy proposals. 
 Nationalism played a pivotal role across every election but for the ones in which both 
parties removed integration from their policy agendas. For the PLQ, initial forms of open and 
civic nationalism eventually gave way to economic integration which was neither civic nor 
ethnic but was still open and pluralist regardless. The PQ, however, shifted from a 1976 platform 
which stressed protectionism to platforms which were incredibly open and civic in nature before 
eventually being restrictive and affirmationist under Marois. A result of the PQ’s shift was the 
Charter of Values, but it dies on the order paper in the National Assembly and became a 
campaign issue during the 2014 election. The PQ’s Charter saw a new legislative birth in a 
different more moderate form through the PLQ’s affirmationist Bill 62. Overall, the expected 
nationalist ideology which aimed to protect, affirm, and level out the differences between the 
Francophone majority and the rest of the population were not apparent in most of the PQ’s 
policies. Both parties fundamentally agreed that civic inclusion and the fostering of democratic 
participation were essential for integration. This integration was to be aided by both the state and 
the citizens who must understand that difference existed and that it was a benefit. But rhetoric 
stressing the benefit that difference would bring fundamentally changed under the Charest 
Liberals who began to re-focus integration and immigration as an economic reality—thus 
reducing the state’s responsibility to integrate newcomers into culture and instead integrating 
them into employment. 
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 The 1994 election demonstrated that restrictive forms of nationalism can play an impact 
on policy determination. For the PLQ, the 1994 election saw the first mention of a form of 
integrative contract that newcomers were to sign. Evidently, the PQ does not maintain a 
monopoly on integration policies which sought to reduce the differences among newcomers and 
the Quebec born. Beginning in 2008, and arguably 2007 with the ADQ’s success, restrictive 
nationalism began to appear more evident. With Pauline Marois as leader of the PQ, the Party 
underwent a discursive shift which distanced it from both its past preference for cultural 
pluralism and the PLQ. The PQ promoted instead policies which sought to concretize the values 
that newcomers were to adopt, effectively imposing non-negotiable liberal values onto the 
newcomer. These values were ones which bound the imagined community—the series of core 
beliefs and opinions which formed the nation: language, gender equality, and state religious 
neutrality. It is not to say that these values are not wholly proper liberal values to posses in a 
liberal-democratic society, but references to these values were few and far between for the 
majority of the elections examined. Efforts to codify these values were attempts to reify the 
position that many Quebecers held and attempted to draw a distinction: those who held these 
values were Quebecois, those who did not were the Other. The largest difference that occurred is 
that, assuming these values have been constant since 1976, newcomers were once expected to 
integrate into them through rapprochement with the settled, through being exposed to Quebec 
culture, and through the state’s integrative ability; but moral contracts or Bill 60 and Bill 62 
reduce the fluidity of integrating into these values and instead impose them onto newcomers thus 
drawing a clear distinction between the Quebecois and the Other. In essence, moral contracts and 
Charters of Values were effectively conceived as tools to level out differences between the Other 





Chapter V: Brokerage Politics 
Why do ideological differences that distinguish the PLQ and PQ seem to have but a marginal 
importance when it comes to immigration and integration policies? With two parties both 
espousing fundamentally different ideologies concerning Quebec’s place within Canada, one 
might expect, in fact, that these ideological differences would permeate their proposed policies. 
It would be expected to see the PQ engage the sovereignty project with their ethnocultural 
diversity management proposals; there should be overt efforts to both court newcomers to the 
sovereignist side and to implement immigration policies which target individuals more 
sympathetic to Quebec’s independence. The PLQ would then be expected to combat the decision 
taken by the PQ and implement pluralist and open immigration and integration policies which 
favour the integration into the pan-Canadian multicultural mosaic. Yet this did not occur. Both 
parties fundamentally believed they have a duty and role to play as a defender of the Quebecois 
nation—indeed with considerable immigration policy being transferred to Quebec under 
Bourassa’s Liberal governments—but their respective ideology concerning Quebec’s place 
within Canada did not permeate itself concerning their proposed ethnocultural diversity 
management policies. Instead what emerged were periods of considerable policy proposal 
convergence between the two parties punctuated by elections of difference and divergence before 
ultimately returning back to convergence. Both theses convergences and divergences can be 
explained by ‘brokerage politics’. Generally applied to Canada’s federal parties, brokerage 
politics explains why political parties as a whole are not strikingly different from one another. 
Uniquely applying the brokerage theory to Quebec’s political parties in a micro-policy sense will 
help to shed light on why two ideologically distinct parties effectively propose similar policies in 
an area in which significant difference is expected. 
 This chapter will first present a review of the relevant literature on party ideology, party 
competition, and brokerage politics before applying brokerage politics to the elections under 
consideration. The point of this exercise is to show that brokerage politics allowed for both 
parties to reduce the ideological difference between them and propose similar like-minded 
policies in order to appeal to the broadest electorate possible by acting as pragmatic vote seekers. 
Thus ideological positions concerning sovereignty and integration were de-emphasized in favour 




The ideology that political parties come to espouse can be of utmost importance for voters. Party 
ideology helps individuals delineate where parties stand, whether they agree or disagree with 
them, and can influence the policies that parties develop and implement. But Anthony Downs’ 
(1957) seminal work on the theory of political action posited that “political parties in a 
democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes. They do not seek to gain office 
in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any particular interest groups; 
rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain office” (Downs 1957, 
137). Ideologies, then, act as a simple means for voters to reduce information costs—if the cost 
of obtaining information concerning policy proposals is too high (that is, if the process is too 
time consuming) then voters can vote based on ideological lines by identifying which party is 
most likely to represent their broad interests, an example of parties formulating policies to serve 
identified core voters and maximize potential votes (Downs 1957, 141). Ideologies help the voter 
“focus attention on the differences between parties; therefore, they can be used as samples of all 
the differentiating stands” (Downs 1957, 141-142). 
 If ideologies are an important aspect for voters to determine for whom to vote, and that 
parties invent “an ideology in order to attract the votes of those citizens who wish to cut costs by 
voting ideologically”, it would be logical to assume that ideology would then have an effect on 
policy proposals and policy outputs (Downs 1957, 142). Indeed, the relationship between 
ideology and public policies has been well documented (Castles and McKinlay 1979; 
Consterdine 2015; Hinnfors et al. 2012; Imbeau et al. 2001; Laver and Hunt 1992; Schinkel and 
van Houdt 2010; Vassalo and Wilcox 2006), and has often been reduced to the axiom of ‘politics 
matters’ (Imbeau et al. 2001, 1). It is puzzling, then, that if the literature demonstrates that 
ideology ought to play a role in the development of policy proposals and policy outputs that this 
appears not to be the case in Quebec. Perhaps Quebec is an anomaly. Where the PQ and PLQ 
government undoubtedly espouse two different ideological positions representing both 
federalism within Canada and autonomy outside Canada respectively, their continued proposal of 
convergent policy proposals indicates that party ideology does not play a significant role in the 
determination of policy proposals and outputs. However, this is not to say that nationalism itself 
is unimportant, solely the federal-sovereignist divide. 
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 ‘Politics matters’ has been demonstrated through the study of migration in the UK from 
the perspective of the Labour Party (Consterdine 2015). The ideological shift that the Labour 
Party underwent as a result of spending nearly 20 years in political opposition had “reoriented 
[the party] to the centre” (Consterdine 2015, 1445-1446). This shift was essential to 
understanding “why the government adopted an expansionary approach to policy in the early 
2000s” and the ideological reorientation was reflected “in most public policies, including 
immigration” (Consterdine 2015, 1449). Hinnfors et al. (2012) have similarly discussed the 
importance that ideology maintains in policy outputs. The authors contend that the Swedish 
Social Democratic Party (SAP) has “made reference to central ideological tenets over more than 
40 years. Moreover, we have shown that regardless of voter opinion or the level of party threat 
[…], the SAP’s entry policies have remained restrictive. Thus, we are confident that ideology 
should be included alongside more conventionally accepted explanatory factors” (Hinnfors et al. 
2012, 599). In the Swedish context, the SAP has maintained ideological consistency in their 
restrictive immigration policies even in the face of vote competition. Ideology played a 
significant role in their policy outputs and demonstrates that ideology may play an important role 
in determining policy proposals and policy outputs beyond vote-maximization assumptions.  
 Likewise, Schikel and van Houdt (2010) demonstrate that “active citizenship” was 
subject to “renewed interest” in the Netherlands as a result of the “rise of neo-liberal emphasis on 
‘individual responsibility’” (Schikel and van Houdt 2010, 697) demonstrating that ideological 
changes led to increased dialogue in the Netherlands culminating in the “double helix of cultural 
assimiliationism and neo-liberalism […] [which] consists of a coming together of a 
communitarian emphasis on ‘Dutch culture’ and ‘Dutch norms and values’ with a neo-liberal 
emphasis on individual responsibility and participation” (Schikel and van Houdt 2010, 710). The 
relationship between policy and ideologies is further articulated by Vassallo and Wilcox (2006) 
who convincingly argue that “ideologies are tools that parties can use not only to attract votes but 
also to motivate activists” and that parties “may be seen as the repository of ideologies, but they 
are also the short-term carrier of ideas. The specific policy ideas debated by parties will vary 
across countries and in between election cycles” (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006, 414). Indeed, 
political parties often maintain “these ideas across several election cycles, although it is not 
unusual for parties to coopt [sic] specific ideas offered by other parties in order to eliminate the 
issue in the campaign” (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006, 414). For many, politics does indeed matter 
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in terms of policy proposal, party evolution, and policy output. Castles and McKinlay (1979) 
conclude their analysis by determining that “the answer to the question of whether politics is 
relevant for an understanding of the public welfare commitment in advanced democratic states is 
unequivocally that politics does matter” (Castles and McKinlay 1979, 179, emphasis added). 
 However, in the British context, Richard Rose (1984) argues that while political parties 
do matter: 
   To interpret an election as a choice between ideologies is to     
 misunderstand the nature of both parties and ideologies. A political party is   
 not a thinking organization. Political philosophers may manufacture    
 ideologies as logically coherent set of ideas. But parties do not make    
 ideologies in any positively identifiable sense, for the institutions that    
 constitute a party are multiple and intellectually not coherent, nor are    
 election organizers interested in philosophical matters 
and by extension, campaigns are “about a choice between organizations, not ideas” (Rose 1984, 
144). Freeman (1995) mirrors Rose’s argument in his contention that, in regards to immigration 
as an election issue, “political parties do not normally take clear, strong, or divergent positions 
on immigration issues. There is a strong tendency […] for the major political parties to seek a 
consensus across the political spectrum that has the effect of taking immigration conflicts off the 
agenda” (Freeman 1995, 884). Rose and Freeman argue that policy proposals and policy outputs 
are a result of vote maximization which may often lead to an agreement among parties to reduce 
the significance of a specific issue during an election campaign. 
 
Party Competition 
Richard Rose (1974) succinctly argues that, perhaps hyperbolically, in the British context, 
political parties “are necessary because opinion must be organized if anything resembling 
representative government is to exist; government without parties would make contemporary 
British politics resemble medieval England or contemporary Ethiopia” (Rose 1974, 1). Downs’ 
identification that political parties and governments are vote-maximizing rational actors which 
offer policies for votes is influential in understanding how parties compete and why their policies 
may converge (Downs 1957, 137; 144). A two-party system may emerge where competing 
parties’ policy proposals converge in order to appeal to the most voters possible—thus parties are 
rational actors who are explicitly seeking public office and must put together a broad coalition of 
voters in order to do so. By proposing and crafting policies that are favourable to the biggest 
voting coalition available, parties may dilute their ideological intents in order to capture the 
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mechanisms of government. Rose (1984, 13) articulates policy convergence of competing parties 
by likening it to automobile manufacturers “offering potential customers a car that is identical in 
nearly all fundamental respects, differing only at those points where small advantages may be 
won without alienating anyone”. More formally, he convincingly notes that politics “is about 
reconciling as well as articulating differences. Insofar as there is a substantial majority in favour 
of a given policy, then differences can disappear as parties scurry to adopt the one position 
popular with the bulk of the voters” (Rose 1984, 13). This sentiment is further articulated by 
Robertson (1976) who argues that successful public policies “equally deserve the support of all 
major parties” and in turn leads “us to believe that successful and acceptable policies do, and 
should, have a dominance, such that they are the stock in trade of all parties. They should be 
advocated, and a party ought not to refrain from recommending them because this is not 
electorally expedient” (Robertson 1976, 18). 
 Laver and Hunt (1992) offer an alternative approach to the classic Downsian model of 
party competition. The authors include political systems themselves “as the source of structure in 
electoral tastes, and thus in party competition” (Laver and Hunt 1992, 9). For them, voter 
preference needs to include party identification given that “voters come to prefer policy positions 
that are consistent with those put forward by the party with which they identify” which has an 
important impact on party competition (Laver and Hunt 1992, 9). The inclusion of ideology into 
party competition allows for the explicit recognition that “policy preferences cannot be ‘read off’ 
directly from tastes, but are conditioned strongly by party identification. This means that the 
actual structure of policy preferences is endogenous to party competition” (Laver and Hunt 1992, 
9). For Robertson, competitive political systems should impose constraints on the importance 
that ideology has between a “dominant and emerging party” thus it would not be expected for the 
“emerging party to react in the same way” to a policy issue as does the dominant party 
(Robertson 1976, 128). Robertson offers a nuanced interpretation of the role that ideology plays 
in party competition. For him, ideology is, indeed, of significant importance. But in the event of 
a two-party system with alternating parties—such as Quebec—“other constraints arising from 
the nature of governing in a consensus society, will present essentially the same challenge to 
them” (Robertson 1976, 128). 
 Downs (1957) identified party competition by viewing parties as vote-maximizers and 
thus may, over time, present converging policies in order to receive as much of the popular vote 
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as possible which lends to the possibility of the creation of a two-party system. In this two-party 
system, where two parties propose similar policies and implement similar outputs, the biggest 
distinguishing factor between party A and party B may be their espoused ideology. This ideology 
needs to be factored into party competition as well (Laver and Hunt 1992). If we assume that 
parties fundamentally want to control office, it would behoove them to appeal to the broadest 
electorate—a result of this may be the dilution of strong ideological predispositions that may 
have alienated it from the bulk of the population.  
 With this literature in mind, this chapter argues that the convergence of immigration and 
integration policy proposals is due to brokerage politics. Because ideology, in Quebec, does not 
affect immigration and integration proposals, both the PQ and PLQ act as vote-maximizing 
agents who seek to capture as broad a part of the electorate as possible. For the PQ, restrictive 
policies, or policies that are partisan in nature, or seek to advance the sovereignty project may 
prove to be alienating for newcomers. For the PLQ, then, their commitment to the protection of 
the Quebecois nation, at the expense of pro pan-Canadian ethnocultural diversity management 
policies, would shift their policy proposals to being more in line with their PQ competition—
resulting in both parties to propose nationalistic policies that appeal to the largest number of 
voters as possible. 
 
Parties as Brokerage Agents: Reducing Difference and Increasing Votes 
The conceptualization and idea for the application of brokerage politics stems from Anthony 
Downs’ (1957, 137) seminal work on party competition. Downs’ main contention was that 
governments and parties “always act so as to maximize the number of votes it will receive” and 
thus are entrepreneurs “selling policies for votes instead of products for money”. Thus parties 
“do not seek to gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any 
particular interest groups; rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain 
office” (Downs 1957, 137). The result of this is converging policy proposals. If “a majority of 
voters are massed in one relatively narrow band on the left-right scale, then the government can 
choose all its policies from within this band. Hence its policies will form a fairly cohesive set 
embodying the ideological viewpoint associated with that area of the scale” (Downs 1957, 144). 
Quebec is a bifurcated party system having only had two different parties to form government 
since 1976. The band of policy options that are available to the PLQ and PQ are a result of the 
 95 
PLQ’s inherent liberal ideology and the PQ’s social-democratic ideology (McRoberts 1993, 241, 
255; PQ 1988, 1). Using Downs’ model allows for the recognition that political parties in a two-
party system are essentially rational actors seeking to obtain the highest amount of votes 
possible.  
 Rose’s identification of ‘policy inheritance’, or where “[m]uch time of politicians is not 
spent in making choices, but in dealing with the consequences of inherited programmes that 
would not have been chosen by the current incumbents of office […]” (Rose 1990, 264), is a 
later reflection of Downs’ identification that, when in a two-party democracy with a “distribution 
of voters roughly approximating a normal curve”, the changing of parties in office will have “no 
drastic policy changes” given that “most voters are located relatively close to the incumbent’s 
position no matter which party is in office” (Downs 1957, 143). If the voters are indeed ‘close to 
the incumbent’s position’, then this would in part explain the converging immigration and 
integration policy proposals.  
 The Downsian perspective, however, is often applied to the American perspective. Within 
Canadian political science, the research on ‘brokerage politics’ allows for a theoretical 
framework which recognizes the vote-maximizing behaviour of Canadian political parties while 
accounting for Canada’s unique political culture. 
 Defined by Carty and Cross, brokerage agents are parties which seek to “obscure 
differences and muffle conflicting interests” among the electorate (Carty and Cross 2010, 193). 
These parties do not seek to represent a particular segment of social groups, and instead practice 
“electoral pragmatism” (Carty and Cross 2010, 194) resulting in a “commitment to the broadest 
possible support base” (Carty 2013, 11). In effect, this electoral pragmatism allows for parties to 
present convergent policies in order to limit the difference between them. Should parties 
successfully identify where the largest portion of voters lie, then they may present policies which 
are more in-line with the maximum number of voters. A result of offering similar policies, 
however, is that it may reduce the overall impact of ideology. Because ideology-distinct parties 
may opt to limit their ideological impact ton their proposals in favour of a watered down and 
more centrist version which is less alienating to voters, brokerage parties are not “constrained by 
past support or by specific groups in society; indeed, [their] raison d’être is to act as a social and 
political broker capable of accommodating the competing interests of distinctive elements of the 
whole electorate” (Carty 2015, 15).  
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 Where Downs (1957) recognized that political parties actively seek to vote-maximize by 
trying to cobble together the largest amount of voters possible, the literature on brokerage 
politics assumes the same thing but inadvertently refines the Downsian perspective by allowing 
for the recognition that parties are inherently trying to “[obfuscate] and [suppress] wider political 
conflict” by presenting similar policy proposals (Carty 2015, 15). The converging nature of 
brokerage parties are a result of the “construction of an accommodative bargain that defines its 
role in the system and encompasses its diverse electorate” (Carty 2015, 17) which still allows for 
a political party the potential to “enjoy disproportionate success among distinctive clienteles […] 
but, rather, they are positioned to bind the political interests of such groups to others in the 
electorate” (Carty 2015, 18).  
 The recognition of brokerage parties as being brokers of identity, ideology, and 
difference in order to appeal to the broadest electorate as possible has long been an influential 
tenet of the Canadian political science literature (Brodie and Jenson 1995; Carty 2015; Carty and 
Cross 2010; Clarke et al. 1996; Cross and Young 2002; Jenson 1995; Meisel 1963). Brodie and 
Jenson (1996, 59) add to the literature on brokerage parties by identifying two different 
approaches in which to situate said parties. The first is an “organization explanation” which 
“assumes that electoral success is the sole goal of political parties”, while the second approach is 
“more sociological, emphasizing the social divisions in Canadian society and the role of elites, 
who serve as brokers for divergent interests in order to maintain social harmony” (Brodie and 
Jenson 1996, 59; 60).  
 Aside from the broad application of brokerage politics to the parties as a whole, 
Stevenson (1987) identifies the importance of elites. This is expanded upon by Aucoin (1986) in 
his analysis of Brian Mulroney’s leadership style which was based on the “accommodation of 
interest and not the interplay of ideas” and allowed for an easier facilitation of the “negotiation of 
compromises among different points of view” (Aucoin 1987, 17-18). Like Aucoin (1986), Carty 
et al. (2000) look at the implications of brokerage outside the general party literature. In so 
doing, they determined that ‘regional brokerage’ was a pre-eminent aspect of Canadian politics 
as far back as the second party system which culminated in a political “organization run by 
powerful regional chieftains whose control of the cabinet offices of the national government 
allowed them to engage in the political bargaining necessary to maintain their electoral support” 
(Carty et al. 2000, 17; 18). Regional brokerage is best reflected through the study of Quebec—a 
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province which was once thought to be crucial for the formation of a majority government—who 
inadvertently forced political parties to appeal to the province’s unique political interests while 
simultaneously appealing to the rest of Canada (Johnston 2015, 30).  
 Cochrane (2010), however, looks at the perception that brokerage parties mitigate 
ideology. For Cochrane, “[i]t is a fundamental mistake to suppose that brokerage and ideology 
are inimical models of political operation” (Cochrane 2010, 584). In fact, brokerage and ideology 
must be intertwined because it heavily influences and “shapes party policy and party competition 
depends on the structure of the ideologies that stir party activists” (Cochrane 2010, 584). 
Politicians need the ideologically driven policy-seeking party members to support them, while 
the policy-seekers “need their party’s politicians in power” which results in “quid pro quo 
between policy seekers and office seekers” that “drives brokerage politics” (Cochrane 2010, 
584). The intra-party dimension which concerns office-seeking and membership-based policy 
proposal formulation is a result of the ideological constraints that a party embraces—this allows 
for the recognition that, within the party, ideology does indeed matter but may not explicitly 
translate externally during a general election. 
 As a theoretical framework, and as an extension of Downs’ (1957) work, brokerage 
politics seeks to observe party convergence as a means of vote-maximizing. Under this model, 
the PQ and PLQ propose converging immigration and integration policies as pragmatic means of 
attempting to maximize votes which demonstrates two things: (i) the PLQ can propose 
nationalistic policies that allows them to maintain the support of nationalists and protect the 
Quebecois nation’s culture and language; and (ii) the PQ can propose policies that do not 
actively seek to advance the independence project through immigration and integration while 
simultaneously allowing for pluralist policies that do not alienate the immigrant and still offers 
them the option to vote for the PQ. 
 
A Tale of Two Parties: The PQ and PLQ as Brokerage Agents 
Immigration: Defending the Nation while Remaining Open 
In their policy proposals, the PQ and PLQ both fundamentally agreed that immigration was 
necessary for the province. With immigration being a necessity, the next issue that policy makers 
sought to address was rectifying the need for new individuals with the precarious and delicate 
situation the Quebec nation found itself in. The addressing of concerns for the nation’s survival 
with regard to immigration policy saw the PQ and PLQ both propose policies which sought to 
 98 
affirm the nation, either by demands for policy autonomy or through measures which prioritized 
the immigration of those who could easily integrate such as French speaking immigrants. 
Although the parties seldom converged in how they framed their immigration policies they both 
proposed policies which fundamentally wanted the same thing: the continued survival and 
protection of the nation. 
 The proposed policies by both parties resulted in a convergence which promoted two 
things. First, both parties were able to claim their right as defenders of the nation through 
proposing policies which either sought increased policy autonomy, or through the prioritization 
of French speaking immigrants specifically due to the nation’s French fact. Second, these 
affirmative immigration policies were countered with pluralist policies which did not limit the 
total number of immigrants nor did they allow for only a specific type of immigration. Favouring 
French speaking immigrants did not mean that non-Francophone immigrants were to be rejected. 
Simply put, the PQ and PLQ converged in that both defend and protect the nation while 
remaining open to pluralism in the recruitment of newcomers.  
 These convergences reduced the distance between the two parties’ proposals over time 
which allowed them to offer similar policies to the electorate thus actively engaging in brokerage 
politics. Brokering in this policy area led both parties to commit themselves to the “broadest 
possible support base” (Carty 2013, 11) as non-exclusionary and pluralist policies allowed for 
both parties to remain an enticing party for newcomers, and policies which sought the 
affirmation of the nation allowed for the support of members of the nation who were concerned 
about immigration’s role in the nation’s survival. This key consideration led the PLQ and PQ to 
reduce the differences between their respective ideologies which, in turn, created a large band of 
available voters who fell between protectionist and nation affirming policies, and pluralist 
policies which sought to facilitate immigration. Party competition, then, in a two-party system 
proved to be more important for the PQ and PLQ who actively reduced their ideological 
differences to appeal to the median voter. As the median voter was most likely to respond to 
similar policies, the party which could effectively mobilize this area of support was assuredly to 
be rewarded with political office. Time in office, at the expense of ideological policy positions, 
was a reasonable trade-off for both parties. Both parties acting as brokerage agents did not give a 
single party a monopoly on being defender of the nation, nor did one party have a monopoly on 
promoting immigration.  
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 When applied to the immigration policies proposed, brokerage politics can explain why 
the ideological differences between the parties did not manifest itself in their immigration 
policies. The PQ’s ambition for an autonomous and independent Quebec did not permeate their 
immigration measures; in fact, the PLQ proposed policies, and signed federal-provincial 
agreements, which increased the province’s policy autonomy. The PQ’s ability to broker on this 
policy area effectively reduced the importance of ideology and brought them to policies which 
were more in-line with the PLQ. Brokerage politics, then, demonstrates why the difference 
between the parties’ proposals were so limited, because they identified the largest band of voters’ 
preferences and to receive these votes they had to present similar policies which would not 
alienate a majority of the voters. A result of attempting to receive these votes is the watering 
down of ideology in favour of proposing policies which are ultimately similar. Over the 11 
elections reviewed, the parties proposed significantly less immigration policies than they did 
integration. While it is surprising that the parties broker over immigration policy, particularly 
because one would fully expect ideology to play a significant role in this policy area, integration 
itself is subject to considerable brokering by the parties—although with brief periods of notable 
divergence. Ideology came to play a significant role in the proposed integration policies, but 
ultimately, like immigration, it was the desire for the accumulation of votes in a bifurcated party 
system which proved to be more important. The desire for the cobbling together of large voting 
blocs which rewarded parties with terms in office effectively came to outweigh the sovereignty 
project, resulting in periods of similar policy proposals between two parties where one would 
expect to see significant differences in the policies proposed. 
 
The 1980s: Contexts and Convergences 
Contextually, the convergences that occurred throughout the 1980s are surprising. The 1980s 
were a decade marked by referendum on Quebec’s position within Canada, the province’s refusal 
to sign the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and the Meech Lake Accord. With these 
three aspects coming to dominate Quebec politics and Quebec-Canada relations for the 1980s 
and well into the 1990s, it would be expected that brokerage politics would not occur. One might 
expect that the PLQ and PQ would be diametrically opposed in their policy proposals, both 
seeking different ends and means specifically due to this tension with the federal government. 
With the PQ winning their first term in government in 1976, the province held a referendum on 
‘sovereignty-association’. The referendum, held in 1980, was ultimately defeated 60 percent 
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‘NO’ to 40 percent ‘YES’. And yet, with the referendum’s failure, the PQ was returned to office 
in 1981 with another majority government on a platform which put forth a host of pluralist 
ethnocultural diversity management proposals which did not seek to make integration, or 
immigration, a part of the sovereignty project in the hopes of increasing the likelihood of a 
‘YES’ vote the second time around. Although the 1976 platform proposed affirmationist 
integration measures, none of these measures sought to increase support for the sovereignty 
project and the immigration measures did not seek to promote the migration of those who were 
more sympathetic to the sovereignty project. At the same time, the PLQ’s proposals during the 
1976 and 1981 elections did not seek to facilitate integration into Canada instead of Quebec 
which would ensure a stronger bond with federalists and ultimately reduce the likelihood of 
voting ‘YES’. Instead the policies proposed sought to ensure integration into the Quebec nation’s 
linguistic and cultural majority.  
 Policy convergence and the dilution of political ideology was a result of the province’s 
refusal to sign the Charter and the ultimate defeat of the Meech Lake Accord which further 
solidified the parties acting as brokerage agents. Under these circumstances, integration policy 
was never proposed as a means to combat the federal government or to strengthen the 
sovereignist cause. However, the Meech Lake Accord did result in policy transfer from the 
federal government to the provincial government regarding the selection and integration of 
newcomers to Quebec. Brokerage politics best explains the policy convergences that occurred 
throughout the 1980s. Even under the auspices of a failed referendum and constitutional 
negotiation, the two parties were committed to what Carty and Cross call “electoral pragmatism” 
(Carty and Cross 2010, 194). Because brokerage politics is “about accommodating and 
integrating the social divisions that would otherwise provide the organizational basis for electoral 
division and enduring partisan alignments” (Carty 2015, 15), both parties had to propose 
pragmatic electoral platforms which brokered their ideological differences between them 
resulting in similar policies which sought to cobble the most number of voters together at the 
expense of political ideology.   
 With a failed referendum, hostility towards the federal government, and the failure to get 
Quebec’s signature on the Charter, one might have been expected that the PQ tried to weave 
sovereignty into immigration and integration as a means of ensuring their societal project; 
similarly, the PLQ could have proposed policies to negate the PQ by ensuring integration into a 
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pan-Canadian society. Yet this did not occur. What did occur were policy platforms which 
stressed the same common themes: the extension of citizenship, an open and pluralist nation, the 
state’s formal role in integration, rapprochement between the mainstream and newcomers, and 
the use of French as an integrative tool and not as a protectionist measure. In essence, the parties’ 
ability to broker allowed for them to appeal to the largest electorate possible. The reduction of 
ideology in favour of pluralist policies was a recognition that the median voter maintained this 
preference for pluralist policies and that crafting and proposing policies which may have been 
seen as too ideological risked turning voters away from more centrist and accommodating 
policies. Brokerage in the 1980s was a result of constitutional struggle and voter preference. The 
obfuscation of differences between the parties allowed them to converge towards similar policies 
in an era where significant difference could have been expected, but the parties instead opted to 
propose similar policies as a vote maximizing strategy in order to form political office. While the 
1980s was a period marked by continuity in terms of policy proposals, an election of brief 
divergence occurred in 1994 this time, not surprisingly, in the run up to the highly contested 
1995 referendum. 
 
The 1990s: The Referendum, Brief Divergence, and a Return to Convergence 
The PQ’s 1976 election platform and platforms throughout the 1980s did not demonstrate efforts 
to make ethnocultural diversity management part of the party’s desire for political independence 
for the province of Quebec. Instead the PQ opted to act as a brokerage agent with the PLQ by 
converging on similar policy proposals which were pluralist, open, accommodative, and did not 
advance the PQ’s predisposition for a sovereign Quebec. The 1994 election, however, broke this 
established path of brokerage politics as both the PQ and PLQ diverged from their past 
preference of non-affirmationist integrative policy proposals. The parties’ 1994 election 
platforms saw the PLQ propose an integrative contract, a ‘moral contract’, as a way to legislate 
and codify Quebec’s shared liberal values; the PQ proposed to weave their desire for a sovereign 
Quebec with their integration policies.  
 The combination of sovereignty with integration was a first for the PQ as the party had 
previously committed themselves to keeping the independence project and integration of 
newcomers separate as a means to accumulate the most votes possible. Although the 1976 
election was the last before the 1980 referendum, and the 1981 election immediately followed 
the referendum, the two parties continued to converge. But in the lead up to the 1995 
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referendum, the 1994 election was one where the two parties diverged from one another. Both 
parties diverged from their previous proposals and diverged from their electoral competitor 
which put noticeable policy difference between the two competitors. Unlike the 1976 election, 
the 1994 election demonstrated a clear delineation of ideology and of policy difference between 
the two parties. The application of brokerage politics to this election does not demonstrate policy 
convergence and mitigation of difference; but it can, in part, explain why temporary divergence 
occurred. Brodie and Jenson argue that brokerage parties “are constantly on the lookout for new 
supporters, there is, moreover, no basis for the systematic exclusion of any group if its interests 
can be incorporated into the definition of politics used by the party. Numbers, not principle, are 
the currency of electoral politics” (Brodie and Jenson 1996, 59). The PQ’s incorporation of 
integration policies with the sovereignty project was a recognition that the party was competing 
for the greatest number of votes possible—thus the inclusion of newcomers into the sovereignist 
cause was an explicit understanding that this may increase the likelihood of a ‘YES’ vote should 
their integrative strategy work. In a similar fashion, because brokerage parties “re-create 
coalitions at each election” (Clarke et al. 1996, 16), the party was attempting to reconfigure their 
integrative strategies to form a new voting coalition, one which was sympathetic to their societal 
project. 
 The policy differences between the PQ and PLQ during the 1994 election was a result of 
the PQ ultimately trying to ensure a greater likelihood that a YES vote would be successful. Yet 
with the failure of the 1995 referendum, and Parizeau’s now infamous comments, Lucien 
Bouchard came to head the PQ. The 1998 election saw both Jean Charest and Lucien Bouchard 
compete in their first general election as leaders of their respective parties. The election of 1998 
served as a return to convergence for the PQ and PLQ, although not in terms of concrete policy 
proposed. The parties converged in their lack of policy proposals, echoing Freeman’s (1995) 
assertion that political parties often implicitly agree to remove immigration issue from their 
electoral agendas.  
 Because brokerage parties “constantly compete for the same policy space and the same 
votes” (Clarke et al. 1996, 16) but are not beholden to past voting blocs they have identified and 
accumulated (Carty 2015, 15), the removal of ethnocultural diversity management proposals by 
both parties was an implicit recognition that political gain lied in their ability to not propose 
policies. Through proposing no policies, no differences emerged between the parties. But the 
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parties have nevertheless both agreed to broker through not proposing policies. It is not without 
reason to argue that the lack of policy proposals from the PQ were a result of Parizeau’s 
contentious comments the night of the referendum. Parizeau’s comments were frustrations of his 
policy’s failure at successfully ‘wooing’ newcomers to the sovereignty project. The contentious 
result of the 1995 referendum, combined with Parizeau’s comment, may have led to the PQ 
preferring a muted approach to ethnocultural diversity management where they could propose 
zero policies—along with the PLQ—which reduced the differences between the two parties’ 
proposals thus allowing the parties to re-emerge as brokerage agents. 
 The brief period of divergence in 1994 was accentuated through the parties’ ability to 
simultaneously propose an integration contract and the combination of sovereignty and 
integration for the first time with a handful of pluralist and open integrative policies which again 
demonstrated the established preference for the parties to be defenders of the nation and open 
and receptive to extending citizenship to newcomers. The brief period of divergence that 
occurred in 1994 eventually led back to convergence in 1998. This convergence continued into 
the 21st century with the 2003 election. But the post-2003 elections proved to be a political era 
that was marked with various contextual factors that unequivocally influenced the proposed 
integration policies, culminating in a period era shifting from divergence to convergence. 
 
The 2000s: Divergence and a new form of Brokerage 
The 2003 election continued the path of policy convergence which began again in 1998. Now, 
however, the PQ and PLQ were again proposing hosts of pluralist integrative policies. The PLQ, 
in fact, proposed their integration policies in its own proper document to be read in conjunction 
with the general election platform. The election of 2003 was an election in which both parties 
opted to recommit themselves to pluralist policies. This allowed the PQ to distance themselves 
from the 1994 platform, Parizeau’s comments, and the lack of policies in the 1998 platform. 
Similarly, the PLQ’s overwhelmingly pluralist document was competing against an equally 
pluralist document. Although the PLQ’s platform offered more concrete policies compared to the 
PQ’s recognitions, both parties effectively proposed similar proposals. Because brokerage parties 
do not see themselves as being “constrained by past support or by specific groups in society; 
indeed, [their] raison d’être is to act as a social and political broker capable of accommodating 
the competing interests of distinctive elements of the whole electorate” (Carty 2015, 15), the 
return to converging pluralist policies for the PQ was a repudiation of their attempt to court 
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newcomers to the sovereignist side. This convergence allowed both parties to reduce the 
ideological differences between them in favour of similar policies which stressed integration into 
the nation and the rapprochement of various cultural communities with the mainstream. The 
PQ’s ability to recommit to pluralist integration policies was also balanced with a policy 
proposal to “Affirm our Identity” through intensifying French language courses in milieus where 
immigrants were most common. In contrast to the 1998 platform, the PQ sought to re-engage 
with their prior preference for being a defender of the nation with pluralist integrative policies. In 
effect, this allowed the PQ to act as a broker “capable of accommodating the competing interests 
of distinctive elements of the whole electorate” (Carty 2015, 15). The convergence in the policies 
proposed led to the reduction in the importance of ideology in the policies proposed. The 
significant ideological differences between the two parties were nearly non-existent in their 
policy proposals which allowed them to seek the same voting bloc. 
 The 2003 election ultimately resulted in Jean Charest’s PLQ receiving a majority 
government. However, the convergence which occurred during the 1998 and 2003 elections 
came to an end in 2007. Held against the backdrop of a contentious public debate sparked by the 
town of Hérouxville’s “Standards” for immigrants, the 2007 election featured the ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ of immigrants. The 2007 election, however, saw a divergence between the PQ 
and PLQ as the PQ’s lack of policy proposals allowed for voters to see a significant difference 
between the policies. Thus voters had two clear alternatives. Those who remained committed to 
pluralist policies could vote for the PLQ, while those who wanted to affirm the Quebec nation 
through integration could now vote for Mario Dumont’s ADQ. As a whole, the ADQ’s populist 
and nation-affirming ideology permeated its electoral platform while the PLQ continued its 
proposals which sought to build and consolidate its coalition of newcomers and what they 
identified was the largest band of voters. Indeed, the PQ’s platform was one which was void of 
ideological inspiration in their ethnocultural diversity management proposals. The difference was 
that the PQ’s attempt to remove ethnocultural diversity management from the electoral agenda 
was not echoed by the PLQ and ADQ which created noticeable policy differences between all 
three parties where pluralism versus nation-affirming integration measures came to define the 
election. The result of the 2007 election was a short lived PLQ minority government which 
ultimately fell in 2008.  
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 The PLQ’s minority government in 2007 came to be defined by an impending and 
growing economic crisis and the 2008 election was framed by a growing international economic 
crisis. The PLQ’s 2008 platform did not employ two platforms like in years past, nor did it 
address issues of ethnocultural diversity management. Instead, their platform “L’économie 
d’abord” (“The Economy First”) sought to combat the economic recession. The choice of 
focusing on the relaunching of the economy and combatting economic decline came at the 
expense of immigration and integration. For the PLQ, the economy was more salient than was 
ethnocultural diversity management and their platform was a recognition that Quebecers were 
more concerned with the economy than they were with ethnocultural diversity management. In 
contrast, the PQ, now under the leadership of Pauline Marois, proposed a host of ethnocultural 
diversity management which demonstrated the ideological gap between the two parties. The 
2008 election, Marois’ first as leader, saw the PQ propose a host of nation-affirming and pluralist 
policies which included an integration contract and making the learning of French a ‘duty’ for 
newcomers. Ultimately, however, the shift that occurred under Marois’ leadership began in the 
2012 campaign. Yet with the two parties opting to not propose similar ethnocultural diversity 
management proposals in 2008, the PLQ’s identification of the economy as the most salient issue 
resulted in the party shifting their policy emphasis towards stabilizing the economy at the 
expense of ethnocultural diversity management, ultimately rewarding the party with a majority 
government. The 2008 election serves as one of divergence between the two parties as they not 
propose similar ethnocultural diversity management policies which, in effect, put ideological 
difference between the two parties. 
 The 2012 election saw Marois’ second election as leader of the PQ. The party proposed a 
host of nation-affirming policies which created a large difference between the PLQ and PQ, and 
between the PQ’s historically preferred policies of pluralist integration. Under Marois’ 
leadership, the most significant divergence and notable difference between the two parties 
emerged. Indeed, political leadership is an important aspect of brokerage politics. Because 
brokerage parties are “leader-centric” (Carty and Cross 2010, 194), the leader “is more than the 
public personification of the party message; the leader is the chief broker, the individual who 
determines both the style and consent of the accommodative package the party represents. 
Responsible for creating the message, brokerage leaders are not especially constrained by past 
policies or any natural limits on the party’s reach” (Carty 2013, 15). It is no coincidence that 
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Marois’ leadership coincided with a gradual shift from 2007 to 2008 and culminated in a 
wholesale change in the PQ’s integrative measures in 2012. What emerged from the 2012 
election were proposals by the PQ to affirm the Quebecois nation through the codification and 
legislation of the nation’s shared common values including a charter of ‘laïcité’.  
The PQ’s commitment to reaffirming the nation from the Other was contrasted with the 
PLQ’s silence on the issue—a clear indication that the parties were not converging concerning 
their policy proposals. But this is not to say that the parties were not brokering. The PQ’s 
policies were an indication, by the party, that the majority of Quebec voters lied in an electoral 
band which preferred these affirmationist and protectionist policies; the PLQ, instead, identified 
that the electorate was more concerned with issues other than ethnocultural diversity 
management, or they identified the band that the PQ was appealing to but the PLQ could not 
offer similar policies given that they risked losing their previous support. Where the 2012 
election began the PQ’s shift towards integration policies which were more nation-affirming and 
protectionist, the end result was a minority government for the PQ which demonstrated that the 
median voter was in part both concerned with the integration of newcomers as well as more 
pressing electoral issues.  
The 2014 election continued the PQ’s preference for these protectionist integrative 
measures and the PLQ, now under Couillard, continued their relative silence. The result of the 
2014 election, however, was a majority government for the Couillard Liberals. While the 2012 
and 2014 elections can be seen as periods of divergence, the Couillard Liberals, once in 
government, proposed Bill 62—a nation- affirming protectionist measure in a similar vein to the 
PQ’s Bill 60. While policy convergence stopped in 2012 and 2014, it continued post-2014 
through Bill 62. Bill 62 represents a policy shift for the Party who now distanced themselves 
from their past preference for pluralist integration instead proposing a policy which is more in-
line with the PQ’s identification that the median-voter lies in an ideological position which 
prefers policies which affirm and protect the nation. The brief periods of policy divergence 
between the two parties effectively returned back to convergence with the election of Philippe 
Couillard. A significant implication of bills 60 and 62 is that the parties have now shifted their 
preferences from pluralist cultural and fluid integration to strategies which seek the imposition of 
common values onto the newcomer. In a similar fashion, the parties are reducing their preference 
for the extension of the state to ethnocultural diversity management through the prioritization of 
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rapprochement and using the state as a means to facilitate integration. Instead the state is now to 
be an actor which ensures that moral and integrative contracts are enforced and agreed to upon 
arrival and these the morals and mores that newcomers possess are parallel to the values which 
account for the imagined community—that the imposed values are those which tie the nation 




The 38 years, 11 elections, and 22 platforms studied demonstrate that the proposal of 
ethnocultural diversity management policies by Quebec’s two main political parties are defined 
through periods of convergence with punctuated phases of brief divergence before ultimately 
returning to convergence once more. Early convergences stressed the importance of cultural 
pluralism—integrating into the linguistic and cultural majority while both parties stressed the 
importance of cultural diversity through financially and institutionally supporting cultural 
communities. Throughout the 1980s, the PQ and PLQ both proposed similar plural integrative 
policies before ultimately diverging from one another in 1994 with the earliest identification of 
the PQ’s sovereignist predisposition permeating their integrative measures. After 1994, however, 
the parties opted to remove ethnocultural diversity management from their proposals for the 
1998 election before ultimately converging once more towards plural policies in 2003. The 
parties diverged during the 2007 election—a highly contentious period defined through public 
debates concerning reasonable accommodation and the brief rise of a third party in Quebec—and 
2008 came to place Quebec on a new political path.  
 This work intended to study and answer two research questions. The first question was 
extended from work of Béland and Lecours (2008): Does nationalism affect immigration and 
integration policy proposals and if so, to what extent? The second question was derived from the 
literature on party competition: Does party competition affect immigration and integration policy 
proposals and if so, to what extent? These research questions were answered by employing a 
critical document analysis of election platforms in order to determine how each party 
conceptualized their ethnocultural diversity management proposals and to determine whether, 
first, there was convergence and, if there was convergence, how these similarities manifested 
themselves, how did the proposals conceive of the nation, immigration, integration, and the 
means they proposed to encourage, or discourage, these areas. Furthermore, inaugural addresses 
were used to demonstrate the level of importance, or non-importance, the parties gave to their 
immigration and integration proposals and to further frame each party’s conceptualization of 
ethnocultural diversity management policies outside of the party’s written word within their 
electoral platforms. 
 The result of this study determined that nationalism does indeed affect immigration and 
integration policy proposals. With nationalism being a political reality in Quebec, both the PQ 
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and PLQ actively engaged with affirmationist policy proposals—be it through proposing policies 
which sought greater policy autonomy or proposing ethnocultural diversity management 
proposals which aimed to protect the Quebec nation. Even in the non-exclusive non-protectionist 
perspective, the manifestations of nationalism are apparent. Nationalism does not necessarily 
equate to being exclusive, restrictive, xenophobic, nor racist. Within a substate nation, it may be 
likely that nationalist sentiments manifest themselves through policies and sentiments which 
seek to extend the concept of the nation to the newcomer and thus are wholly pluralist, open, and 
democratic. This form of nationalism, a civic nationalism which stresses citizenship for all 
citizens and does not impose a uniform identity onto newcomers nor does it seek to limit cultural 
differences in the same way that Jacobin citizenship regimes operate, were the preferred policy 
proposals espoused by both the PQ and PLQ over time.  
For most of the observed time period, for the PQ 1976-1994; 1998-2007, and the PLQ, 
1976-2007, the parties favoured cultural integrative measured which openly supported—both 
institutionally and financially—promoted, and recognized the value-added benefits that other 
cultures brought to Quebec society and both parties did not close off democratic participation nor 
citizenship within the nation. But for a brief period of divergence in 1994, and 2008 onward, the 
PQ and PLQ both either proposed these pluralist policies or effectively acted to remove 
ethnocultural diversity management proposals from the electoral agenda in order to limit on-
paper discussion of the topic within their electoral platforms. Nationalism, then, was of 
tremendous importance to both parties but it was the civic conception of the nation that was 
manifested through their policy proposals. In answering the second research question, electoral 
competition was incredibly important in how the parties conceptualized their ethnocultural 
diversity management. By brokering towards similar policies in a two-party system, the parties 
presented similar policies in order to appear attractive to the highest amount of voters as 
possible. Electoral competition resulted in both parties reducing their ideologies’ influence on 
ethnocultural diversity management in order to increase their chances of seizing the levers of 
government. 
 There are, of course, limitations associated with this study. First, a significant limitation 
of document analysis and content analysis concerns contextual identification and bias. While the 
coding process has been justified, and the bias reduced through the affirmationist typology, the 
selection and determination of what constitutes ‘pluralist’, ‘affirmationist’, or ‘protectionist’ is 
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selective on the part of the researcher and open to debate and rejection by others doing the same 
research. Second, while the study of election platforms are an invaluable tool to determine 
shifting policies overtime, the proposed measures were not further explored to see whether they 
were effectively implemented by the party who formed government. As a result, it remains 
unclear whether these policies remained undelivered promises or solely as electoral promises 
which served as enticements for votes. Regardless, it is the specific policy proposals observed 
within the documents which account for brokerage politics. Third, there were ethnocultural 
diversity management proposals which were put forth within electoral platforms which were 
non-codifiable. While every attempt was made to include these policies within the analysis, they 
nevertheless were not included in the count of policies as they were neither non-plural or non-
affirmationist and thus do not tell the full story of the proposed policies. As a whole, identifying 
nuance and subtlety in ethnocultural diversity management policy proposals is not as simple as 
dividing them into a binary distinction of ‘pluralist’ and ‘non-pluralist’. 
 The result of this study creates exciting possibilities for future research. Included in these 
possibilities is extending this study over the next election cycle, and cycles, to observe whether 
the convergence which took place by the PLQ with Bill 62 will be maintained, or whether the 
Party will instead go back to their previous ethnocultural diversity management policies. 
Similarly, future study should look at the policies proposed by the PQ in the face of Pierre Karl 
Péladeau’s resignation (CBC 2016). It remains to be determined as to whether the observed 
divergence that occurred under the Marois-Charest competitive era will continue over future 
election cycles, or whether bills such as Bill 60 and Bill 62 have cemented a new path for the PQ 
and PLQ to continue on, a path which has fundamentally altered the previously established 
preference for plural ethnocultural diversity management proposals. Not only should leadership, 
and leadership changes, and the policies proposed in the National Assembly be examined, but so 
too should the policies proposed. Extending the study of electoral platforms will provide insight 
into the continued shifts, convergences, and divergences presented by each party. Thus this will 
continue to elucidate the fundamental differences between the parties’ conceptions of 
immigration and integration—that is, if a difference exists at all—and whether or not these 
parties continue to actively engage public debate concerning ethnocultural diversity management 
or whether they opt to remove this policy area from their electoral agenda altogether. 
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 The result of this research demonstrates four things. First, over time, the PQ and PLQ 
have proposed similar ethnocultural diversity management proposals which have equally stressed 
a fluid integration into the linguistic and cultural majority which emphasized difference, cultural 
tradition, and proposed policies which fostered these differences while expecting integration to 
be practiced by both the settled and the settling. Second, a brief period of divergence occurred 
under the Charest Liberals and Marois PQ. Yet this divergence was still met with similar policy 
proposals concerning immigration. Third, it is a facile and non-substantive argument for 
individuals to claim that the PQ is anymore exclusionary, racist, and ethnic than is the PLQ. In 
fact, through careful examination of both parties’ policy proposals from 1976-2014, both parties 
have prioritized open and pluralist policies. Fourth, both nationalism and electoral competition 
are of pivotal importance for the proposed policies. While it is not determined as to which one is 
more important than the other, the nationalist aspects remain clear given that both parties 
promote policies which sought to protect the Quebec nation, language, and culture. The proposal 
of these protectionist and pluralist policies resulted in the parties promising similar policies as an 
attempt to broker their ideology to the voting public. This has a twofold effect. First, it allows the 
PQ and PLQ to be both pluralist and nationalist as a means of solidifying their own core vote all 
the while remaining a possibility for newcomers. Second, this brokering results in policies which 
are favoured by the public, thus this is where the median voter lies, and as a result the parties can 
propose policies which appeal to the broadest electorate possible by blurring the lines between 
these parties’ difference in this one specific micro-policy area. 
 Quebec is, and will continue to be, a fascinating area of study. As a nation, per Benedict 
Anderson (2006), Quebec embodies the ‘imagined community’. Forged through a common bond 
of language and culture, many of the province’s residents feel connected to each other through a 
common past and collective future. Yet this common past and collective future has not 
manifested itself in an ethnic form of citizenship which restricted access to the nation for those 
who were non-White-Francophone-Catholic Quebecers. Even with the predominance of plural 
ethnocultural diversity management policy proposals, Quebec remains in a precarious situation. 
The province must decide whether the protection of the nation must come at the expense of 
cultural difference; or whether the nation can be protected through the promotion of this cultural 
difference as a means of strengthening the province as a whole.  
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However, the proposal of two similarly restrictive and exclusive legislative bills 
pertaining to integration poses a significant challenge to a province which requires immigrants 
both for economic and demographic gains. The province is undertaking a delicate balancing act 
of prioritizing economic immigration while offering exclusive integration policies in parallel. 
Where immigration is a necessity, so too is protecting the nation from perceived illiberal values. 
The protection of the Quebec nation, coupled with the need for immigration creates a 
complicated paradox that the province needs to address and the province must determine how to 
protect these common values while remaining open and inclusive in order to remain an attractive 
land for newcomers to settle. Remaining on the path that has been created during the Marois-
Charest competitive era, indeed converging towards the protectionist policies proposed by the 
PQ, limited the province’s ability to be seen as a welcoming and accommodating province—
instead giving the perspective that Quebec’s cultural insecurities manifest themselves through 
restrictive policies concerning the very newcomers that the province needs for its economic and 
demographic benefit. 
 Over the course of the province’s history, Quebec has actively sought to extend the 
boarders of citizenship to those that comprise the changing face of Quebec’s population. Policy-
makers have traditionally been in a precarious situation of attempting to facilitate the 
immigration and integration of newcomers—those bringing with them different cultural values, 
histories, traditions, and languages—while ensuring their integration into the linguistic majority 
in order to make certain that the Francophone fact, language, and culture does not disappear in an 
increasingly globalized world. From 1976-2007, both the PQ and PLQ favoured proposing plural 
ethnocultural diversity management policies and with these proposals, and their eventual 
implementations, the protection of the French fact, language, and culture could be done through 
facilitating access to the French language and ensuring participation within the host society while 
reducing the totality of the integration burden from the newcomer. Integration was to be done by 
the newcomer but was to be made easier by non-immigrant Quebecers, through dialogue, 
cultural events, and by fostering this difference as a means of developing cultural understanding 
between the settling and the settled. The proposal of plural policies does not inherently increase 
the likelihood that Quebec’s cultural uniqueness will become assimilated into the Anglophone 
North American hegemony. There is no reason to believe that promoting pluralist policies will 
lead to the erosion of Quebec’s culture—the nation’s culture has persisted, indeed thrived, in 
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parallel with pluralist policies. Likewise, restrictive ethnocultural diversity management policies 
do not concretize or solidify Quebec’s common values and cultural uniqueness any more than do 
plural policies. The fundamental strength of the Quebec nation comes in numbers. Eschewing 
restrictive policies which seek to limit cultural difference in favour of pluralist policies which 
respect, promote, and support cultural differences is a more conducive way of incorporating 
newcomers into the nation and to ensure that the boundaries which limit citizenship are 
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